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Preface
This book is the product of research collaboration between The Australian 
National University and Dhurakij Pundit University. It brings together new 
work—from a conference held in 2008 in Bangkok—on higher education 
financing by international experts on the issue from around East Asia.
The research collaboration between the ANU and DPU was initiated in August 
2007 and involves biannual conferences with broad international participation 
and research and training exchanges. It aims to build capacity in the region 
through collaborative research and training and to share experience in the 
important areas of higher education financing and loans systems. It will 
encompass other key economic policy issues over time.
This volume addresses important issues to do with access to higher education and 
different models of its financing, and the analysis spans the East Asian region. It 
is enriched by diverse perspectives from vastly different starting points and by 
the historical and institutional settings in the East Asian region. The issues are 
set out in the context of the value of higher education in economic development 
and how it contributes to the capacities to adopt and adapt to new technologies 
and undertake institutional innovation. The established and well-functioning 
higher education loan and financing systems, such as those in Australia, and 
the experience of different systems tried—both in East Asia and in the United 
States—are brought to bear in this volume. 
The ongoing research collaboration is led by Bruce Chapman and Peter Drysdale 
at the Australian end and Boonserm Weesakul in Thailand. We are grateful to 
Boonserm and his colleagues at DPU in Bangkok who were responsible for hosting 
the conference that reviewed the original research and to Peter Drysdale at the 
ANU for coordinating the program of research and the conference organisation. 
Our gratitude is also extended to the DPU management team including Charles 
Newton and especially Somsri Lathapipat, without whom this collaboration 
would not be possible. 
The conference drew on the network and administrative work of the East 
Asian Bureau of Economic Research (EABER) and we are grateful to the 
member institutes and their researchers who contributed to the conference. 
The conference was made possible with the professional administrative input 
and expertise of Marilyn Popp, Aaron Batten, Alisa Maksamphan and Paitoon 
Sinralat. 
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We, and the EABER team, are especially grateful to all the contributors—the 
paper writers, discussants and referees—who collaborated so enthusiastically 
to bring this research to publication. Our debt to the authors in the volume 
is obvious. Sippanondha, Norman LaRocque, Aniceto Orbeta and Rangsit 
Sarachiti made substantial contributions to the chapters in this volume with 
their clarification of issues and refinement of ideas at the conference and 
in the process of preparation of the papers for publication. In addition, the 
volume benefited greatly from the background work and training conducted 
in Thailand and Australia by Piruna Polsiri, Rangsit Sarachitti and Thitima 
Sitthipongpanich. Finally, our special thanks to Kiatanantha Lounkaew and Dr 
Dilaka Lathapipat, who provided extremely valuable input on the training and 
intellectual aspects critical to the conference. 
We are grateful to the Economics of Education Review Journal published by 
Elsevier that gave us permission to produce earlier versions of the three papers 
on Thailand as Chapters in this volume. The three papers were published in 
Volume 29, Issue 5, pages 685-721 (October 2010) of the Journal as: Bruce 
Chapman, Kiatanantha Lounkaew, Piruna Polsiri, Rangsit Sarachitti, Thitima 
Sitthipongpanich, Thailand’s Student Loans Fund: Interest rate subsidies and 
repayment burdens; Bruce Chapman, Kiatanantha Lounkaew, Income contingent 
student loans for Thailand: Alternatives compared; and Somkiat Tangkitvanich, 
Areeya Manasboonphempool, Evaluating the Student Loan Fund of Thailand.
We are indebted to Kay Dancey and Jennifer Sheehan at CAP Cartography–GIS 
Services for their professional work on the charts. Duncan Beard and Lorena 
Kanellopoulos at ANU E Press did a fantastic job and we are very grateful for 
their patience with us throughout the process. 
We would also like to thank Denis Cairney for excellent editorial assistance. 




1. Issues and Overview
Shiro Armstrong and Aaron Batten 
Crawford School of Economics and Government, 
The Australian National University
Human capital plays a key role in the development of all economies. A decade 
ago, discussions of education and development tended to be categorised by 
focusing on the importance of primary and secondary services. For example, 
it was thought more important to teach large amounts of people to read than to 
teach a small cadre liberal arts and high-level sciences. In an egalitarian sense, 
support for universities was seen as biased against poorer elements of society. 
These arguments have a degree of merit and, certainly, primary and secondary 
education are both important elements of the sector—not least because they feed 
directly into the quality of higher levels of education. But the lessons of recent 
economic history also highlight both the importance of strong higher educational 
outcomes obtained through universities and the need for delivering substantial 
economic support. The growth of Europe and the United States in particular can 
be attributed largely to the success of their universities. These knowledge-based 
economies require high levels of human capital, which influences a large number 
of economic outcomes and boosts long-term productivity. The current world 
economy is going to be increasingly dominated by knowledge-based industries 
over the coming decades. Agricultural, industrial and technical revolutions 
will all give way to increases in knowledge. Manufactures will continue to be 
displaced by services, and salary differences between knowledge-based and 
non-knowledge-based industries will continue to rise. The widening of these 
economic differentials highlights the importance of investing in knowledge and 
getting the fundamentals of each country’s higher education sector right. 
These developments are also placing increasing pressure on governments across 
the globe as citizens increase their demand for higher levels of human capital so 
that they can benefit from the growing knowledge-based economy. In addition, 
the constraints on investment in higher education within the region are in 
nearly all cases large. As such, the benefits must be weighed carefully against 
the large costs associated with a quality higher education sector—particularly 
in developing countries with tight fiscal constraints.
At present, the United States clearly dominates the university sector, and 
Lawrence Summers in Chapter 2 offers some important insights into how the 
sector should be run. First, the US university sector is intensely competitive—
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as universities compete for the best students, faculty and rankings. This can 
sometimes be destructive but the fact of brutal competition forces a discipline 
and excellence that are present in US universities and not present in many 
other countries. Too often countries try too carefully to plan and manage their 
university sector, which undermines the sector’s ability to drive for excellence. 
The second element is a governance model that maintains ‘diamonds’. Judgments 
about the quality of staff and students are best made by experts in the field, but 
this can often lead to the self-perpetuation of ideas. It is difficult, for example, 
for incumbents to shut down mediocre activities and support ideas that diverge 
from their own. The challenge therefore is to draw on experts for identifying 
resources but to also maintain diversity. 
The third great strength of the US system is its reliance on the private sector. The 
greatest universities are not public institutions, as the lion’s share of resources 
comes from successful alumni. This mixture between the public and the private 
sector is a great stimulus to innovation within the university sector. Asia has 
the potential to build on these US lessons. As its wealth grows, so too does it 
ability to build universities that challenge the dominance of US universities and 
enhance the long-term development prospects of the region. 
Ultimately, financing higher education systems must be focused on providing 
wide-scale access to higher education that is based on merit rather than 
economic status. Substantial efforts are required to attract the best students 
regardless of their life circumstances. This can act to help transform a society. 
Higher education is, however, about much more than simply teaching students 
technical skills. A quality higher education system must also be able to train 
students to question traditional dogma and assess views based on the strength 
of the argument rather than the person who is delivering it or what their 
status is in society. Fostering this type of environment, which challenges the 
current status quo, is a key role for quality universities as it promotes long-term 
improvements in entrepreneurship and productivity. 
Higher education financing systems should thus aim to improve all aspects 
of higher education delivery. In all countries, this should include increasing 
both the quality and the quantity of access, helping to smooth consumption 
over time for consumers of higher education, and perhaps, most importantly, to 
widen access to those who are disadvantaged. 
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The Economics of Higher Education and its 
Financing Arrangements
Economic theory offers a number of lessons for a system that seeks to strengthen 
the quality of higher education while simultaneously promoting access. At 
present, access to higher education within East Asia is growing swiftly. This is a 
positive development. The expansion of access to higher education is, however, 
occurring largely through the expansion of the private sector. This is creating a 
number of challenges to the future dynamism of the sector. For example, private 
financing might preclude the enrolment of deserving students who do not have 
the ability to pay, and often evokes resentment among students who do. In 
Chapter 3, Nicholas Barr sets out the principles—from theory and practice—by 
which policy makers can make decisions regarding access to higher education 
and the growth of private and public institutions and address challenges of 
equity.
The economic case for government subsidies in the higher education sector is 
based largely on the large positive externalities involved in higher education. 
Market failure occurs because private-sector lending to finance tuition and 
prospective students’ smooth consumption are unreliable, as banks are unable to 
generate collateral on human capital. This leads to suboptimal rates of borrowing 
and lending and, in the absence of government intervention, suboptimal levels 
of investment in higher education. 
There are, however, a number of principles that must be incorporated into the 
system if government intervention into the higher education sector is to be 
effective at meeting its objectives. Barr gives lessons for policy design from 
economic theory combined with operational experiences. The first of these is 
that competition within all areas of the sector is highly beneficial, as the US case 
highlights. As in any market, competition benefits consumers when consumers 
are well informed. Within the higher education sector, the assumption of a 
well-informed consumer generally holds such that student choices, though not 
necessarily perfect, are better than those of central planners. The competition 
this creates encourages flexible institutional structures within the higher 
education sector and promotes adaptability to the prevailing economic and 
institutional environment. It is therefore important to promote competition 
and to better inform consumers where necessary so that these two dynamics 
reinforce each other. 
Second, graduates should contribute to the cost of their degree so as to offer an 
allocative mechanism within the sector. Whilst higher education has large social 
benefits—albeit hard to quantify—it also has significant private benefits. Thus, it is 
both efficient and equitable that the graduate shares in the cost of higher education. 
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But sharing costs should not be vested with spurious accuracy, as it is impossible 
to measure the positive externalities generated through education systems. 
Determining the optimal trade-off between public and private financing of 
an individual’s higher education thus should be determined not by scientific 
quantification but rather in relation to a country’s overall fiscal envelope and the 
incumbent political and social values. Third, as mentioned, conventional loans 
are the wrong model for investment in human capital. They lead to inefficiently 
low borrowing and lending. They are also inequitable, in that these efficiency 
problems impact most on people from poor backgrounds, and minorities, who 
might be less well informed and therefore less prepared to risk a loan, if able to 
obtain one. 
These principles offer a number of lessons for the role of government in designing 
optimal financing strategies for higher education. The first is that there is 
sufficient cause for the provision of taxpayer support for higher education. 
The second is that the government must regulate the system, both through a 
maximum level of fees and by ensuring that there is effective quality assurance 
(the role of government is to make sure that quality assurance happens, not 
necessarily to provide the service itself). Third is that government can play a 
role in allocating incentives towards the needs of the economy—for example, 
providing larger subsidies for certain subjects. Last, the government should be 
focused on policies that at all times seek to widen participation and access to the 
higher education sector for all segments of society. 
Governments are thus faced with a range of possibilities for how to finance 
higher education support schemes. The first is a mortage-type bank-loan system 
(as used in Canada, the United States and the Student Loans Fund in Thailand). 
This helps to solve the default problem for the lender as the government enters 
the market to guarantee the loan and it provides finance simply and easily. But 
there are costs. These include the large expenses for taxpayers when people 
default, and the credit of government often means that banks are less likely 
to make sure people pay their debt. Also, government is forced in to a strict 
rationing system to try to maintain costs. Because repayments are based on time, 
those who enter the workforce in a low-paying job or who have poor labour-
market outcomes at some stage will face a large repayment hardship, which 
could force default. There is also a credit risk for default for the students as it 
can ruin their credit rating and ability to finance into the future. 
An increasingly popular option is the adoption of income-contingent loan 
schemes. Under this system, repayment is calculated as a portion of the graduate’s 
(not student’s) income in the future if and only if that graduate is earning over 
a threshold. This helps to fix the student default problem and lowers repayment 
hardships if the student enters a period of poor labour-market outcomes. These 
systems also act to smooth consumption over a person’s life, as people pay more 
as their income goes up and less at times when income is low. 
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In terms of collection methods, ideally, income-contingent repayments should 
be collected alongside income tax or social security contributions on the basis 
of a person’s current earnings. Thus, repayments instantly and accurately reflect 
changes in a person’s economic circumstances. This approach is, however, 
administratively demanding. A different approach—less optimal in policy 
terms, but less demanding administratively and hence perhaps more realistic 
in some countries—is to base a person’s loan repayments on his or her last 
completed tax return. It is also important to recognise that the ideal recovery 
rate for loans need not necessarily be 100 per cent as these loans can also offer 
insurance against low lifetime earnings. In fact, there have been no cases where 
a country’s income-contingent loan scheme collects 100 per cent repayments, 
and that is by design, as it is not optimal to have 100 per cent repayments. 
Income-contingent loan schemes do, however, have a number of risks. For 
instance, students can avoid repayment by not earning enough income despite 
living in high-income households, or in some cases leaving the country. Also, 
in developing countries in particular, postgraduate incomes are often not high 
enough to have sufficient rates of repayment over the life of the scheme. 
Of course, the overarching issue with income-contingent loan schemes relates to 
implementation. Regional and global experiences suggest that this issue has been 
the key cause of failure in many income-contingent loan schemes. These lessons 
must, for example, be carefully applied to the unique institutional and historical 
environment that categorises each East Asian economy. In particular, they must 
be designed in reference to the administrative capacity of the relevant country. 
For example, a country should not consider starting a loan scheme without a 
reliable method of identifying individuals and the capacity to maintain records 
of amounts borrowed, cumulative borrowing and interest charges, and the value 
of each person’s repayments. 
The strength of income-contingent loan schemes is that they provide support 
and allow for variation in outcomes of students and do not place an excessively 
high burden on their ability to repay in the event of a poor outcome at the 
end of their higher education. These schemes are, however, notoriously difficult 
to get right and the world and region are littered with examples of failed 
income-contingent loan schemes. This highlights the importance of carefully 
assessing the validity and details of implementing such schemes before they are 
carried out. Means-tested scholarships have, for example, proven very difficult 
to administer due to the difficulty of assessing the ability to pay sometimes 
exorbitant administrative costs, corruption and high rates of default. Indeed, 
the failure of systems in the Philippines and Thailand highlights these risks to 
the development of income-contingent loans that do not take into account the 
administrative limitations of their incumbent institutional environment. 
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Once this is possible, the economics clearly points to the optimality of income-
contingent loan schemes. It is important to recognise, however, that a pure focus 
on higher education financing systems as a means of improving human-capital 
outcomes understates the importance of undertaking reforms that strengthen 
the fiscal arrangements for the bureaucracy as a whole. There is, for example, a 
strong interdependence between aggregate fiscal policy, expenditure processes 
and the ability of government to provide optimal support for higher education. 
A further issue is that in some countries it will be optimal to have student 
grants from government operating in combination with income-contingent 
loans. A 100 per cent repayment rate for an income-contingent loan scheme as 
a whole is effectively a commercial loan with no subsidy from the government. 
The lower the repayment rate of an income-contingent loan scheme, the closer 
it becomes to a grant or direct wealth transfer. Therefore, countries with very 
low repayment rates have the option of simply giving grant transfers instead of 
running a poorly performing and costly income-contingent loan scheme. There 
is also scope for a combination of grants and income-contingent loans. 
Before making a decision about which type of scheme is most suitable, it is 
necessary to take into account each country’s institutional setting and the 
contexts of each market for implementation and ongoing success of any financing 
regime. Collection is an important aspect, with not all countries able to collect 
repayments effectively. Policy design that exceeds a country’s implementation 
capacity is not appropriate policy. 
It is also important to recognise that policy regimes of allowing foreign institutions 
into countries and the financing schemes of higher education institutions are 
intertwined. Questions of whether governments should subsidise foreign-
owned institutions, extend financing schemes to students of these institutions, 
and how these should be treated relative to domestic private-sector institutions 
are all complex issues that have not been adequately addressed in countries in 
the region yet. 
Regional Experiences 
Countries across the East Asian region have adopted a wide variety of approaches 
to financing their higher education sectors. There has also been a wide variety 
in both the successes and the failures of these approaches, which can offer a 
number of important lessons for the design of future strategies in the region 
and more broadly. In Chapter 4, Anthony R. Welch examines the rise of private 
higher education institutions and the implications for affordability and access 
in South-East Asia. 
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The regional experiences are especially important in the context of education 
becoming a much more widely traded and internationally delivered service, 
with the movement across borders of students, academics and even institutions.
Australia
The introduction of the Australian Higher Education Contribution Scheme 
(HECS) in 1989 has been highly successful. HECS incorporates an income-
contingent loan for the payment of tuition through the income tax system, and 
was the first time that such an approach to student financing had been used 
internationally. A major issue for the adoption of HECS was the potential for 
the scheme to improve the access of the disadvantaged to Australian higher 
education, as private-sector lenders provide inefficient levels of loans given the 
uncertainty surrounding investments in human capital. 
The intellectual architect of HECS, Bruce Chapman, explains the genesis and 
draws out the particular features of the Australian system in Chapter 5. There 
is evidence, as Chapman shows, to suggest that HECS has been associated with 
significant increases in the size of the higher education system and has proved 
to be administratively inexpensive. A major benefit of income-contingent 
loans in Australia is with respect to consumption smoothing for borrowers. For 
example, compared with the repayment of a similar bank loan, the burden of 
an income-contingent loan for students, as measured by the proportion of a 
graduate’s income that is required to service the debt, can be far less than is 
the case for a bank loan. In addition, even though HECS means that students 
pay for a portion of their higher education—which had previously been free—
extensive research into the implications of the scheme for the access of the poor 
to universities reveals that there have been no discernible effects. The second 
major impact of the HECS system is that for graduates receiving low incomes 
for some part of their lives there is considerable potential for the system to 
provide consumption smoothing. For situations in which former students 
experience very low incomes, the repayment of normal loans results in very high 
proportions of incomes being obliged to pay debt, and thus being unavailable 
for consumption. HECS has no such implication, and this is a critical benefit of 
an income-contingent loan.
Japan
In Chapter 6, Motohisa Kaneko takes a detailed look at higher education funding 
in Japan. Japan has been less successful than some places in the design and 
implementation of its higher education financing schemes despite undergoing 
radical changes over the past decade. For example, the Law for Incorporation 
of National University was enacted in 2004, transforming the legal status of the 
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national universities as a kind of governmental facility to an independent legal 
entity. Private institutions have experienced a radical change in governmental 
subsidies, with their weight shifted from the mandatory current-cost subsidy 
to discretionary subsidies. In 2007, the current-cost subsidy fell from the 
previous year for the first time in 30 years. The government also revised the 
Private School Law to enhance accountability in governance and financing of 
private institutions. Yet, reforms are incomplete and the future institutional 
arrangements of the sector are uncertain. 
There have been persistent demands for greater government expenditure on 
higher education, and one of the grounds for the argument was the low standing 
of Japan in international comparisons. On the other hand, there have been strong 
criticisms of this argument from the Ministry of Finance and various economic 
advisory committees. It is claimed that the low level of government expenditure 
does not constitute the main issue; after all, the government expenditure 
is financed by tax revenues—one of the main sources of which is taxes on 
individuals. Japan’s higher education tends to be financed through direct 
contribution from households, not through tax and government expenditure. 
Whether this is optimal in Japan’s case is part of an ongoing debate, and the 
international and regional experiences have not been brought to bear. 
Japanese higher education is also faced with the effects of demographic 
change, a shrinking population and declining absolute enrolments. The direct 
consequence of the shrinking market will be the prospect of institutional 
closure. Some institutions are already facing a decline in applicants, and in a 
number of cases the freshman class has failed to fill the legal sitting capacity. 
The situation will be further aggravated over the next decade. Despite the large 
number of institutions in the high and medium-risk groups, there have been 
very few cases of closure for directly fiscal reasons. Many institutions appear 
to have sizeable margins in their current revenue over costs. Some of them have 
succeeded in slashing costs by either decreasing the number of employees or 
reducing wage levels. Nonetheless, the prospect of closure is definitely looming. 
Kaneko makes clear that after a half-century of robust expansion, higher 
education in Japan is clearly at a crossroad. In order to respond to the new 
challenges, it has to undergo a significant transformation in which changes in 
financing assume the critical role. The policy management of a transition to fewer 
students has important implications for the Japanese higher education sector. 
Opening up further to international trade in education services is another issue 
that will have to be debated in addition to the improvements in the financial 
accessibility for prospective students. All of these developments involve a 
number of issues over which there are significant differences of opinion. In 
this sense, Japanese society is struggling to find a definite direction for higher 
education finance towards the future. 
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China 
The Chinese higher education sector has also been undergoing rapid 
transformation in recent years as the economy increasingly integrates itself into 
the global knowledge economy. The rapidly growing economy, increasing job 
opportunities and the demands of a modern society have resulted in large unmet 
student demand for financial assistance to attend higher education institutions 
in China—as measured by the gap between loan applications and approvals 
in the adoption of the country’s student loan policy in 2004. In addition, the 
coverage of the financial assistance is very small across the sector and has 
declined in recent years. In total, the student loan coverage rate increased from 
2.7 per cent of total students in 2004 to 6.6 per cent in 2005 but then dropped 
again, to 4.6 per cent, in 2006. 
The scale and pace of growth of the Chinese higher education sector are 
unprecedented and present policy makers with some acute challenges. Wei 
Jianguo and Wang Rong outline the problems and challenges in Chapter 7. 
At present, there are two major challenges to improving the effectiveness and 
size of the Chinese education sector. The first step is in defining the financial 
responsibilities of government for its elite and non-elite institutions. The second 
regards efforts that need to be made in the future to strengthen and improve 
the existing public higher education system or enhance the role of the non-
public sector. Central to both of these challenges is improving China’s student 
financial-aid system so that it can both channel the best students into the sector 
in a non-discriminatory way and provide adequate resources for the sector to 
remain competitive and meet the labour-market demands of the economy. 
The State Council implemented a new policy for student financial aid in 2007. 
This policy allocated $7.1 billion in earmarked funds annually to student 
financial aid (including aid for students in vocational middle schools). This has 
included a dramatic increase in the coverage of the National Scholarship Program 
to approximately 20 per cent of all students in the sector at approximately 
RMB2000 per recipient per annum.
In addition, in order to promote the development of the student loan program, 
the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Finance, the People’s Bank of China 
and the China Banking Regulatory Commission mandated a new policy for the 
student loan program in June 2004. This new policy both extended the repayment 
period of the loan, reducing repayment hardships, and allowed recipients to 
receive loan waivers if they voluntarily chose to work in less-developed regions 
or less-attractive professions for a set time after graduation. The new policy also 
reformed the way to identify banks that are eligible to provide student loans 
using bidding and implementing collaboration between the banks and higher 
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education institutions to improve the competitiveness of the sector. Finally, it 
introduced a risk compensation fund, whereby the government and the higher 
education institution each pays 50 per cent of the fund to commercial banks.
The Chinese higher education sector still, however, faces a number of significant 
challenges in addressing the country’s shortage of highly skilled labour, which 
can drive entrepreneurship and productivity into the future. As is the case 
in other countries, in China, the governance and accountability of the sector 
remain as the core determinants of whether the sector can adequately meet the 
needs of the country’s rapidly growing economy. The government has made 
some significant moves towards decentralising the sector. For instance, since 
1998, about 200 regular higher education institutions that used to belong to 
central ministries and agencies have been transferred to the jurisdiction of 
local governments. This has had a large impact, with the proportion of college 
enrolment in centrally controlled higher education institutions dropping from 
20 per cent in 2000 to 10 per cent in 2006. There is, however, little evidence 
to suggest that locally run institutions perform any better or are more efficient 
than centrally controlled ones. Ultimately, setting up appropriate institutional 
structures that ensure that the sector remains accountable to the people it 
serves and adaptable to the changing demands of a rapidly growing economy 
will prove to be the biggest determinant of China’s ability to meet its higher 
education needs. 
Indonesia 
Teguh Yudo Wicaksono and Deni Friawan outline in Chapter 8 the challenges 
the Indonesian higher education sector faces. Indonesian higher education 
institutions have expanded rapidly in the post-independence era (since 1945). 
In more recent decades, participation rates in higher education have, however, 
tended to stagnate. Access to tertiary education is also very unequal. In 2006, 
for example, the participation rate of students from the lowest 40 per cent 
income group was only 2.67 per cent, compared with about 33.9 per cent for 
the richest 20 per cent. In part, this is a result of a large share of the cost of 
higher education still being borne by parents and students as well as the flow-
on effects from low participation rates in secondary education. Notably, the 
percentage of national education expenditure to gross domestic product (GDP) 
increased from 2.4 per cent in 2001 to 3.8 per cent in 2007, but this is still well 
below other countries in the region such as Malaysia (8.1 per cent) and Thailand 
(4.6 per cent). In addition, tertiary education received only less than 10 per cent 
of the total education budget—lower than primary education (75 per cent) and 
secondary education (15 per cent). 
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In large part, the stagnation of access to higher education access stems from a 
number of failed attempts at financing arrangements in the sector. In the 1980s, 
student loans were implemented under the so-called ‘Kredit Mahasiswa Indonesia’ 
(KMI; Indonesian Student Loan) scheme, which provided government-backed 
loans to selected disadvantaged groups. After a few years, however, default rates 
reached up to 95 per cent and this scheme began to place an excessively high 
burden on government resources and was subsequently cancelled. This failure 
was caused largely by the moral hazard of the borrowers, a poor administration 
system and a lack of strong political support to impose more effective collection 
standards on students. 
More recently, the government has sought to improve the funding of the sector 
by increasing resources for direct means-assessed scholarship payments—
particularly to private higher education institutions, although public institutions 
are still the major beneficiaries. Even after being augmented with substantial 
private contributions, these scholarship programs were having an insufficient 
impact on the overall access of students to the higher education sector. In 
2006, the Sampoerna Foundation in conjunction with the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) and Bank International Indonesia (BII) also began to try to 
reinvent and rejuvenate the student loan program by offering advances of up to 
Rp200 million (approximately US$20 000). 
Perhaps the biggest constraint on the quality and access of Indonesia’s higher 
education institutions, however, which cannot be corrected by student loan 
systems, has been the lack of proper long-term planning and vision for the 
sector. The universities suffer from internal inefficiency and poor initiatives, 
particularly in research, and lack clear lines of public accountability. 
Undoubtedly, these problems have brought negative impacts on quality, 
efficiency and the relevance of higher education in the country. The goals of 
widening access and improving the quality and quantity of higher education 
institutions are thus far from being achieved. 
Facing these issues, the government, through the Directorate General for Higher 
Education (DGHE), has taken some major reform efforts. These have included 
moves to increase the autonomy of public university governance structures, 
clarifying funding mechanisms, particularly between private and public higher 
education institutions, as well as reforming the curriculum content so that it 
is more in line with the national development context. Ultimately, it will be 
the ability of these reforms to create an environment in Indonesia that allows 
the sector to make effective policy decisions that will determine whether the 
renewed financial loan scheme will prove a success or lead to another failure. 
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The Thai Case 
The last three chapters of the volume are concerned with the Thai case. The rapid 
expansion of the higher education sector in Thailand and the policy failures and 
successes make for valuable case studies. In Chapter 9, Somkiat Tangkitvanich 
and Areeya Manasboonphempool give an overview and outline the problems 
faced, the policy measures undertaken to date, and also assess the success and 
failure of each. Piruna Polsiri, Rangsit Sarachitti and Thitima Sitthipongpanich 
conduct analysis in Chapter 10 that shows repayment burdens for the Thai 
Student Loans Fund (SLF) under different scenarios of interest rate subsidies. 
Their chapter is a contribution to the understanding of the Thai case but also 
to the analysis of interest rate subsidies and repayment hardship in the higher 
education literature. Bruce Chapman and Kiatanantha Lounkaew in Chapter 11 
compare alternatives in Thai income-contingent student loans.
Since the early 1900s, the number of higher educational institutions in Thailand 
has increased to nearly 800 institutions with the total number of students 
enrolled reaching 2.5 million. With a 41 per cent gross enrolment ratio, the 
country ranks second only to Japan and is ranked higher than much wealthier 
countries such as Malaysia and Hong Kong. The public sector plays a very 
dominant role in this education provision, enrolling more than four-fifths of 
total students.
To cope with this rapid enrolment expansion, the Thai education financing 
system has needed a number of reforms. During the past three decades, 
continued efforts have been made to transform major limited-admission public 
universities into autonomous universities. The purpose of this was to provide 
administrative flexibility to these universities, aiming to enhance their quality 
to an international level. So far, however, only seven public universities have 
been successfully transformed, with only a few more in the pipeline. 
In addition to the direct provision of higher education by public institutions, 
the Thai government has also provided loans to students since 1996 under the 
SLF scheme. The main objective of the SLF is to increase the opportunities for 
students from low-income families to continue their study. Other objectives 
are to promote more equal income distribution in the long run and to develop 
a demand-side financing system by increasing the capacity of households 
to contribute more resources to education. The SLF loans cover tuition fees, 
educational-related expenses and other living expenses. Only high-school or 
tertiary-level students whose family’s income is less than B150 000 per annum 
are eligible to apply for the loan. During the first 10 years of its operation, the 
SLF has lent to more than 2.6 million students, with the loan value totalling 
nearly B200 billion.
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In practice, however, despite its high cost, the SLF seems to have increased 
the educational opportunities of the borrowers only from families with income 
below the poverty line. Since this group constitutes only 13 per cent of the total 
borrowers, the income threshold set by the SLF appears to be far too high. The 
current SLF scheme also contains many flaws. For example, its loan-screening 
system is far from perfect, it fails to disburse loans on time, it has a very poor 
collection mechanism and it is still based on the supply-side financing paradigm. 
Analysis shows also that it has not significantly influenced the decisions of 
high-school students to continue their studies to a higher level, except for the 
poorest group, who were a minority among the recipients. In addition, the SLF 
is suffering from a serious financial sustainability problem due to its very low 
recovery rate.
The SLF was temporarily abolished and replaced with the Thai Income Contingent 
Allowance and Loan (TICAL) scheme under the Thaksin government in 2006—
with the SLF reintroduced following the 2007 election. The TICAL, which was 
modelled after the income-contingent loan scheme in Australia, is different 
from the SLF in many important ways. First, it allows only undergraduates 
but not high-school students to borrow. In addition, it sets no conditions on 
the household income of the borrowers. This means that all undergraduate 
students in any field may apply for a loan. Second, it covers only tuition fees, 
not other education-related and living expenses. Third, it does not require the 
borrowers to start repaying until their incomes reach B16 000 a month (the 
minimum income threshold for the payment of income tax). The repayment rate 
is contingent upon the borrowers’ incomes, and is progressively increased with 
higher income. Fourth, there is no interest charged under the TICAL scheme, 
but the outstanding debt will be adjusted by inflation from the first year of 
borrowing. Finally, the revenue department is responsible for collecting the 
repayment.
The shift to the TICAL brought about many important improvements, especially 
a potentially more effective repayment collection system. Moreover, it was based 
on a demand-side financing paradigm that promoted more choices for students. 
The TICAL was not, however, without its problems; it still unnecessarily 
subsidised the borrowers by charging a zero real interest rate. In addition, the 
TICAL by itself could not bring about the overall changes to the educational 
financing system unless other complementary reforms were also undertaken. 
Hidden costs in the SLF make up a large portion of the total implicit subsidy 
received by students. The Thai SLF is relatively soft in terms of payment 
hardships under poor post-education outcomes. It is also very generous in 
terms of the implicit subsidy. This means that a large amount of public money 
is required to maintain the system. If you remove a lot of the hidden benefits of 
the scheme, such as grace periods and income thresholds, the system becomes a 
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lot more inexpensive but dramatically increases the burden on students. Having 
said this, the current scheme is prohibitively expensive for the Thai government 
and reform needs to be implemented whilst still maintaining widespread access 
to quality higher education for all economic groups. 
Perhaps most importantly, policy certainty is a prerequisite for the long-
term development of the system. Frequent policy reversals will not only 
bring about confusions to all stakeholders, they will also raise questions 
about the government’s commitment to any loan programs, thus undermining 
the credibility and integrity of the scheme. Another important lesson is the 
importance of strengthening public financial management, which not only 
allows the government to implement a more effective higher education financing 
system, but also has a number of other equally important positive effects on the 
economy. Within this process, to avoid haphazard policy changes, policy makers 
should seek consensus from broad-based stakeholders before making any more 
major policy changes in the future.
Conclusion
Higher education and an appropriate financing system that helps to overcome 
market failures are essential components of a country’s ability to integrate into 
the increasingly knowledge-based global economy. 
The question is how to arrange the resources to make sufficient investment in 
education that is accessible to everyone while also improving the quality of the 
education that is delivered. This is not an easy problem particularly in the early 
stages of economic success when resources are stretched towards achieving 
many objectives. The focus of research is on the various strategies that have 
been used to promote the expansion of accessibility to higher education for the 
populations around the region. There is much policy experience in addressing 
these questions from other countries in the region and, taken together, these 
experiences can illuminate the challenges and options in different countries. 
The first of these is the ultimate role of government within the sector to correct 
a market failure that occurs from the existence of the large positive externalities 
derived from a highly educated, capable workforce. Large positive externalities 
lead to sub-optimal levels of investment in education under free-market 
conditions. This is also amplified by the inability of individuals to use human 
capital as collateral to make investments in their own education. 
Such a situation creates a clear role for government to intervene in the higher 
education sector, but, as with all interventions, these must be carefully planned. 
One key element of this planning must be a clear recognition of what the 
government wishes to achieve from its intervention as this will play a large 
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role in the optimal type of intervention. Ultimately, there are three main 
objectives of government intervention into the higher education sector. These 
include increasing the quantity and quality of and access to higher education. 
Consumption smoothing is an important aspect that helps facilitate this.  
Economic theory also offers a number of lessons for the design of higher education 
schemes that can achieve the objectives of government. These include elements 
such as the importance of competition—both amongst universities and amongst 
those wishing to attend. This raises the importance of promoting access to the 
sector for people from all segments of society regardless of economic background. 
It is also important for government to recognise the strengths and weaknesses 
of different types of support systems. Loan schemes are not well designed to 
directly benefit the poor. They are best designed to increase resources to the 
higher education sector and to provide an element of consumption smoothing, 
which will benefit mainly middle-income students. Grant-based or interest rate 
subsidy schemes, on the other hand, are better suited to improving access to 
higher education—particularly for poorer segments of society. 
The big question is whether a country is capable of implementing and 
administering a student loan or higher education support scheme. Countries 
need a number of characteristics, such as strong political support, which is long 
term, enough bureaucratic capacity to ensure an effective administration as well 
as widespread public acknowledgment of the need for a higher education system. 
It is also important to highlight the importance of country specificity in the 
design, implementation and, ultimately, the effect of higher education financing 
schemes. Israel attempted to import a scheme directly from another country 
without adjusting it to Israel’s institutional settings with predictable adverse 
consequences. If Thailand were to implement a scheme similar to Australia’s 
or New Zealand’s it would be unlikely to generate either the same outcomes or 
the same level of debt repayment. One reason for this might be, for example, 
that local incomes are not high enough in Thailand to allow for sufficient rates 
of repayment. As noted in the previous section, the main policy conclusions of 
successes in the implementation of income-contingent loans across the region 
need to be handled with care. In some countries, the institutional framework 
might be currently inappropriate to allow efficient, even workable, collection of 
income-contingent loans. If this is the case, fruitful policy reform would seem 
to involve improvements in public-sector management. The Australian case, for 
example, offers some useful insights into the application of higher education 
financing in Thailand but should not be taken to suggest that income-contingent 
loans are a panacea to international higher education funding challenges. In 
many countries, there are important institutional difficulties to be overcome in 
the successful adoption of such approaches.

17
Part 1. Education and Development:  
The role of higher education

19
2. Education and Development: 
The role of higher education
Lawrence Summers 
Harvard University
This chapter provides an American perspective on issues affecting higher 
education in China. It discusses how the work of universities is so important 
to the development of nations, and reflects on the success of the US system and 
what lessons can be taken from this system for higher education in other parts 
of the world. 
Discussions of higher education and development took an odd turn about 
a generation ago from which we are only now recovering. It came to be a 
fashionable idea that emphasis should be placed on primary and secondary 
services, rather than on tertiary services. The argument was made that from an 
equity point of view, it was more important to teach more people to read than 
to teach a small cadre the liberal arts. The argument was made from the point 
of view of mass economic development. Strengthening primary and secondary 
schools for the many was more important than strengthening universities for the 
few. The argument was made that in a fundamental sense, there was something 
unegalitarian about support for universities, especially since the majority of 
students entering the system were the children of what quite likely had been 
privileged families. None of the arguments is entirely without merit, and to 
suggest that higher education should be emphasised at the expense of primary 
and secondary education is not the point. It does seem that the lessons of recent 
economic history point in a very compelling way towards the importance of 
strong universities—and universities that receive substantial public support.
This is not a new idea. Economic historians who have studied the growth of 
Europe assign a very significant role to what took place in universities. In 
the United States, the land-grant colleges established during the Lincoln 
administration—with the objective of spreading education and in particular 
promoting research into more productive agriculture and the dissemination of 
agricultural technologies—are generally regarded as having made an important 
contribution to US economic success. 
Most evidence would suggest that the current world economy is going to 
be a knowledge economy to a much greater extent than any we have seen to 
date. As the agricultural revolution gave way to the Industrial Revolution, 
increasingly the Industrial Revolution is giving way to a kind of information 
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revolution. Alan Greenspan made that point in a very powerful way by noting 
that even as the value of the US gross product had increased, its total mass 
had quite substantially decreased. We are replacing semi-conductive steel with 
semiconductors; we are replacing manufactured products with services. All you 
have to do is look at the results of the market to see the impact of knowledge. 
Salary differentials between those with high-school degrees and no high-school 
degree, those with college degrees and no college degree, graduate degrees 
and college degrees, those with training at first-rate institutions versus those 
with training at second-rate institutions—all of these economic differentials 
have widened very substantially, and that suggests the high importance of the 
increase in the supply of highly skilled workers.
Bill Clinton was fond of remarking that you could not have employees without 
having employers. Or, as he sometimes put it, he hoped that there would be 
many more millionaires in the United States at the end of his term than there 
were at the beginning. He expressed that hope because he recognised that people 
who started successful businesses, who built successful institutions, generated 
enormous externalities by employing large numbers of people. If there is going 
to be that leading edge in any country, it is going to depend critically on that 
country’s system of higher education, because in today’s economy, the majority 
of such people are going to be those who have received sophisticated education 
at the undergraduate level and perhaps even the graduate level.
The case in countries such as the United States or those in Europe is that a large 
fraction of the benefits of higher education derive from enabling entrepreneurs 
to push the frontier of science with commercial application. In emerging 
markets, the largest fraction of the benefit will probably derive from facilitating 
the adoption and dissemination of new technologies. In either event, successful 
practically oriented institutions of education are crucial to the success of any 
country competing in today’s global economy.
There are other reasons why strong institutions of higher education are 
important to the work of nations. Strong institutions of higher education that 
promote access, that enable access without regard to financial circumstances or 
the ability to pay, that provide large numbers of spaces for those who are most 
able, regardless of their connections or their family’s wealth, are also important 
guarantors of the kind of social mobility that promotes a healthy society. 
These are only some of the reasons why the work of universities is very important 
in any society. One of the major differences between the economy of today and 
the industrial economy of a generation ago is that a contemporary economy 
has to be based much more on the authority of ideas and much less on the 
idea of authority. The most successful organisations today are not those based 
on strong hierarchical commanding control; they are based on organisations 
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and companies that reorganise themselves every six months or every two years. 
They are based on organisations whose strategy can be altered, whose traditional 
dogma can be questioned by any part of the organisation, by anyone who has 
something to contribute. It is this kind of culture that universities, at their best, 
are very good at fostering. 
As President of Harvard University, I taught a freshman seminar and one of the 
topics we covered was capital flows and capital flows to emerging markets—an 
issue I would be very much engaged in at the US Treasury. And it was with 
great pleasure that I remember the meaning of the seminar, at which a freshman 
who had been at Harvard for six weeks and who was asked to summarise that 
week’s readings said very calmly that he had read Professor Summer’s lecture 
and he had found it very interesting, although the data, in his view, did not 
come close to proving the conclusions. And I thought, what a remarkable and 
positive thing that a seventeen-year-old who had been at Harvard for all of six 
weeks felt entirely free saying that the President did not really know what he 
was talking about on an issue for which he had led policy for his country. To 
be sure, I did not agree with the student and I made clear why I did not agree, 
but I thought that kind of open dialogue, which is encouraged in universities, 
is something that does not get fostered in many institutions and it is something 
that universities are very, very good at doing. New knowledge pushing back the 
frontiers of science with commercial application, providing equal opportunity, 
modelling the kinds of open organisations and the kinds of open structures that 
promote creativity and entrepreneurship—these are the great contributions 
that universities make to societies. 
Universities make another contribution. To be sure it is not a contribution they 
have always made. They prompt reflection by society on what their deepest 
values are, what their true nature is, ways in which they can be better. The 
United States and Europe are very different places because of the events of the 
1960s. In the United States there would be a very different attitude towards 
women and race if the changes in university policy that were very much at 
the vanguard of questions of inclusion had not taken place. It might be an 
exaggeration to say that what is good for a country is good for its universities 
and what is good for its universities is good for the country, but when one 
looks at different emerging markets, one has the sense that looking back one 
or two generations at which countries have succeeded and which have not, the 
ones that have been most successful will tend to be the countries that were 
most successful in fostering terrific educational experiences for the people in 
their late teens and early twenties who in 25 or 30 years are going to be their 
nation’s leaders in every sphere. That is why the development of educational 
institutions is so important.
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When looking at the data of the top-ranking universities in the world, it is clear 
that US universities are a very substantial fraction of the top group—whether 
that is the top five, the top 10, the top 25, the top 50 or the top 100. There are 
few other sectors where that would be the case. It certainly would not be the 
case in almost any area of manufacturing activity today. It would be the case in 
very few service-sector activities. It is worth considering what it is about the US 
system that contributes to that great strength. This can be summarised in three 
primary factors. 
First, the US university system is intensely competitive. Universities compete 
for the best students; they compete for the best faculty; they compete to have 
the highest rankings whenever anyone constructs a system of rankings. That 
competition can sometimes be destructive but in the fullness of it, the fact of 
brutal competition for the best students and the best faculty forces a discipline 
and excellence that are present in US universities and are sometimes less present 
in others. As such, the capacity to maintain a competitive environment and 
what the competitive environment depends on is the availability of choice—the 
fact that professors are free to move from one university to another without 
regard to any kind of national plan, the fact that students have multiple options 
and that the best students are able to choose the universities that they wish 
to go to. This competition among universities, as among businesses, is a very 
powerful spur to quality. Too often countries beyond the United States have 
a carefully planned and managed system that does not provide those kinds of 
incentives for competition and therefore miss a drive for excellence of the kind 
that has proven so powerful in the United States. 
A second strength of the US university system—though it is one on which 
improvements are certainly possible—is a governance model that maintains 
dynamism. A university is a very difficult kind of institution to govern, because 
many of the most important judgments—judgments about what is going to 
be taught in a physics class or a history class or a literature class, judgments 
about who is the best scholar to hire—are judgments that really are best made 
by experts in those fields and not by general leaders. Yet, at the same time, 
when judgments are made by the incumbents in a field, you tend, as in any 
area of human activity, to get self-perpetuation. So the challenge is to find a 
governance model that draws on local expertise, draws on experts, but at the 
same time ensures accountability for excellence. University governance models 
go wrong in two ways. In some cases in the United States, and certainly in 
many cases abroad, universities are governed too much like any other part of 
the public sector. There are elaborate bureaucratic rules governing promotion, 
compensation and decision making that preclude the kind of dynamism, 
flexibility and rapid movement to opportunity that success and knowledge-
based activities require. If universities cannot be run like departments of motor 
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vehicles, it is also true that it is very dangerous when universities are run by 
their staff. In too many places, university presidents are chosen or renewed on 
the basis of votes of faculty, students and staff. In such a context—which would 
be unthinkable in a modern corporation—it is very difficult for a leader to make 
difficult choices, to shut down mediocre activities or to reallocate resources from 
lower-productivity activities to higher-productivity activities. The challenge is 
to find leadership that is empowered vis-a-vis those who work in the institution 
but at the same time understand that empowerment is a very different thing to 
the ability to dictate precisely what is going to happen. Private universities in 
the United States with trustees—often trustees who are involved in providing 
substantial resources to the university—strike this compromise as well as it has 
been struck. It is a constant battle, however, and one that requires constant 
vigilance, but it is a critical issue that must be monitored. 
A third strength of the US system is its substantial reliance on the private sector. 
Great institutions such as Harvard, the University of Chicago and Stanford 
University are not public institutions. They certainly do receive support for 
research and for financial aid for students from the government. But the lion’s 
share of their resources comes from loyal alumni—from people who have 
been highly successful and have chosen to allocate resources to support their 
activities. That mixture of the public and the private sector is often a source of 
tension in the United States, but it is also a great spur to innovation. It is hoped 
that around the world over the next generation we will see the John Harvards, 
the Lyman Stanfords, the Andrew Carnegies and the John. D. Rockefellers who 
will step forward and provide the leadership for creating academic institutions 
that will be a source of national strength for many years into the future. 
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3. Financing Higher Education: 
Lessons from economic theory and 
operational experience1
Nicholas Barr2 
London School of Economics
This chapter talks about how to pay for teaching at universities. It does not talk 
about financing research or about any particular country. Instead, its purpose is 
to offer a tool kit for policy makers thinking about reform.
The chapter sets out lessons for policy design from economic theory and the 
experience of developed countries. Economic theory, however, is not enough. 
Policy design that outstrips a country’s capacity to implement it effectively is 
bad policy design. This chapter therefore deliberately goes beyond theory to 
include lessons about implementation. The chapter concludes with discussion 
of the resulting system. 
The Backdrop
Higher education matters—and always will—because knowledge for its 
own sake is important. But, in sharp contrast with 50 years ago, now higher 
education matters also for national economic performance and for individual 
life chances. Technological advance has driven up the demand for skills. To 
compete internationally, countries need mass high-quality higher education.
That immediately raises the question of how to pay for it. Countries typically 
pursue three goals in higher education: larger quantity with good access, higher 
quality, and constant or falling public spending. It is possible to achieve two 
but only at the expense of the third. Systems can be
•	 large and tax financed, but with worries about quality (France, Germany, Italy)
•	 high quality and tax financed, but small (the United Kingdom until 1989)
•	 large and good quality, but fiscally expensive (Scandinavia).
1 This chapter is a shortened version of Barr (2008), which draws on earlier writing—notably Barr (2004a)—
much of it growing out of work over many years with Iain Crawford (see Barr and Crawford 2005).
2 Professor of Public Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, 
London WC2A 2AE, UK. Tel: +44 20 7955 7482; fax: +44 20 7955 7546. Email: <N.Barr@lse.ac.uk>; 
<http://econ.lse.ac.uk/staff/nb>
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There is nothing illogical about the last option, but it is unsustainable in most 
countries, not least because of competing fiscal pressures connected with 
population ageing (see Barr and Diamond 2008), advances in medical care, and 
increased international competitive pressures (‘globalisation’). Thus, the only 
realistic way of achieving all three objectives is to supplement public finance 
with private finance. The scale of the task should not be underestimated. In 
South Korea, the participation rate in tertiary education is 82 per cent; total 
spending on tertiary education is 2.6 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP)—
double the average for the EU19 of 1.3 per cent; and private spending on tertiary 
education is significantly higher than total (public plus private) spending in 
any Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) country 
except the United States and Canada (OECD 2006:Table B2.1b; all figures for 
2003).
A related issue is how to promote quality. Part of the story is adequate finance, 
but there is also the issue of how to ensure that resources for higher education 
are used efficiently. As discussed later, competitive systems of higher education 
tend to produce higher quality, at least as measured by world rankings.
Lessons from Economic Theory
This section sets out three central lessons from economic theory for a system 
that seeks to strengthen the quality of higher education while simultaneously 
promoting access: competition is beneficial; graduates should contribute to the 
cost of their degree; and well-designed loans have core characteristics. 
Competition is Beneficial
The case for competition in higher education is not ideological, but rooted in 
the economics of information. 
Fifty years ago, richer countries generally had small university systems offering 
degrees in a limited range of subjects. In that world it was possible, as a polite 
myth, to assume that all universities were equally good and hence to fund them 
broadly equally. Today there are more universities, more students and much 
greater diversity of subjects. As a result, the characteristics and the costs of 
different degrees at different institutions vary widely, so that institutions need 
to be funded differentially—a problem too complex for any central planner. 
A mass system in an increasingly complex world needs a funding mechanism 
that allows institutions to charge differential fees to reflect different costs and 
objectives. Central planning is no longer feasible.
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Central planning is also no longer desirable. It is a standard proposition in 
welfare economics that competition benefits consumers when consumers 
are well informed (Barr 2004b:Ch. 4). Students (in sharp contrast with 
schoolchildren or people with complex medical problems) are potentially well-
informed consumers, and thus able to make choices that conform with their 
interests and those of the economy. Though that proposition is robust, there is 
an important exception: people from disadvantaged backgrounds might not be 
fully informed, emphasising the need for action to promote access. It should be 
noted that the same analytical approach can lead to very different conclusions 
for school education (Barr 2004b:Chs 13, 14).
Graduates Should Contribute to the Cost of their 
Degree
Higher education creates benefits beyond those to the individual—benefits in 
terms of growth, the transmission of values, and the development of knowledge 
for its own sake—justifying continuing taxpayer subsidies. But there are also 
significant private benefits—in terms of higher earnings, more satisfying jobs 
and/or greater enjoyment of leisure time—making it efficient and equitable for 
graduates to bear some of the costs. 
Though the previous paragraph is uncontentious as far as it goes, policy 
makers—especially in ministries of finance—are keen to know the answers to 
two questions
•	 what is the efficient level of spending on education
•	 what is the efficient level of taxpayer subsidy?
These questions are important but unfortunately can be answered only 
indicatively. The conclusion of a very different literature (Barr 1999; Sen 1999) 
is that it is not possible to quantify a value-free definition of poverty. Instead, 
the decision about where to pitch the poverty line depends on social choice 
constrained by fiscal realities. Analogously, problems—of concept and of 
measurement—mean that the benefits to education cannot be quantified in any 
definitive way. 
Quantitative Arguments
In principle, it is efficient to devote resources to tertiary education to the point 
where their marginal social value equals their marginal social costs. Though it is 
possible to measure the costs of education, there are several reasons why there is no 
definitive way of quantifying social benefits: measuring outputs and inputs faces 
major problems; and, even were these to be resolved, causality is problematic. The 
arguments summarised briefly below are set out more fully in Barr (2000).
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First, output cannot be measured, because there is no single definition of 
a ‘good’ education. Test scores are imperfect measures even where output is 
defined narrowly as technical achievement; they fail to capture the broader 
benefits of education to the individual; and they take no account of a range of 
external benefits, including shared values. That the broader benefits are largely 
unmeasurable does not make them unreal.
Second, there are problems connecting output to educational inputs. Measuring 
inputs is not easy. It is possible to measure the quantity of teachers’ and pupils’ 
time, buildings, and so on, but much harder to measure the quality of teachers, 
natural ability and the quality of parenting. A second problem is establishing 
the production function that connects inputs and outputs. Studies tend to 
assume (since no other assumption is available) that schools have a single, simple 
objective: maximising pupils’ test scores. Though analytically tractable, this 
approach is flawed; it implies, for example, that a school should stop teaching 
children who are not capable of passing tests.
A third set of problems relates to establishing causality. The discussion above 
implicitly assumes that education increases individual productivity. What 
is known as the screening hypothesis questions the causal link—at least for 
post-primary education—arguing that education is associated with increased 
productivity but does not cause it.3 The argument has two elements.
•	 Individual productivity could be the result of natural ability rather than 
post-primary education (analogously, good health could be due more to a 
naturally strong constitution than to medical intervention). 
•	 Firms seek high-ability workers but, prior to employing them, cannot 
distinguish high-ability from low-ability workers. 
The two elements together suggest that there is no social benefit from post-
primary education, but a private benefit for individuals, who face incentives to 
make themselves stand out. The screening hypothesis argues that post-primary 
education does exactly that: it gives a signal to prospective employers that it is 
in the individual’s interest to acquire. 
It is clear that the hypothesis does not hold fully. It fails where education includes 
professional training such as medicine. It also fails where there is more than one 
type of job; if skills and job characteristics are heterogeneous, education has a 
social benefit as a device for matching workers and jobs. The extent to which 
the hypothesis has some validity is an empirical matter, but is clouded by the 
measurement problems already discussed—notably of such factors as natural 
ability and family background.
3 The large literature on this and other aspects of the economics of education is surveyed by Blaug (1976, 
1985) and Glennerster (1993).
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Qualitative Arguments
Thus, it is not possible to quantify external benefits; hence there is no definitive 
answer to questions about the optimal size of the sector or the efficient level of 
taxpayer subsidy.
There are, however, powerful qualitative arguments for increasing investment 
in human capital. Technological advance is a key driver. Though technological 
change reduces the need for some skills (user-friendly computers), it mostly 
increases the demand for skilled workers. In addition, skills date quickly. The 
‘information age’ can be taken to mean a need for education and training that is 
larger than previously, more diverse and repeated, given the need for periodic 
retraining.
Demographic change offers a second reason for increased investment in 
education. The rising proportion of older people foreshadows increased 
spending on pensions, medical care and long-term care. Part of the solution is to 
increase output sufficiently to meet the combined expectations of workers and 
pensioners.4 If workers are becoming relatively more scarce, the efficient response 
is to increase labour productivity. Demographic change is thus an argument for 
additional spending on investment both in physical and in human capital.
For these reasons, the qualitative case for expanding higher education and 
continued taxpayer support is strong.
Alongside the case for expansion is a strong case for cost sharing, given the 
evidence on the private benefits of higher education. It is a standard proposition 
in economic theory that it is efficient (and usually also equitable) if a person 
pays for the private benefits he/she receives. Beneficiaries, however, should bear 
those costs when they can afford them—when they are graduates—and not as 
students, leading directly to the third set of lessons from economic theory. 
Well-Designed Loans Have Core Characteristics
Two lines of argument support widespread student loans. As noted, it is not 
feasible to rely on taxation to finance high-quality mass higher education. As 
well as being infeasible, tax finance is also undesirable, for at least three reasons. 
First, in most countries it has not significantly widened access. The record in 
the United Kingdom in this regard is shameful: in 2002, 81 per cent of children 
with parents from professional backgrounds went to university; the comparable 
figure for children from poorer backgrounds was 15 per cent (UK Education and 
Skills Select Committee 2002:19). Second, tax finance has not generally been 
able to protect quality; the days are gone when the higher education sector was 
4 On the analytics, see Barr and Diamond (2008).
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small and competing claims on public funds less powerful. Finally, tax finance 
is generally regressive; participating in higher education is a matter of choice, 
and that choice is highly skewed to the better off.
Thus, the case for loans is twofold: well-designed loans bring in private-sector 
sources (graduates’ repayments) to supplement tax revenues; and they address 
the regressivity of tax finance. 
Characteristic 1: Income-contingent repayments
How should loans be designed? A central element is that they should have 
income-contingent repayments—that is, repayments calculated as x per cent of 
the borrower’s subsequent earnings until the loan has been repaid, rather than 
$X a month.5
There are both efficiency and equity gains from this approach. The equity 
argument is that loans with income-contingent repayments protect low earners 
because insurance against inability to repay is an integral part of their design. In 
efficiency terms, such loans address important imperfections in capital markets 
whose implications were first explored by Milton Friedman (1955).
To illustrate, when someone buys a house, she normally borrows from a private 
lender. Similar loans exist for cars. Why has the private market not provided 
analogous loans for borrowing to finance investment in human capital?
Home loans are relatively low risk for both borrower and lender.
1. The person who buys a house generally knows what he is buying.
2. The house is unlikely to fall down and is, in any case, insurable.
3. The real value of the house will generally (though not always) increase.
4. The existence of a physical asset reduces risk for the borrower; if his income 
falls, making repayments impossible, he can sell the house and repay the 
loan. 
5. The house acts as physical collateral, reducing risk for the lender, who can 
if necessary repossess the asset—thus, loans are available with only a small 
risk premium.
Thus, it is not surprising that a market solution exists. The contrast with human 
capital is clear. Though many applicants to university are well informed, this 
is not the case in families where no-one has been to university, violating (1). 
A qualification can ‘fall down’, violating (2), since students might fail exams. 
5 For fuller discussion, see Barr (2001:Chs 11, 12), and for an early proposal with loan repayments based on 
social security contributions, see Barnes and Barr (1988).
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Though the real rate of return to a degree continues to be high, there is a 
variance around the average so that the same is not necessarily true for all 
students, violating (3). In addition, there is no collateral. Thus, someone who 
has borrowed to finance a degree but then experiences low earnings does not 
have the option to sell the qualification, violating (4), and can therefore borrow, 
if at all, only at a substantial risk premium, violating (5). One solution is to 
introduce collateral in the form of a guarantee—say, from a parent—but this 
runs counter to the drive to widen access. 
Friedman (1955) recognised these capital-market imperfections explicitly:
[I]n a non-slave state, the individual embodying the investment cannot 
be bought and sold. But even if he could, the security would not be 
comparable. The productivity of…physical capital does not…depend 
on the co-operativeness of the original borrower. The productivity of 
the human capital quite obviously does…A loan to finance the training 
of an individual who has no security to offer other than his future 
earnings is therefore a much less attractive proposition than a loan to 
finance, say, the erection of a building…
A further complication is…the inappropriateness of fixed money loans 
to finance investment in training. Such an investment necessarily 
involves much risk. The average expected return may be high, but there 
is wide variation about the average. (Friedman 1955:137)
The solution proposed by Friedman is that the government would provide the 
investment capital, in return for which
[t]he individual would agree in return to pay to the government in each 
future year x per cent of his earnings in excess of y dollars for each 
$1,000 that he gets in this way. This payment could easily be combined 
with payment of income tax and so involve a minimum of additional 
administrative expense. (Friedman 1955:140)
Thus, the efficiency case for income-contingent repayments is that they 
address important capital-market imperfections: borrowers from disadvantaged 
backgrounds might be badly informed about the value of a degree; and all 
borrowers face substantial uncertainty. Thus, there are technical problems on 
the demand side of the market for loans and, as a result, borrowing to finance 
investment in human capital will be inefficiently low.
On the supply side, lenders are uncertain about the riskiness of an applicant for 
a loan and will therefore charge a risk premium. A risk premium assessed by 
a well-informed lender is efficient (analogous to higher automobile insurance 
premiums for bad drivers). But lenders are not well informed about the riskiness 
of an applicant. The problem is compounded by the potential for adverse 
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selection, since the borrower is better informed than the lender about his or her 
degree of riskiness. For example, the lender cannot be certain that the borrower 
will become an accountant rather than an actor, or that the borrower will work 
hard. Adverse selection leads to two sets of ill effects. Private lenders will charge 
a risk premium that is inefficiently high. In addition, they face incentives to 
lend only to the best risks (analogous to incentives to cream-skimming facing 
private medical insurers). An obvious way to do so is to lend only to students 
who can provide security—for example, from a home-owning parent.
In sum, borrowing to finance a degree has technical characteristics that differ 
substantially from borrowing to buy a house. Conventional loans are the wrong 
model for investment in human capital. They lead to inefficiently low borrowing 
and lending. They are also inequitable, in that these efficiency problems impact 
most on people from poor backgrounds, women and ethnic minorities, who 
might be less well informed and therefore less prepared to risk a loan. In 
addition, these groups are likely to be on the wrong end of cherry-picking by 
lenders. The interest of lenders is in secure loans; the national interest is in the 
optimal quantity and mix of investment in human capital. In a world of perfect 
information, the two interests coincide; with imperfect information, they do 
not.
Characteristic 2: Large enough
A second feature of well-designed loans is that the loan should be large enough 
to cover fees and, in developed countries, living costs, thus providing efficient 
consumption smoothing, resolving student poverty and promoting access by 
making higher education free at the point of use. 
Characteristic 3: A rational interest rate
Finally, loans should attract an interest rate broadly equal to the government’s 
cost of borrowing. The question of interest rates bears examination. A number 
of countries, including the United Kingdom, offer loans at a zero real interest 
rate—a rate lower than the government has to pay to borrow the money.6 
Thus, there is a blanket interest subsidy. In a system with income-contingent 
repayments, this policy achieves not a single desirable objective. The subsidy is 
6 Australia has a system in which students may pay a tuition charge (say, A$6000) either through a loan with 
a zero real interest rate or by paying tuition charges up-front at a 25 per cent discount (that is, A$4500). Thus, 
students pay a zero real interest rate at the margin but also a fixed element (in that they are liable to repay 
A$6000—A$1500 more than those who pay up-front). The effect of the discount is to introduce a positive real 
interest rate on average. The balance between the marginal element (the zero real interest rate) and the fixed 
element (the discount) determines the size of the resulting real interest rate. Irrespective of the balance, a 
marginal subsidy is likely to be distorting even if offset by an average charge.
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enormously expensive in fiscal terms. Because of the resulting fiscal pressures, 
loans are too small, harming access. The subsidies also crowd out university 
income, harming quality. Finally, the subsidies are deeply regressive.
The regressivity point merits attention.
•	 The subsidies do not help students (graduates, not students, make 
repayments).
•	 In a well-designed system, they give relatively little help to low-earning 
graduates, since unpaid debt is eventually forgiven.7
•	 They do not help high-earning graduates early in their careers; with income-
contingent loans, monthly repayments depend only on earnings, thus the 
interest rate has no effect on monthly repayments, but only on the duration of 
the loan.
•	 Thus, the major beneficiaries are successful professionals in mid career, 
whose loan repayments are switched off earlier than would otherwise be the 
case because of the subsidy. This is not the target group that policy makers 
had in mind.
In contrast, targeted interest subsidies have much to commend them.
In sum, income-contingent repayments improve efficiency by protecting 
borrowers and lenders from the uncertainty of a loan that is not secured by 
physical collateral; borrowers are protected because monthly repayments are 
calibrated to the borrower’s subsequent earnings, and lenders are protected 
from the risk of an unsecured loan, not least because repayments are collected 
alongside income tax. Income-contingent repayments also protect access because 
the loan has built-in insurance against inability to repay. Note that what is being 
discussed is not a tax, which goes on forever, but a genuine loan, for which 
repayments cease once the principal plus interest have been repaid. Income-
contingent repayments have a profound effect that is insufficiently understood. 
The Resulting Policy Strategy 
These theoretical considerations suggest a general strategy for efficiency and 
equity with three elements: variable fees, well-designed loans, and active 
measures to promote access. The strategy is potentially applicable to all countries 
that have the capacity to implement it—a centrally important topic discussed 
later.
7 In the United Kingdom, any loan that has not been repaid after 25 years is forgiven. Income-contingent 
repayments protect against low current income; the 25-year rule protects against low lifetime income.
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Element 1: Variable fees
There are three arguments for variable fees (OECD 2004:Ch. 4, 2005:Ch. 3, 2008)
•	 they promote quality by making funding open ended,8 thus increasing the 
volume of resources going to higher education
•	 they promote quality by strengthening competition, thus improving the 
efficiency with which the extra resources are used
•	 counter-intuitively, they are also fairer: why should a student at a small local 
university be required to pay the same fee as one at a world-class institution?
The argument for competition is rooted in the idea that students in higher 
education are broadly well informed and that their information can be further 
improved. The argument is not for law-of-the-jungle competition but for 
regulated markets. 
The obvious argument against fees is that they deter students from poor 
backgrounds. That is true of up-front fees, but not where students go to 
university free and make a contribution only after they have graduated. This 
brings us to the second part of the strategy.
Element 2: A well-designed loan scheme
Student support is through loans with income-contingent repayments. The 
loan entitlement should be large enough to cover fees and, if possible, also 
living costs, and should carry a rational interest rate. If, however, someone has 
extended spells out of the labour force, his or her loan can spiral upwards. Thus, 
though there is a strong case against blanket interest subsidies, there are good 
arguments for targeted interest subsidies for people with low earnings or out of 
the labour force. 
If loans are large enough to cover fees, the package resembles ‘free’ higher 
education financed through taxation. Students pay nothing at the time they go 
to university. Part of the cost is paid through taxation and part through their 
subsequent income-contingent repayments. The viewpoint of the ministry of 
finance is somewhat different. Though loans bring in private resources in the 
longer term, a loan system, by definition, has up-front costs because it lends 
the money first and receives repayments later. Thus, depending on a country’s 
fiscal situation, there can be advantages if students can borrow from private 
sources, but—particularly in a developing country—private lenders will charge 
8 If there are no fees, the ministry of finance controls the total volume of resources going to higher education. 
With fees set centrally by central government the same is true; if rising fee income is offset by declining 
taxpayer funding, the total volume of resources going to higher education does not change (this is what 
happened in Australia over the 1990s). With variable fees, in contrast, universities have an instrument with 
which they can respond to any decline in public funding, hence funding becomes open ended.
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a substantial risk premium unless there is a government guarantee; and if there 
is a government guarantee, the loans will be classified as public spending. As 
discussed later in this chapter, potential solutions exist in this highly technical 
area, but require considerable care in design.
Element 3: Action to promote access 
Assume that all students are well informed and have a good school education. In 
that case, a good income-contingent loan is all that is needed. In most countries, 
however, not all students are well informed. In particular, the group for whom we 
want to promote access is not well informed. More is needed. Most people argue 
that what is needed is ‘free’ higher education. The evidence, however, points 
in a different direction. The primary driver of participation in higher education 
is attainment in school. The sharp socioeconomic gradient in participation in 
the United Kingdom has already been noted. Yet controlling for the quality of 
high-school grades, the gradient disappears; of those with good high-school 
graduation grades, 90 per cent progressed to higher education, irrespective of 
socioeconomic background (UK Office for National Statistics 2004:Fig. 2.15). 
What does this imply for policy to improve participation? Exclusion, it can be 
argued, has four roots: lack of education, lack of information about university, 
lack of aspirations, and lack of money. A well-designed strategy should address 
all four.
Raising attainment: access fails when someone drops out of school early, 
usually for reasons that started much earlier. More resources are needed earlier 
in the system, not least because of the growing evidence (Feinstein 2003) that 
the roots of exclusion lie in early childhood. A central element in widening 
participation is to strengthen pre-university education, from nursery school 
onwards.
Increasing information and raising aspirations: a series of policies addresses 
both. Action to inform schoolchildren and raise their aspirations is critical. 
Relevant activities include mentoring by university students, visit days, 
Saturday schools, summer schools, and the like. 
More money: policies include financial support to encourage teenagers to 
complete high school, and grants and scholarships to cover some or all costs 
at university. Both policies could be supported by financial incentives to 
universities to widen participation. 
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Policy Design: Lessons from international 
experience
There are important lessons about tuition fess and about student loans. It is also 
useful to inquire about other sources of private finance.
Lessons about Fees
As noted earlier, competition benefits consumers when they are well informed. 
This line of argument suggests that each university should be able to set the 
level of its tuition fees and other charges. That, however, does not mean that 
the optimal solution is complete deregulation. Liberalising fees in a ‘big-bang’ 
way can be politically destabilising. In 1992, New Zealand introduced fees set 
by universities, but made mistakes. First, reform was to some extent big bang. 
Student loans were new, and fees, though not new, were fully liberalised. 
Second, though the system included targeted interest subsidies, more could have 
been done to assist low earners. Third, the government failed to explain—and to 
continue to explain—the reforms and, in particular, the considerable advantages 
of income-contingent repayments. As a result, as nominal student debt increased 
over time, so did political pressures. The scheme was diluted in 2000.
A second lesson is that the opposite policy direction—no liberalisation—is also 
a mistake. Higher education with no or low fixed fees creates two problems. 
Quality suffers because the education budget has to compete with other 
budgetary imperatives; and within the education budget, universities compete 
with nursery education, school education and vocational training. As a result, 
real funding per student tends to decline. Access also suffers. If places are scarce, 
middle-class students tend to get them; and if places are not scarce, the need to 
finance a mass system typically creates concerns about quality and means that 
resources to promote access are limited.
Lessons about Loans
Discussion focuses on four lessons: income-contingent loans do not harm access; 
interest subsidies are expensive; positive real interest rates are politically 
feasible; and the design of the student loan contract matters.
Income-contingent loans do not harm access. Australia introduced a system of 
income-contingent loans in 1989 to cover a newly introduced tuition charge. 
Chapman and Ryan (2003) point to increased participation overall since 1989 
and, superimposed on that trend, that women’s participation grew more strongly 
than men’s, and that the system did not discourage participation by people in the 
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lowest socioeconomic groups. This result is what theory would predict: income-
contingent repayments are designed explicitly to reduce the risks borrowers 
face, and fees supported by loans free resources to promote access.
A second lesson is that interest subsidies are expensive. The UK system charges 
an interest rate equal to the inflation rate—that is, a zero real rate, which is less 
than the government has to pay to borrow the money. The interest subsidy is 
expensive: for every £100 the government lends, between £30 and £35 is never 
repaid simply because of the interest subsidy (Barr 2002:paras 33–7). In other 
words, the interest subsidy converts nearly one-third of the loan into a grant. 
New Zealand offers parallel evidence (see Barr 2004a). 
Positive real interest rates, however, are politically feasible—examples include 
Hungary, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. It is interesting that in those 
countries, in contrast with the United Kingdom, the interest rate has not been 
the subject of much political discussion. 
Finally, contract design is important. International labour mobility is high and 
likely to increase, creating problems of default when a person emigrates. In 
Australia, loan repayments are part of a person’s tax liability, so that someone 
outside Australia is not liable to make repayments. With interest subsidies, this 
is a particularly costly mistake. In the United Kingdom, the individual loan 
contract includes the collection of repayments through the tax system, but does 
not exempt a person outside the country. Though default and administrative 
costs for people working abroad are somewhat higher, the effect is not large. 
There is no question of emigration causing a repayment black hole.
Why Not Other Sources of Private Finance? 
Why the emphasis on private finance through student loans? There are, of 
course, other potential sources of private finance.
•	 Family resources: parents might wish to help their children and the children 
might wish to accept that help. But not all parents are willing or able to 
help, and those least likely to do so are those with little or no experience of 
university. Major reliance on family resources thus runs counter to widening 
participation.
•	 A student’s earnings while a student: time spent earning money is at the 
expense of studying and other aspects of student life. There is nothing wrong 
with this approach, but taken too far it conflicts with the quality of study.
•	 Employers: it is often argued that employers should contribute. But with 
today’s fluid labour markets, the incentive facing each employer is to let 
others pay for training and then try to poach the resulting trained workers. 
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As a standard proposition in economic theory, given the presence of an 
externality, employer contributions will be sub-optimal.
•	 Entrepreneurial activity by universities: this approach is often advocated; 
however, few universities make much money this way, and many waste 
resources trying. Again, there is nothing wrong with this approach, but its 
usefulness is overestimated.
•	 Philanthropic donations: often advocated, the benefits from this approach, 
again, are overestimated. The approach works well for some US universities, 
but produces major resources for very few institutions even in the United 
States, and, outside the United States, as with entrepreneurial activities, 
it would usually run at a loss if the relevant resources were accounted for 
properly.9
In sum, the potential for other sources of private finance should not be 
overestimated. Loans—that is, the student’s future earnings—are the only 
large-scale and socially equitable source of private finance, provided they can 
be implemented effectively.
Lessons about Implementation10
Implementation: The policy maker’s blind spot
As mentioned at the start of this chapter, strategic policy design is important 
but, on its own, is not enough. Implementation is of equal importance. Loans 
are not easy to implement, so the international landscape is littered with failed 
schemes. Many countries have a woeful record of collecting repayments. It is 
one thing to design a good loan system, quite another to make sure that the 
money is paid promptly and accurately to the right people and that repayments 
are collected effectively. After introductory discussion, we consider the 
prerequisites for an effective loan system, before outlining the tasks that are 
necessary to create and run a scheme, illustrating some of the problems that 
can arise where implementation fails; we then discuss an implementation myth.
9 There is an incentive to overstate the resources brought in by fundraisers. The relevant amount is not total 
donations, but only donations that would not have happened without the effort of the fundraisers. There is 
also often double counting—for example, where the research arm of a university and the fundraising arm 
both claim an incoming amount in full.
10 I am grateful to Hugh Macadie for the material on which the sections ‘Prerequisites for a Loan System’ 
and ‘The Necessary Tasks’ draw.
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Effective reform rests on a tripod of skills: strategic policy design, political 
implementation, and administrative/technical implementation.11 In many ways, 
policy design is the easy task. The more difficult part is to make a scheme work 
in practice—in both political and administrative terms. 
Most people are not aware of implementation, or, when they are, they 
underestimate what is involved. The idea that if one understands a policy one 
can establish a program for implementing it—a view to which academics are 
perhaps particularly prone—is generally false. A person with one of the skills 
frequently fails to grasp the importance of the other two. Academics frequently 
ignore politics and administration. Politicians might give too little weight to the 
coherence of a policy strategy or to meeting its administrative requirements—
for example, by allowing enough time and including an adequate administrative 
budget. Technical experts might take a narrow approach or oppose reforms for 
other reasons.
Prerequisites for a Loan System
Political Prerequisites
Implementing student loans has obvious political dimensions. Though largely 
taken for granted once they have become established, their initial introduction 
was turbulent in many countries. In the United Kingdom, the introduction 
of student loans in 1990 provoked enormous demonstrations, though today, 
loan design is part of my undergraduate teaching. In 2004, in the crucial 
parliamentary vote on a bill to introduce variable tuition fees, a government 
with a parliamentary majority of 160 won by five votes. In Australia, similarly, 
the proposal to introduce an income-contingent charge in 1989 to pay for part of 
tuition costs provoked considerable commotion, but the system is now regarded 
as part of the landscape.
The experience of the United Kingdom and Australia illustrates the need for 
robust political capacity. That capacity is necessary not only at the time the 
scheme is introduced, but on a continuing basis. As the New Zealand case 
shows, initial momentum for reform can falter for lack of continuing action 
by government to sustain support. Political pressures and populist politics can 
combine to introduce expensive and regressive blanket interest subsidies.
Technical Prerequisites
A country should not embark on a loan scheme unless and until it has
11 For fuller discussion, see Barr and Crawford (2005:Ch. 16).
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•	 a reliable method of identifying individuals—a responsibility of national 
government
•	 the capacity to maintain records of amounts borrowed, cumulative borrowing 
and interest charges, and the value of each person’s repayments; this task is 
the responsibility of the loans administration
•	 the capacity to collect repayments; income-contingent repayments are best 
collected by the tax or social security authorities; relying on educational 
institutions to collect loan repayments does not work well; in addition to 
collecting repayments within the country, it is necessary also to have the 
capacity to collect repayments from graduates working in other countries
•	 the capacity to track the income of each borrower; ideally this is the task 
of national government through personal income tax or social security 
contributions.
The first three elements apply to any loan scheme. As discussed in more detail 
in the section ‘Banks are Good at Collecting Repayments’, a country that cannot 
implement income-contingent repayments will generally also have difficulties 
collecting conventional loan repayments.
The Necessary Tasks
If a country has the technical capacities outlined above, a further series of 
requirements has to be in place to: a) establish a loan scheme; and b) run it.
Establishing an Effective Scheme
In order to establish a new scheme
•	 enough time must be allowed from the passage of legislation to the delivery 
of loans to the first cohort of borrowers; a large number of schemes fail at 
this first hurdle
•	 strong political sponsorship is essential—someone must have the vision and 
power to ensure that the policy happens as proposed
•	 clear ownership is also essential—for example, by the ministry of education
•	 the introduction of a loan system is not an event, but a process. Thus, 
political support has to be strong when the system is being established and 
continuing when it is in operation. 
A further series of requirements is more narrowly technical, including ensuring 
that there are enough people with the necessary skills, legislative preparation, 
information technology (IT) development, and effective project management.
A number of problems are common.
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•	 The political timetable for the introduction of a scheme is often incompatible 
with the timetable necessary for administrative purposes. A problem 
besetting UK governments is that they consistently underestimate the time, 
skills and energy necessary to make policy work. The United Kingdom is far 
from alone in making this error.
•	 Policy makers might introduce changes to the scheme once work is under 
way. Such changes are often incompatible with the planned administrative 
structure.
•	 Ownership of the scheme might be unclear or diffuse. 
Running a Scheme
As already noted, running a scheme once it has been established involves 
identification of the student, record keeping (amounts borrowed, repayments, 
accumulation of interest), and collection of repayments within the country and 
from graduates working abroad.
More specifically, at the time a student first takes out a loan it is necessary 
to establish her identity reliably; to provide her with information about her 
entitlement and about the operation of the loan; to establish the size of the loan 
to which she is entitled, which will require information about the degree she 
is taking (fees might be higher for some subjects than others), the university at 
which she is studying (some universities might be more expensive than others, 
either in terms of fees or living costs), and perhaps also her own income and 
that of her parents (if the size of the loan to which a student is entitled is income 
tested); and to establish that she actually turns up at the relevant university.
During the time a student is at university, it is necessary to establish that she 
continues her studies (and perhaps to keep track of her grades), and to keep 
track of the dates and amounts of further borrowing.
After the student has left university, it is necessary to
•	 keep track of him or her through changes of name, address, job, family 
circumstance (for example, if this is relevant to qualifying for a targeted 
interest subsidy), and country
•	 collect repayments, liaising as necessary with the tax authorities if that is the 
main route by which repayments are collected
•	 collect repayments in other ways for people who are outside the country
•	 ensure that any concessions on repayment are granted
•	 pursue delinquent repayments
•	 answer queries 
•	 record repayments and calculate the outstanding balance
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•	 keep borrowers notified of the balance of their loans
•	 arrange for collection of repayments to cease once the loan has been repaid.
Depending on how the loan scheme is financed, the loans administration might 
also need the skills to operate in financial markets.
A Different Way of Implementing Income-Contingent Repayments
Ideally, income-contingent repayments should be collected alongside income 
tax or social security contributions on the basis of a person’s current earnings. 
Thus, repayment instantly and accurately reflects changes in a person’s economic 
circumstances. 
This approach—as in Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom—is, 
however, administratively demanding. A different approach—less good in policy 
terms, but less demanding administratively and hence perhaps more realistic—
is to base a person’s loan repayments on his or her last completed tax return. 
Since tax returns are filed only at the end of the tax year, and then require time 
for the authorities to process them, repayments reflect a person’s earnings only 
with a lag. This is not a major problem where earnings do not change much, but 
fails to give automatic protection where a person’s income falls—for example, 
when someone loses their job or leaves paid work to have a child. For such 
cases, it is necessary to have an additional procedure whereby the person can 
apply for a reduction of his or her loan repayment. This is the arrangement in 
Sweden (which certainly has the capacity to collect repayments on a current 
basis) and Hungary (where policy makers intend to move to collection on the 
basis of current income once they have sufficient confidence in the robustness 
of the—still new—system of personal income tax).
The least demanding way to approximate income contingency is the system in 
the Netherlands. The default arrangement is that the borrower repays in equal 
annual instalments for a fixed period after graduation (that is, mortgage-type 
repayments). But the system includes provision for someone with low earnings 
to be allowed a lower repayment. Note, however, that this approach does not 
avoid the need to measure a person’s income—a task that many countries are not 
able to do well.
Illustrations 
Merely to list these requirements indicates the size of the task. The following 
tales illustrate the importance of implementation and the predictable problems 
that arise when policy makers ignore practicalities or accept excessively 
optimistic predictions about the ease of solving implementation problems.
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•	 Some institutions have a large peak in communications—for example, tax 
returns around the filing deadline, or student loan applications at the start 
of the academic year. How does a paper-based system deal with tasks such as 
opening large numbers of envelopes?
•	 In an electronic system, the analogous question is whether the system can 
cope with a huge peak without crashing.
•	 If a loan scheme processes loan applications by optically scanning handwritten 
paper applications, can the system cope with an application that has spent 
two weeks folded in a student’s pocket or has a large coffee stain on it?
•	 Does the system have a way of coping where an applicant for a loan misspells 
(paper-based) or mistypes (electronic) his or her own name (this is not 
fanciful)?
•	 Can the system cope with a massive peak of phone inquiries—for example, 
by automatically moving staff at the student loans administration from other 
tasks to the phones at such times. Again, this is not fanciful. If any element 
in the system breaks down (for example, a delay in disbursing loans), there 
will be a surge of telephone inquiries; if nothing is done, a breakdown in 
disbursement is rapidly followed by a breakdown in the system of telephone 
inquiries.
Given the wide array of institutional requirements both to establish and to run 
a scheme,
it is not surprising that successful income-contingent loans in advanced 
economies—including Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom—are not echoed in poorer 
countries. Chile and South Africa have such schemes on a small scale, 
with repayments collected by universities, a method that has proved 
unsatisfactory. Both schemes have met with some success, but would 
be fiscally costly on a larger scale. Thailand is planning to introduce 
an income-contingent loan scheme in 2006, the success of which will 
depend greatly on the effectiveness of income tax collection. Designing 
a cost-effective repayment mechanism in poorer countries should be at 
the top of the policy-maker agenda. (World Bank 2006:Box 3.7) 
‘Banks are Good at Collecting Repayments’: 
An implementation myth
It is often argued that one way to sidestep these problems is to ask banks to 
organise the scheme as a conventional loan, with fixed monthly repayments 
and short repayment duration. This approach, it is argued, does not depend on 
tax collection, and can therefore be effective in a country without an effective 
income tax system. That argument is profoundly mistaken.
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Mortgage Repayments Require a Fairly Sophisticated Collection 
Mechanism
Commercial banks have expertise in collecting repayments for loans that are: 
a) short term; and/or b) secured on a physical asset. This is the point Friedman 
made 50 years ago. Neither applies to student loans. There are good reasons for 
wanting student loans to have a fairly long duration: it is efficient if the lifetime 
of a loan bears a rational relationship to the lifetime of the asset being financed 
by the loan—thus, there are 25-year home loans but three-year car loans; and 
a longer repayment period makes possible smaller monthly repayments and/
or larger loans. In addition, as noted, there is no security for borrowing to 
finance human capital. For both reasons, collection by banks is likely to be 
administratively demanding and requires some sort of government guarantee. 
Government Guarantees to Private Lenders Create Problems
If, however, the guarantee is not generous, banks will decline to get involved. 
But if the guarantee is sufficiently generous, it creates problems of moral hazard, 
since banks have no incentive to pursue repayments vigorously, not least because 
they have no desire to alienate people who will become their best customers. 
Thus, the incentive structure is inimical to effective collection, leading to high 
default rates.
A second problem arising from government guarantees is what is known as 
the classification problem. There are international guidelines for national 
accounting that determine whether spending is public or private (IMF 2001; for 
non-technical discussion, see Barr 2001:Ch. 14). If students borrow money from 
banks, but the government guarantee is generous, the government, in effect, 
takes the risk of default. Thus, there is no risk transfer and, under international 
guidelines, lending by banks to students counts as public borrowing. The US 
system—with a government guarantee for loans that are classified as private—
ignores the rules. Ignoring the rules is not an option for developing countries.
The classification problem is central to discussion of ways of bringing private 
finance into post-compulsory education as, for example, in Hungary. This topic 
is rarely discussed and little known, but a developing country ignores it at its 
peril.
A Public Collection Agency?
On the face of it, public collection of conventional repayments might work 
better. This approach, however, requires considerable administrative capacity. 
Even where that administrative capacity exists, the public sector ends up 
running a student loan collection agency and a tax collection system, raising 
the question of whether resources devoted to collecting mortgage-type student 
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loan repayments might not be used better to bolster the effectiveness of the tax 
system. In the United Kingdom, the need for the Student Loans Company to 
conduct an annual reconciliation of individual accounts with the tax authorities 
helped to strengthen the effectiveness of both institutions.
Mortgage Repayments Require a Capacity to Implement an Income Test
Whether collected by a public or private agency, mortgage repayments require 
an income test. If repayments (say, $100 a month) are unrelated to a person’s 
income, a mechanism is needed to protect people with low or no earnings, for 
equity reasons, to ensure that the scheme remains politically viable, and to 
protect the credibility of the collection mechanism. But the corollary is that the 
agency organising repayments has to be able to establish a person’s income. This 
is a difficult task of measurement and enforcement even in an advanced country, 
let alone in a poorer country that does not have an effective tax system (which 
was the argument for having mortgage-type loans in the first place). An income 
test, in short, will be administratively demanding and costly. With a mortgage 
scheme, these costs will be in addition to those of the tax system.
In sum, mortgage-type loans, for the well-established reasons discussed earlier, 
work well for physical assets such as housing. With lending for human capital, 
in contrast, the theoretical arguments suggest that they expose both borrower 
and lender to excessive risk and uncertainty. The outcome is inefficient because 
it wastes talent and inequitable because capital-market imperfections bear most 
heavily on the least well off. Separately, mortgage loans are considerably more 
demanding administratively than is generally realised.
The Resulting System
It is important to be clear that the resulting system is not—and should not be—a 
free market. It is a regulated market. Universities set fees, but with a maximum 
fee level established by government. There is continued taxpayer support for 
teaching. Students apply to the institutions and courses of their choice.
Lessons About the Role of Government
Economic theory and international experience both suggest that a well-designed 
system has a continuing, important role for government
•	 to provide taxpayer support for higher education
•	 to regulate the system, both through a maximum level of fees and by ensuring 
that there is effective quality assurance (the role of government is to make sure 
that quality assurance happens, not necessarily to provide the service itself)
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•	 to set incentives—for example, larger subsidies for certain subjects
•	 to ensure that there is a good loan scheme
•	 to adopt policies to widen participation. 
Lessons About the Design of Student Loans 
Economic theory offers a series of conclusions.
•	 Loans should have income-contingent repayments.
•	 Untargeted interest subsidies prevent the achievement of any desirable 
policy objective. The default interest rate should be the government’s cost of 
borrowing, in combination with targeted interest subsidies.
•	 If untargeted interest subsidies are avoided, there should ideally be no 
income test for loan entitlement.
•	 There needs to be a thoughtful choice of the level of income at which loan 
repayments start and the repayment rate as a fraction of a person’s income.
•	 The design of the loan contract should ensure that emigrants and others 
outside the tax net are required to make repayments.
International experience offers complementary lessons.
•	 Income-contingent loans do not harm access (Australia, New Zealand, the 
United Kingdom, Hungary).
•	 Interest subsidies are expensive (New Zealand, the United Kingdom).
•	 Positive real interest rates are politically feasible (the Netherlands, Sweden, 
Norway, Hungary).
•	 The design of the loan contract matters.
•	 The design of the loan matters; it is possible, with care, to design a system 
with income-contingent repayments but mainly private finance, as in 
Hungary.
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4. Finance, State Capacity, 
Privatisation and Transparency in 
South-East Asian Higher Education  
Anthony R. Welch  
University of Sydney
Key dilemmas underpin the development and expansion of higher education in 
South-East Asia. On the one hand are the tensions between the desire to expand 
the quantity of higher education while at the same time improving quality. On 
the other is the issue of enhancing access while improving equity. While all 
of the five states treated in this chapter (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Thailand and Vietnam) share the goal of extending access to higher education as 
part of their wider social and economic development goals, none is in a position 
to provide public higher education to all who aspire to it, especially at a price 
they can afford. (The last is particularly significant: as is seen below, it is already 
the case, for example, that fees for high-demand courses in some public higher 
education institutions in Indonesia outstrip those in the private sector; Welch 
2007a:680.) 
Hence, across the region, private higher education is growing swiftly. This 
expansion is clearly widening access, although often at fee levels that, being 
much higher than those that commonly apply at public higher education 
institutions (HEIs), further exclude the poor. At the same time, the growth of 
private higher education is also sharpening quality issues, as well as problems in 
governance systems within the sector that are, in cases such as the Philippines, 
Indonesia and Vietnam, already stretched to capacity. 
This chapter examines the rise of private-sector HEIs in South-East Asia, and 
some of the issues associated with the changing balance and blurring borders 
of public and private higher education: finance, state capacity, governance, and 
transparency. The context for South-East Asian society and higher education 
is also rehearsed, including the relatively peripheral place occupied by the 
five South-East Asian higher education systems, within the global knowledge 
system. What is argued is that, while the spread of private higher education 
is undoubtedly opening up access, the high fee levels demanded effectively 
preclude enrolment by the poor, who are now also being squeezed by rising fee 
levels at public HEIs. Selected examples are given of differential funding and fee 
regimes, from the public and private sectors. 
Financing Higher Education and Economic Development in East Asia
50
The Functions of Higher Education
According to Manuel Castells (1993), all societies throughout history designate 
specific roles and functions for universities. Not only do these roles and functions 
change over time, depending on a given society’s prevailing history, culture, 
ideology or politics, they are also not always congruent, hence Castells refers to 
universities as ‘dynamic systems of contradictory functions’. He identifies four 
principal functions, each of which has implications for access and equity.
1. Universities might be assigned the responsibility for training bureaucracies 
and the provision of a highly skilled labour force. Most clearly evident in 
classical China, this was also their primary goal in Vietnam’s early Confucian 
period—for example, when institutions of higher learning were devoted to 
preparing students for the imperial system of examinations, which, for the 
successful, led to the state bureaucracy (Welch 2008a). While this strategy 
was in principle open to all, in practice, males drawn from noble families 
were the most common source of scholars. 
2. A somewhat different function of universities can be to act as social sorting 
mechanisms to select and train scientific, economic, political and educational 
elites. In such cases, the selection, socialisation and development of networks 
among other cadres all help to distinguish these elites from the rest of the 
society. Historically speaking, the French example is pertinent here, as also 
is its paler colonial imitation in Vietnam. Santo Tomas University—the 
Philippines institution founded in 1611—also served this function, albeit for 
the colonial elite. This function stands in contradiction to most principles of 
access and equity. 
3. Universities are often assigned the duty of acting as ideological apparatuses, 
responsible (among other institutions) for the formation and dissemination 
of the societal or state ideology. Here again, the role of Ho Chi Minh 
thought and Marxist–Leninist thought in contemporary Vietnam and the 
national ideology of Pancasila in Indonesia since independence are arguably 
illustrative. In principle, this function can open access to new aspirants, 
based on their ideological purity (but could well close that same door to 
well-qualified aspirants whose ideological orthodoxy is suspect). 
4. Universities also function to generate new knowledge. This is a more modern 
trend attributable to the successful incorporation by German universities 
of the research seminar and modernist subjects such as maths, science and 
technology into their curriculum in the nineteenth century (Welch 1980), 
and, somewhat later, US science-oriented universities’ close involvement in 
scientific and technological (including military) development and economic 
growth. Once again, this function does not exclude the poor or dispossessed, 
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but an examination of the social class characteristics of elite German and 
US institutions over time, for example, reveals a strong class bias. Much the 
same can be said of the characteristics of leading universities in South-East 
Asia, which are in general more concerned with teaching than knowledge 
creation. 
In summary, Castells’ taxonomy of roles and functions yields a broad outline of 
goals that are set for universities to perform
•	 train skilled labour as demanded by the society
•	 cultivate elites 
•	 generate and transmit ideology 
•	 create and apply new knowledge. 
Here, however, while ambitions and aspirations among developing countries 
are usually great, they often suffer from something of a disadvantage, relative 
to their counterparts in the developed world, where, as indicated below, the 
concentration of various kinds of resources, and a longer history of research and 
development, give the latter important competitive advantages.
The ongoing ability to successfully manage the sometimes contradictory functions 
of Castells’ typology is one crucial index of success for developing countries 
in achieving growth, reform, equity and social integration. Castells does not 
distinguish here between public and private institutions, but the addition of 
private universities into this sometimes volatile mix, including the regulation 
of this developing sector, further complicates an already difficult task, as is 
seen below. While it is acknowledged that, in a context that includes significant 
privatisation of public-sector HEIs (Welch 2007a, 2007b), and widespread 
globalisation of higher education, the former sharp divisions between public 
and private are no longer tenable, and, moreover, that different dimensions of 
private higher education also exist (Kim et al. 2007; Marginson 2007; Thaver 
2003), the specification of these different dimensions is beyond the scope of this 
chapter. Official government definitions of private higher education are referred 
to throughout. 
All of the states embraced by the following analysis can be considered part 
of the global South. Yet despite the fact that four of the South-East Asian Five 
countries in this analysis can be seen to fall within the low-income category 
(Malaysia’s GDP per capita level now places it into a middle-income category), 
all five have ambitious plans to extend higher education to larger proportions of 
their populace, who are in turn pressing their governments for more and more 
places for their children, and more institutions of higher education. This is for 
at least two reasons, each of which relates to Castells’ taxonomy above. 
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The first is that higher education is seen by all five governments, as well as 
international organisations such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB), as critical to the supply of the highly skilled personnel who, in a 
more post-Fordist world, are said to be the foundation of the new knowledge 
economies that supposedly characterise the twenty-first century (World Bank 
2002a). Governments of all five nations would subscribe to the following 
statement that summarises the role of higher education in forging the twenty-
first century knowledge economy: ‘The quality of knowledge generated within 
higher education institutions, and its availability to the wider economy, is 
becoming increasingly critical to national [and one could add international 
ARW] competitiveness’ (World Bank 2000b:9). 
Governments of developing nations, especially in South-East Asia, tend to 
see universities not merely as institutions of great national and international 
prestige (and also as important repositories of national culture), but, crucially, 
as springboards to the future, perhaps in concert with key industries such as 
information technology (IT), engineering and science, with which many of 
its better established universities are now engaged in cooperative or contract 
research. Just as information and communication technology (ICT) is seen as 
critical to development priorities, so too higher education is increasingly seen 
(especially in a more neo-liberal, economically rational world; Pusey 1991) as 
a driver of economic growth, putatively even enabling developing nations to 
leap ahead in their ongoing quest for development (World Bank 2002b). (As 
seen below, however, the parallel with higher education goes further, since this 
fervent aspiration is not so easily achieved, at least in the short term.) 
As indicated, however, this rationale for higher education is not limited to 
states (termed by economists the ‘social rate of return’), but also obtains at the 
level of the individual (the ‘individual rate of return’). Many individuals in the 
developing world see university education as a chance to secure a good white-
collar job, and perhaps to provide a passport to a postgraduate opportunity at an 
overseas university and/or the chance to work and live abroad. While this does 
not hold true for all who wish to pursue higher education (after all, significant 
numbers of students still pursue degrees that are almost bound to keep them 
poor—such as in the performing or fine arts, or in the less remunerative areas of 
the humanities, including history, languages or philosophy), it is more likely to 
hold true for those who enrol in the key areas such as engineering, the sciences, 
IT and business. 
But there are important differences in poorer, developing countries where, as in 
Vietnam, for example, public universities can provide places for at most about 
10 per cent of qualified applicants, fuelling a demand for private universities 
that is likely only to increase and perhaps lead to some distortions in fields 
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of study. Thus, for example, the intense pressure to gain entry leads to access 
becoming an end in itself: numbers of students end up studying subjects in 
which they have little interest, thus adding to the concerns about the efficiency 
and quality of the higher education system. Or, private institutions offer only 
a restricted range of popular subjects, particularly languages, IT and business 
studies, which are cheaper to provide (Levy 2007). 
Compared with lower levels of education, tertiary education is particularly 
expensive to provide, and even more so in the mission-critical departments and 
faculties of IT, engineering and science: 
By their very nature, science and technology have always demanded 
significant and ongoing investment to establish, maintain and expand 
the ‘engine’ of physical infrastructure—including laboratories, libraries 
and classrooms. They also need a rich [and expensive] fuel of textbooks, 
computers, equipment, and other supplies. (World Bank 2000b:71) 
This is less the case in the area of business, although even here, to establish 
an internationally reputable, well-staffed business school takes both time and 
considerable investment. To develop Stanford Business School or INSEAD in 
France to their current level took time, planning and a considerable, ongoing 
injection of resources—something often unavailable in developing countries. 
The South-East Asian Context
In order to appreciate the context for South-East Asian higher education, it is 
important to remind ourselves here of several key elements of the socioeconomic 
context that are relevant to considerations of financing access and equity. 
South-East Asia embraces about 540 million people, with a combined GDP of 
US$610 billion (or US$1.9 billion in purchasing power parity dollars/PPP$), 
and with very wide disparities—both across the region and within countries. 
Per capita GDP ranged from US$9120 (Malaysia) to US$2300 (Vietnam) in 2005 
(UNDP 2005:20). Females make up 49 per cent of the total population, while 
more than 56 per cent of the population still inhabits rural areas. Almost half the 
substantial numbers employed in agriculture are women; Human Development 
Index (HDI) rankings ranged from 59 (Malaysia) to 112 (Vietnam) in 2002 (UNDP 
2005). 
Of the five nations considered in this analysis, all are developing countries, 
while only Malaysia can be considered middle income. As well, while all five 
have recovered significantly from the calamitous effects of the regional financial 
crisis of the late 1990s, the gap between rich and poor continues to increase. 
Overall, this does not mean that the poor are becoming poorer, but rather that 
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the rich are making greater gains: ‘By and large…increases in inequality are 
not…“the rich getting rich and the poor getting poorer.” Rather, it is the rich 
getting rich faster than the poor’ (ADB 2007:6). 
Table 4.1 summarises key human development indicators for the South-East 
Asia Five, over the period 1990–2002, including expenditures on education. 
What can be seen from the table is that none of the five countries figures all that 
highly within overall HDI rankings, although there are significant differences 
among the five, with Indonesia and Vietnam—the two poorest—placed 
significantly below the other three. Indonesia and Thailand showed the greatest 
fall in HDI rankings over the period, but Malaysia also fell. Much of this decline 
can be attributed to the severe effects of the regional financial crisis of the late 
1990s, from which affected economies have only recently emerged. Only Vietnam 
emerged from this financial crisis with its HDI ranking unchanged (UNDP 
2005:20). Darkening this picture of limited resources are the debt levels carried 
by the majority of the five. While Vietnam’s debt, expressed as a percentage 
of GDP, is relatively low, at 3.4 per cent, the ratios for all the other countries 
are much higher: Indonesia, 9.8 per cent; Malaysia, 8.5 per cent; Philippines, 
10.9 per cent; and Thailand, 15.6 per cent (UNDP 2005:27). Additionally, in 
the case of Indonesia, expenditure on the military, expressed as a percentage 
of GDP, is as high as that for education (UNDP 2005:27). Such factors form an 
important part of the context and impose clear limits upon public-sector efforts 
in higher education: ‘Expenditures on debt servicing and military spending 
tend to crowd out social expenditures’ (UNDP 2005:26). 
While all countries (including Vietnam, whose data are absent in Table 4.1) 
show a rise in public expenditure on education over the period 1990–2002, this 
needs to be put into perspective. First, compared with public expenditure on 
education by the European Union, for example (5.41 per cent for the EU15, and 
5.14 per cent for the Accession 12), investment levels are modest for four of the 
five (UNDP 2007). Moreover, the apparently high proportion of the national 
budget expended on public education in Malaysia revealed in Table 4.1 is 
misleading, since in effect Chinese and Indian Malaysians (who together make 
up one-third of its population) are effectively excluded from the public sector in 
higher education (Tierney 2008; Welch 2008b), thereby heavily reducing access 
and equity. The same is true when proportions of public expenditure on tertiary 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Financing Higher Education and Economic Development in East Asia
56
While significant variation is evident in the above data, the percentages are 
generally low compared with high human development countries (UNDP 2007). 
Once again, the exception is Malaysia, which spends 35 per cent of its public 
education budget on the tertiary sector; but, as seen above, funds are effectively 
cordoned off for ethnic Malays (Bumiputras). 
In general, while rates of primary completion have shown significant growth, 
net secondary enrolment rates among the South-East Asia Five range from 58 per 
cent in Indonesia to 76 per cent in Malaysia (UNDP 2007). Many of those who 
do not complete secondary schooling, thereby rendering themselves ineligible 
for higher education, are from the poor. 
Poverty is also a significant issue that constrains the development of the public 
higher education sector in South-East Asia; actual poverty rates vary from 9 
per cent in Vietnam to more than 14.1 per cent in the Philippines, and 16.6 per 
cent for Indonesia (ADB 2005; World Bank 2007a:8). As measured by the GINI 
Index, inequality, particularly between rural and urban groups, is high relative 
to other world regions. Compared with the EU15, for example, which embraces 
a significant range of different contexts, all of the South-East Asia Five reveal 
relatively high indices, as evident in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3 GINI coefficient for the South-East Asia Five, compared with the 
EU15







* EU data cannot be given for a specific year since the category includes a number of countries for which 
data stem from different years. 
Source: UNDP (2005:26). 
In effect, what this means is that access by marginalised groups such as the 
urban and rural poor lags behind that of the overall population, in a context in 
which regional governments spend too little on the delivery of services to the 
poor.
In addition, spiralling costs of basic commodities such as food and fuel in 
2007 and 2008 have meant that larger amounts are being taken from national 
budgets to support significant sections of the population hardest hit by swiftly 
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rising prices. In an effort to offset rising unrest among the poor, for example, 
Indonesia increased the price of subsidised rice by 60 per cent in April 2008, 
but also expanded eligibility—beyond the 19 million individuals who already 
qualify for 5 kg of subsidised rice monthly (SMH 2008). Millions of the poorest 
Filipinos—currently allocating almost all their income to buy rice—are barely 
being kept afloat by government food subsidies. Following similar action by 
Indonesia, Vietnam—traditionally a major exporter of rice—has imposed 
export restrictions (SMH 2008). The above measures do not merely reduce 
the discretionary income of poor families available for education, including 
higher education, they also significantly constrain state budgets for social and 
educational programs. 
Last, it is important to note that, in addition to the factors indicated above, 
pressure upon tertiary education provision in the South-East Asian context 
also stems from the demographic profile of all five countries, in terms of both 
the relative youth of their populations and the high fertility rates (relative to 
developed nations). The implications of each can be seen in Table 4.4.

















(% of total) 
2000
Malaysia 12.3 22.2 2.4 34.1
Thailand 41.1 62.8 1.7 26.7
Philippines 42.0 75.7 2.4 37.5
Indonesia 134.6 212.1 1.8 30.8
Vietnam 48.0 78.1 2.0 33.4
Source: Compiled from UNDP (2002). 
Simply responding to this demographic pressure—and rising aspiration levels 
for higher education—is a difficult task for each of the South-East Asia Five, 
even apart from questions of institutional quality. 
A final index of development consists of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, 
which, while revealing remarkable changes over recent decades (including 
the substantial impact of the regional financial crisis of the late 1990s), remain 
modest (compared with China’s current FDI inflow for 2006, for example, of 
some US$72 billion). Some of this investment capital flows into South-East Asian 
higher education, as do some of the remittances—which, in the case of the 
Philippines, are extraordinarily high—but evidence is not systematic (Welch 
2008b). 
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Table 4.5 FDI inflows, South-East Asia Five, 1970–2003
Country 1970 1980 1990 2000 2003
Indonesia 83 180 1092 –4550 –597
Malaysia 94 933.9 2611 3787.6 2474
Philippines –1.04 –106 550 1345 319
Thailand 42.8 293.9 2575 3350.3 1802
Vietnam 0.07 17.9 180 1289.0 1450
Source: UNCTAD (2004).
All of the dimensions treated above significantly constrain growth in state 
capacity and substantial expansion of public higher education. 
North–South Differences in Higher Education 
and Research
Thus, while the ambition and commitment of the South-East Asia Five, and 
more generally among countries of the global South, to expand access to 
higher education in these key areas—and at the same time to build world-class 
departments and institutions—are undoubted and ubiquitous, the question of 
how far and fast they can move on this front is a genuine one. This is all the 
more the case when one considers that many developing countries, including 
the majority of the countries in this survey (except the Philippines, whose 
impressive tertiary enrolment ratio of 30 per cent in 1995—albeit including 
many low-quality HEIs—bears comparison with many OECD countries) had 
a tertiary enrolment ratio in the second-lowest category of all internationally 
(between 5 and 15 per cent) in 1995 (World Bank 2000b:12–13), while quality 
among many HEIs is still problematic in all five. 
What the above context adds up to is that the existing scientific gap between 
South and North is huge, and growing—exacerbated by trends that are 
examined below. This is not surprising, in light of some basic statistics. The 
North, for example, has something like 10 times the proportion of research 
and development (R&D) personnel (scientists and technicians) per capita of the 
South (3.8 per cent, compared with 0.4 per cent), and spends about four times 
the proportion of GDP on R&D—2 per cent compared with 0.5 per cent (World 
Bank 2000b). Most recent data further underline major disparities on a variety 
of knowledge indices, as seen in Table 4.6.
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South-East Asia 6.6 210 4.1 3.6
Indonesia 4.7 207 3.9 3.4
Malaysia 7.9 299 5.0 4.7
Philippines 7.6 48 3.3 2.7
Thailand 6.1 287 4.0 3.6
Developed-country 
average
9.5 3616 5.1 4.4
Source: World Bank (2006:134). 
Particularly with respect to researchers per million of population, the average 
difference is more than seventeen-fold, while in no South-East Asian country is 
the difference from the developed-country average less than twelve-fold. 
Table 4.7 reveals significant ongoing disparities in R&D, in terms of both 
spending and proportion of GDP.
Table 4.7 R&D expenditure levels and as a percentage of GDP, 2002 (R&D 
spending 2002; R&D as a percentage of GDP)*
Country US$ billion (PPP)
Percentage 
of world 1992 2002
South-East Asia 3.3 0.4 0.1 0.2
Indonesia 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.1
Malaysia 1.5 0.2 0.4 0.7
Philippines 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.1
Thailand 1.1 0.1 0.2 0.2
Developed-world 
average
645.8 77.8 2.3 2.3
* Regional data are the sum of R&D divided by the sum of PPP GDP
Source: World Bank (2006:116). 
In addition, the North registers some 97 per cent of all patents registered in the 
United States and Europe, and, together with the newly industrialising countries 
of East Asia, accounts for 84 per cent of all scientific articles published (World 
Bank 2000b:69). Further data from the US Patent Office reveal a continuing wide 
gap in terms of performance with respect to patents. 
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Table 4.8 US patents granted, by region, country and level of development 
(number of patents; patents per 100 000 people)
1990–94 2000–04 1990–94 2000–04 % change
South-East Asia 31 140 0.01 0.04 15.3
Indonesia 6 15 0.00 0.01 8.8
Malaysia 13 64 0.07 0.28 15.3
Philippines 6 18 0.01 0.02 10.4
Thailand 6 43 0.01 0.07 20.9
Developed world 
(average)
104 170 168 017 12.88 19.58 4.3
Source: World Bank (2006:123).
It is of course important to acknowledge that such indices as the Science Citation 
Index (SCI), Social Science Citation Index (SSCI), Engineering Index (EI) and 
the like are skewed in favour of English-language journals (thereby adding 
linguistic disadvantage to the existing disparities of wealth). Notwithstanding 
this additional burden for the South-East Asia Five, it is illustrative to note the 
following publication differentials (Table 4.9). 
Table 4.9 Papers and citations, by country, 1980s and 1990s
Country No. of papers 1981
No. of papers 
1995





Indonesia 89 310 694 3364
Malaysia 229 587 1332 3450
Philippines 243 294 1379 2893
Thailand 373 648 2419 8398
Vietnam 49 192 203 1657
Source: World Bank (2000b:125–7). 
Comparative figures help put this into perspective: Australian publications for 
1995 totalled 18 088, and for Japan 58 910. Citation counts for each country in 
1993–97 were 301 320 and 930 981, respectively. More recent data show that 
higher education across South-East Asia contributes much less to total R&D 
performance than among developed nations, as indicated in Table 4.10.
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Table 4.10 R&D performance by sector 
Country Business Government Higher education
South-East Asia 51.3 22.1 15.7
Indonesia 14.3 81.1 4.6
Malaysia 65.3 20.3 14.4
Philippines 58.6 21.7 17.0




Source: World Bank (2006:120).
Table 4.10 shows that, with the exception of Thailand, the higher education sector 
contributes little more than half of total R&D performance, relative to the average of 
developed nations, while in the case of Indonesia, it is about one-sixth, at 4.6 per cent. 
These stark disparities exist, notwithstanding the existence of traditions of great 
respect for education and the role of the teacher in society that obtain in much 
of Asia, and East and South-East Asia particularly, and despite the venerable 
forms of learning that long obtained in countries such as Vietnam (where Ha 
Noi’s Van Mieu [Temple of Literature]—founded in 1070, and more recently 
refurbished by American Express—contains the stelae of scholar-priests of 
many centuries ago) and Thailand (which exhibits a longstanding Buddhist 
tradition of commitment to learning) (Bovornsiri et al. 1996:55–7). 
What the above data reveal is that, notwithstanding the highest annual GDP per 
capita growth rate of any world region in recent decades (World Bank 2006:38–9), 
very high aspirations for higher education at both individual and social levels, and 
a high commitment to learning, among South-East Asian nations, existing levels 
of infrastructure in higher education limit the capacity for knowledge creation—
indicated by Castells as the fourth key function of the modern university. 
The Rise of Private Higher Education
It is important to consider the implications of the above here. Given a young 
population (as seen above, only one of the South-East Asia Five has less than 30 per 
cent of its population under the age of fifteen, and in the case of the Philippines it 
is closer to 40 per cent), rising levels of aspiration for higher education, and a tight 
budgetary context, the state is less and less likely to be able to satisfy demand for 
tertiary entry. How far is this likely to fuel demand for private higher education? 
And, if so, what does this mean for equity in countries where, under the influence 
of globalisation and structural adjustment, the gap between the rich and poor—
already large—is only widening (Mok and Welch 2003)? 
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Baseline data, against which to measure change, consist of the differing 
proportion of public and private higher education enrolments in the South-East 
Asia Five countries about a decade ago, as indicated in Table 4.11. 
Table 4.11 Distribution of students in public and private institutions of 







Source: Gonzales (1999:116). 
A striking index of change in South-East Asian higher education is the extent 
to which this picture has altered over the past decade. Notwithstanding the 
substantial diversity of political systems within the South-East Asia Five 
(ranging from a socialist polity adapting to the demands of a market economy 
and recent entry to the World Trade Organisation in Vietnam, to long-term 
crony-capitalist regimes such as the Philippines), private higher education in 
the region has grown apace. 
Both the dynamism of the region and the incompleteness of the data preclude the 
development of a current table comparable with the above. Nonetheless, indices of 
change are telling. While private higher education in the Philippines was already 
dominant, it has continued to grow, so that the proportion of private HEIs has 
remained more than 75 per cent (Welch 2008b). Vietnam has announced strikingly 
ambitious targets to expand higher education, which entail vigorous growth of 
the private (‘people’s’) higher educational institutions. (Following China, the 
term ‘socialisation’ is preferred to ‘privatisation’.) Effectively, private-sector HEIs 
doubled their share of enrolments in Vietnam over the three years from 1996–97 
to 1998–99 (Welch 2007b), while Le and Ashwill (2004) report that, by 2002–03, 
there were 23 private HEIs, enrolling 24 500 students (about 12 per cent of the 
total of 200 000 new enrolments). By 2020, government plans are for 40 per cent of 
all enrolments to be private (‘non-public’) (Hayden and Thiep 2004). In Malaysia, 
there are now 11 private universities registered, with a similar number of colleges, 
while private enrolments in higher education now significantly outnumber those 
in the public sector, if diploma and certificate levels are taken into account (MOHE 
2006). In Indonesia, too, private higher education has grown, although with 
total private enrolments now estimated to be 1.9 million, of a total of 3.4 million 
(Buchori and Malik 2004; Welch 2007a), the proportion might not have increased. 
Table 4.12 reveals the extent of change over the past decade or more. 
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Fees and Funding
Funding and fees are each an important factor in the expansion of private 
higher education. Given that although specific policies differ across the region, 
state funding for private higher education remains minimal (some countries 
choose to make land or other facilities available, and in some instances allow 
private HEIs to compete for discretionary funds), and that perhaps 90 per 
cent of the income of private HEIs comes from fees, issues of quality—already 
problematic—remain a concern. Compared with this is the situation of public 
HEIs in Indonesia, for example, which still gain about two-thirds of their budget 
from the state (Purwadi 2001; Welch 2007a).
There are also direct implications for access and equity, since fee levels for 
private HEIs are at least 50 per cent higher, and are often at least three times 
higher, than those at public HEIs (Welch 2007a, 2007b), which are usually still 
of higher quality. For example, when per capita income level in Indonesia was 
at US $880 in the mid 1990s, fees (which account for only an estimated 15–
20 per cent of total costs) ranged from about US$100–400 at public HEIs, and 
from US$100–1000 in private institutions. (While fee levels have changed, the 
patterns of difference between public and private have not.) Making matters 
worse was the differential impact on the poor. World Bank data for 1995 showed 
that higher education was already well beyond the reach of many: average 
household expenditure on higher education per student in West Java, for 
example, was 84.6 per cent of total per capita expenditure levels. The average, 
however, conceals the differential impact on social strata, which ranged from 
79.1 per cent for the highest quartile to 151.5 per cent for the lowest quartile 
(Welch 2007a). 
Two factors increase the squeeze on the poor. The first is the effect of very 
different schooling retentivity rates. In Indonesia, for example, many ‘students 
from poorer families fail to complete secondary school, and efforts to target the 
few poor students who do, for scholarships, have largely proved unsuccessful’ 
(Welch 2007a). Second is the trend by many public HEIs—themselves squeezed 
in an era of rising enrolments but declining per-student funding from the 
state—to raise their fees, particularly for high-demand courses. In Indonesia, 
for example, it is now possible to pay more for specific high-demand courses—
for example, in engineering—at a major public university than would be paid 
at a quality private HEI (Welch 2007a). The phenomenon known in Indonesia 
as ‘Jalur Khusus’ (special path, or special passage) gives entry to perhaps 10 
per cent of enrollees, upon payment of a fee that might be double that paid at a 
decent private HEI (Welch 2007a). The effects on the poor—for whom entry to 
a good public HEI was, however difficult, their only hope of an affordable place 
at a quality institution—are obvious. 
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In Vietnam, the relatively recent category of HEI known as ‘people’s universities’ 
(a term that disguises the fact that they are, for all intents and purposes, private 
institutions) attracts no funds from the state, and they are entirely dependent 
upon fees and donations (although they might be given land by the government, 
or permission to purchase land at a discount).  
Distinct political ideologies make a difference to higher education policies in 
each of the five cases, although at least three factors moderate these differences. 
The first are the powerful homogenising effects of economic globalisation and 
structural adjustment, which, as has been argued elsewhere, are moving many 
systems in a similar direction, albeit at different paces and to differing degrees 
(Welch and Mok 2003). The second is the gap between official rhetoric and 
actual practice in each case. Although following the example of its powerful and 
sometimes troublesome northern neighbour, Vietnam chooses to call its private 
universities ‘people’s universities’, they are in many ways little different in form 
and function to private institutions in other countries. The third homogenising 
effect is the rise of global English (Crystal 1997; Wilson et al. 1998), which is 
exerting pressure on teaching and research regimes—and not merely regionally. 
State Capacity and Governance in Higher 
Education
What implications do the data and trends indicated above yield for the governance 
of regional higher education? Clearly, the fact that, with the exception of Malaysia, 
the South-East nations included here are each among the low-income category, 
and that additionally each of them suffered substantially in the fallout from the 
regional economic crisis of the late 1990s, imposes limits on both the quality of 
teaching and learning and the capacity of the public sector to respond to demand. 
Table 4.13 shows shifting levels of GDP growth among the South-East Asia Five 
before, during and after the regional economic crisis. 
Table 4.13 GDP growth rates, South-East Asia Five countries, 1996–99 
and 2005 (per cent)









Indonesia 8.0 4.5 –13.7 0.2 5.5
Malaysia 8.6 7.5 –7.5 5.4 5.3
Philippines 5.8 5.2 –0.5 3.2 5.0
Thailand 5.5 8.4 –10.0 4.2 5.2
Vietnam 9.3 8.2 3.5 4.2 7.5
Sources: World Bank (2000a, 2005); IMF (2001:Table 3, p. 35). 
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While Table 4.13 reveals significant economic regrowth among all of the South-
East Asia Five, especially compared with the depths of the late 1990s, recent 
analyses predict that the ‘global fallout from the US financial crisis’ will reduce 
growth rates for 2008 in all of the South-East Asia Five, with the exception of 
Thailand (The Australian 2008). 
What this means for universities throughout South-East Asia is that there is still 
much ground to be made up. None of the universities in the South-East Asia 
Five, for example, was among the top-500 universities listed in the Shanghai 
Jiaotong index of leading research universities (MOHE 2006:263–73). That said, 
of course, each country has cherished icons of higher education among its ranks: 
Vietnam National University, the University of the Philippines, the University 
of Indonesia, Chulalongkorn University and the University of Malaysia. 
More than knowledge creation is, however, limited by relative lack of resources, 
infrastructure and training. The lack of income and infrastructure in education 
also affects regulatory capacity in higher education (notably, the various national 
agencies or departments charged with regulation and quality assurance) (Welch 
2007a, 2007b). While regional higher education systems grow apace, particularly 
in the private sector, as was seen above, it is not clear that regulatory capacity, 
and in some cases transparency, has always grown in parallel, in either size or 
strength. 
Internationally, a significant element of higher education reforms in recent 
years has been changes to governance. As the goals of higher education have 
been revised, against the background of a complex and shifting environment, 
so too has the governance of higher education (Amaral et al. 2002, 2003; OECD 
2003). A key element common to many systems of higher education, including 
in the Asia-Pacific, is the move towards devolution, from a pattern of strong 
centralisation. While governments retain a strong interest in higher education, 
and in particular its capacity to contribute to national economic development, 
devolution to institutional level is seen as a means to ensure flexibility and 
diversity. In Indonesia, for example, educational decentralisation in higher 
education was trialled via a pilot scheme in five public HEIs, which were 
accorded the new status of ‘Badan Hukum Milik Negera’ (BHMN; ‘State-Owned 
Legal Institution’) (Welch 2007a). By virtue of this new status, the selected HEIs 
were authorised to create new patterns of student recruitment, which would, 
inter alia, have the effect of garnering greater financial support from students 
and their families.
At the same time, however, HEIs are caught in something of a dilemma. On 
the one hand, the increasing mismatch between ever increasing enrolment 
demand and limited state capacity means that public HEIs are being pressured 
to diversify their income sources, while the private sector expands to respond to 
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unmet demand. Both trends are evident in the South-East Asian systems treated 
here. This might, however, add little if anything to teaching quality or research 
output; indeed, there is evidence in several South-East Asian systems that it 
could weaken each, with academics from the public sector either being poached 
to work in the private sector or increasingly moonlighting there (Welch 2007a). 
On the other hand, while governments tout the virtues of devolution, institutions 
find themselves pressured by more intricate regulatory architecture, which sets 
real limits on their capacity to implement devolution effectively. While state 
funding per student plateaus, or even declines, governments demand more and 
more accountability—a process that has been characterised as like accountancy, 
as ‘rule by performance indicator’ increasingly burdens academic work and life 
(Welch 1998). In the process, devolution has been characterised as a form of 
‘centralised decentralisation’ (Lee and Gopinathan 2004; Mok 2004). Many critics 
seriously question the extent to which the much-touted institutional freedom to 
run their own affairs is genuine, or illusory, against such a backdrop. Certainly, 
regional evidence shows that decentralisation of governance (Aspinall 2004) 
and education at other levels has not been without its problems (Amirrachman 
et al. 2008; Surakhmad 2002), while in higher education, too, problems persist, 
as is seen below. 
The Impact of Limited Infrastructure
In a curious irony, it can be argued that the increasing demands of governance 
impose real limits on governability in South-East Asian universities. While 
regionally devolution has been accompanied by increased demands for 
performance data, and a move to discretionary funding for which HEIs must 
compete, little or no additional personnel or other resources have been made 
available to respond to such trends. At the same time, governments, too, are 
under pressure, often with very limited resources available within agencies 
and ministries charged with the regulation of quality and propriety in higher 
education. Given the less-developed status of all but one of the South-East Asia 
Five, personnel with which to perform such regulatory tasks are limited, and 
high-level training of such staff cannot always be assumed. 
This has long been problematic, but has become more so in light of several 
factors. The rise of mass higher education systems, and larger numbers of 
institutions, makes the mechanics of ensuring quality control difficult, even in 
the public system. The rise and complexity of the private sector, sketched above, 
have made the job even more complex, with in some cases the total number of 
HEIs nationally rising to more than 1000. Most recent figures for Malaysia show 
533 private HEIs of non-university status (MOHE 2006:257), while in Indonesia, 
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for example, there are two categories of private HEIs: ‘terakreditasi’ (accredited) 
and ‘tidak terakreditasi’ (non-accredited). The latter are quite widespread. 
Geographic dispersal adds to these difficulties—although in the early 1990s, 
some 25 per cent of all private HEIs were still located either in Jakarta (16.4 per 
cent) or East Java (9.6 per cent) (Pardoen 1998:28). The proliferation in recent 
years of private HEIs (PHEIs) well outside the major cities itself yields its own 
difficulties: 
[S]uch a big number of PHEIs presents problems, especially when 
dealing with the quality control of the education they offer…the controls 
sound weak due to the fact that monitoring activities are not easy, and 
necessitate a high cost because some of the PHEIs are in scattered areas. 
Generally, the problems of monitoring PHEIs lead to several particulars 
concerning government policies, quality control and financial matters. 
(Hardihardaja 1996:42) 
Last, the rise of transnational higher education and cross-border programs and 
institutions makes the regulatory challenge even tougher (Knight 2007) for 
already hard-pressed national regulatory agencies. While many transnational 
institutions and programs act ethically, and are of high quality, there are 
numerous regional examples of bogus ‘cyber universities’ and virtual-diploma 
mills. 
Transparency: The impact of corruption
It must also be acknowledged that South-East Asia is not free of corruption, and 
that this also at times permeates higher education. While most university staff—
both academic and administrative (sometimes they are the same individuals)—
throughout the region work hard under challenging conditions, including the 
aforementioned poor remuneration rates and very limited resources, there are 
some who perform less honourably.  
Transparency International’s 2006 Corruption Perceptions Index points to a 
strong correlation between corruption and poverty, with a concentration of 
impoverished states at the bottom of the ranking. ‘Corruption traps millions 
in poverty’, according to the chair of Transparency International, Huguette 
Labelle. ‘Despite a decade of progress in establishing anti-corruption laws 
and regulations, today’s results indicate that much remains to be done before 
we see meaningful improvements in the lives of the world’s poorest citizens’ 
(Transparency International 2006). 
The 2006 Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International 2006) is 
a composite index that draws on multiple expert opinion surveys that poll 
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perceptions of public-sector corruption in 163 countries around the world—the 
greatest scope of any Corruption Perceptions Index to date. Countries are scored 
on a scale from zero to 10: zero indicates high levels of perceived corruption, 
while 10 indicates low levels of perceived corruption. 
A strong correlation between corruption and poverty—evident in the results 
of the 2006 Corruption Perceptions Index—affects the South-East Asia Five 
significantly. Public-sector wages in all but Malaysia are poor, and moonlighting 
is common. Indeed, the correlation between poverty and corruption is 
underscored by the fact that only Malaysia scored 5.0, while others ranged 
from 3.6 (Thailand) and 2.6 (Vietnam) to 2.4 (Indonesia) and 2.5 (Philippines). 
Moreover, there is evidence that, while some among the South-East Asia Five 
have made progress in controlling corruption in recent years (notably, Malaysia 
and Thailand), the situation has worsened in Indonesia, Vietnam and the 
Philippines (UNDP 2005:41). As seen below, higher education is not immune to 
such effects.
Westcott’s (2001) analysis of corruption in South-East Asia provides some 
examples of the general effects of pervasive corruption (International Herald 
Tribune 2001). He cites, for example, the estimate of Thailand’s National 
Counter-Corruption Commission (NCCC) that up to 30 per cent of government 
procurement budgets could be lost due to corrupt practices. At the lower end, 
this would almost equal the entire budget of the Ministry of Agriculture. At the 
upper end, it would exceed the combined budgets of Agriculture and Public 
Health (Westcott 2001:252). Data from Vietnam cite reports showing that nearly 
one-third of Vietnam’s public investment expenditure in 1998—equivalent to 5 
per cent of GDP—was lost to fraud and corruption, and the situation has not 
improved since then (Westcott 2001:258). As elsewhere in South-East Asia, in 
Vietnam, the situation is not helped by poor public-sector pay and widespread 
moonlighting (Welch 2007a, 2007b). 
Education effects at all levels, especially for the poor, are clearly evident, as 
illustrated in the following example taken from the Philippines:
Corruption…has an impact on the health and education of the poor…it 
reduces test scores, lowers national ranking of schools, raises variation of 
test scores within schools, and reduces satisfaction ratings…corruption 
affects public services in different ways than urban areas, and…harms 
the poor more than the wealthy. (UNDP 2005:44) 
Specific effects on higher education are revealed in the two following 
examples. The first occurred within Indonesia, where a private HEI’s Faculty 
of Engineering, facing an upcoming evaluation of its facilities by the national 
regulatory authority (BAN), and well aware that its level of engineering 
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infrastructure was inadequate, adopted a strategy designed to circumvent the 
problem. Unwilling to accept the consequences of a poor rating, the Faculty 
of Engineering approached local engineering firms to borrow numerous items 
of major equipment. The day after the successful inspection, which ultimately 
yielded a satisfactory B rating, all items of equipment were returned, leaving 
students just as bereft of much necessary equipment as before. Such stories are 
not uncommon: ‘Many private schools provide engineering education without 
sufficient equipment to support the curriculum and end up compromising the 
quality of their graduates’ (Buchori and Malik 2004:262). The need for a more 
effective regulatory regime is now widely acknowledged against a background 
of a widespread culture of corruption (known in Indonesia as KKN: ‘Korrupsi, 
Kollusi and Nepotism’) that has the capacity to undermine the effectiveness 
of quality-assurance procedures (Kompas 2002; Transparency International: 
<http://www.transparency.org>). Indeed, one of the impacts of devolution in 
Indonesia in recent years is sometimes said to be the export of corruption to the 
local level (Amirrachman et al. 2008). 
The second set of examples comes from Vietnam, where, in 2001, serious 
problems surfaced at certain private HEIs. At least two difficulties became 
apparent in the course of the official police investigation. Each also arguably 
related to their status as non-state institutions, ineligible for public funds. The 
first issue was that of over-enrolment, in a situation in which the Ministry of 
Education and Training (MOET) sets legally defined enrolment limits for such 
institutions. Dong Do University was found by MOET to have over-enrolled 
to the tune of 2.8 times its MOET quota. Thus, for the academic year 2001–
02 alone, Dong Do had enrolled 4205 students, rather than its allotted 1500. 
Interestingly, however, the problems had been known for some years: ‘The 
Dong Do University scandal first surfaced in October 1998 when officials of the 
Ministry of Education and Training found that the number of students admitted 
to the university far surpassed the permitted figure’ (Viet Nam News 2002a). 
The second issue was one of entry standards. While this could be seen as simply 
an issue of quality, it was alleged in 2001 that the leaders of Dong Do had been 
routinely accepting bribes from students or their families in order to secure 
entry to the institution. This, too, is strictly illegal, but allegedly occurred in an 
effort to boost the numbers of enrolments and income levels. 
Once again, the official MOET investigation did indeed uncover substantial 
breaches: papers were given marks of eight or nine out of 10, at times by 
unqualified markers, when their real grade was assessed as being as low as 0.5. 
Several dozen students were accepted for enrolment without even being on the 
list of students for selection. Another 380 had no upper secondary graduation 
certificates at all. All in all, some 80 per cent of students accepted for enrolment 
at Dong Do were found to have scores lower than those reported by the 
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University Council, while some had had their marks increased by re-scoring. 
The investigating team also found, beyond these serious breaches of procedure, 
that the university had failed to build any facilities, offices or classrooms in 
seven years of operation or to invest in enhancing the quality of academic staff. 
Facilities were assessed as not meeting the standards of a university (Lao Dong: 
<http://www.laodong.com.vn>). 
As a result of this investigation, Dong Do’s 2002 enrolments were deemed 
cancelled, and the university was given strict instructions to end such illegal 
practices. The Ha Noi police were called in to conduct an investigation and, 
if necessary, proceed to prosecutions against the rector and other senior staff 
responsible. The deputy chair of its board of management was subpoenaed ‘for 
his involvement in [one] of the biggest scandals to date in the education sector’ 
(Viet Nam News 2002a, 2002b). The former director of its training department 
was also charged. 
At times, too, gamekeeper has turned poacher. In a separate case in 2002, two 
senior MOET officials—both at deputy minister level—were either reprimanded 
or sacked after their involvement in the ‘Asian International University’ (AIU) 
scam was revealed. Both officials were linked with the ‘bogus university, 
which set up shop in Viet Nam, and enrolled thousands, awarding worthless 
paper degrees’ (Viet Nam News 2002c). After being in operation for five years, 
AIU, which was established in 1995 in cooperation with Hanoi University of 
Foreign Languages, ceased pretending to be a university, leaving more than 
2000 students stranded, having lost hundreds of thousand of dollars (Le and 
Ashwill 2004). In another incident, the so-called American Capital University 
(ACU) offered an MBA program, together with a partner: the variously titled 
Singapore (later Senior) Management Training Centre. Both institutions are now 
defunct—again, leaving numbers of students thousands of dollars out of pocket 
(Ashwill 2006). 
What are the implications of the above examples for access and equity? The 
Indonesian example clearly raises issues of access, since if the process of 
accreditation had proceeded in a transparent manner, the ability of the institution 
to recruit would have been crippled. Equity is also implied, since under the 
current regime, students are being denied access to good-quality engineering 
education, notably through lack of relevant facilities and equipment. Of the 
Vietnamese cases, Dong Do could be said to represent widening of access—albeit 
illegally—but at the cost of quality, since students were able to enter at scores 
well below those normally deemed acceptable. The cases of the bogus AIU and 
ACU represented a loss of both access and equity, leaving many families out of 
pocket, having paid fees in good faith to institutions that proved in the end to 
be little more than shopfronts. 
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Conclusion: Blurring borders, changing balance
If, as is evident above, expanding access to higher education is occurring largely 
through expansion of the private sector—as is currently the case in many parts 
of the world (Altbach 1999)—the question of the impact of such a new balance 
on equality must be addressed:
[T]here is another important downside to private financing—it may 
preclude the enrolment of deserving students who do not have the 
ability to pay, and often evokes resentment among students who do. 
Means-tested scholarship and loan programs are one possible approach 
to addressing this problem, but they have proven very difficult to 
administer due to the difficulty of assessing ability to pay, sometimes 
exorbitant administrative costs, corruption and high rates of default. 
(World Bank 2000b:57) 
The ongoing failure of student loans in the Philippines and Thailand illustrates 
such difficulties (Welch 2008b). At the very least, there is a heightened need for 
regulation and quality assurance (QA) in such a new context, in which there are 
likely to be a growing number of domestic and international private providers, 
some of whom are worthy and others of whom are little more than shopfronts or 
(cyber) diploma mills. As indicated above, already the rector of one of the larger 
and more longstanding ‘people’s universities’ in Vietnam has been placed under 
police investigation, allegedly both for exceeding his enrolment quota by a huge 
margin and for taking bribes to allow students with poor marks to enrol. In 
Indonesia, and in others of the South-East Asia Five countries, further examples 
of corrupt practices and cheating exist. Such stratagems were driven, at least in 
part, by the need—or greed—for funding, as well as poor public-sector pay and 
a culture in which lack of transparency is widely accepted. 
Despite the undoubted need for careful regulation of the higher education 
sector, and the importance of promoting quality, it will not be easily or simply 
accomplished:
[I]n most developing countries, no clearly identified set of individuals 
or institutions is working to ensure that all the goals of the country’s 
higher education sector will be fulfilled. A coherent and rational 
approach toward management of the entire higher education sector is 
therefore needed…Policymakers must decide on the extent to which 
they will guide the development of their country’s higher education 
sector, and the extent to which they think that market forces will lead 
to the establishment of and operation of a viable system. Overall, the 
Task Force believes that government guidance is an essential part of any 
solution. (World Bank 2000b:58) 
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The case of the Philippines, where, as was seen above, until recently more than 
80 per cent of all HEIs were private, illustrates the difficulty clearly. In a political 
system in which every legislator sees it as part of their legacy to create an HEI 
that will be named after them, the proliferation of small, poor-quality institutions 
is a longstanding problem. Faced with this difficulty, efforts were made during 
the 1980s to introduce a national system that regulated the establishment and 
operations of private HEIs. The ensuing stout opposition by the private sector, 
many sections of which argued that the regulations threatened the financial 
viability of their institutions, forced the abandonment of the scheme, and a 
reversion to a laissez-faire pattern occurred. It is for such reasons, for example, 
that all but a few HEIs in the Philippines—public and private—are regarded by 
both domestic experts and external accreditation agencies as falling well short 
of international degree-level standards. 
Finally, given the swiftness and the extent of the transformation, which are 
seeing public HEIs introducing fees, at times quite high, and employing all 
available strategies—and stratagems—to diversify their funding base, are the 
boundaries between public and private likely to be as clear in the future as 
in the past? Just as transnational HEIs and programs are breaching national 
borders on an unprecedented scale, are we likely to see a further blurring of 
borders between public and private in higher education?
Private higher education is one of the most dynamic and fastest-growing 
segments of post-secondary education at the start of the twenty-first century. 
A combination of unprecedented demand for access to higher education and 
the inability or unwillingness of governments to provide the necessary support 
has brought private higher education to the forefront. Private institutions—
with a long history in many countries—are expanding in scope and number 
and are increasingly important in parts of the world that have relied on the 
public sector. A related phenomenon is the ‘privatisation’ of public institutions 
in some countries. With tuition and other charges rising, public and private 
institutions look more and more similar (World Bank 2000b:58). 
In such circumstances, the challenge to access and equity in higher education in 
South-East Asia remains substantial. The second function of universities listed 
above by Castells—the selection and training of elites—is being distorted by 
increases in fees, which are excluding the poor both from both private and, 
increasingly, from public HEIs. Adding to the problem is corruption—an 
ongoing problem, with clear implications for access and equity. Hence, while 
the rise of private higher education ensures that access to higher education will 
continue to expand (albeit less so in the Philippines where access is already 
substantial), equity, particularly in terms of access to good-quality higher 
education for the poor, will likely continue to be quite limited. 
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Introduction and Background
In 1989 the Australian government introduced an income-contingent loan for 
the payment of public-sector higher education1 tuition charges, known as the 
Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS). The debt is repaid through the 
income tax system and, at the time, it was the first scheme of its kind. Since 
then similar arrangements have been adopted in, among other countries, New 
Zealand (1991), South Africa (1991), the United Kingdom (2006), Thailand (2006) 
and Israel (planned for 2008). As well, there is currently active consideration of 
potential higher education financing reforms towards income-contingent loans 
in Germany, Canada and a host of other countries. It is not an exaggeration 
to suggest that there is an ongoing quiet revolution internationally in higher 
education financing towards the adoption of income-contingent loans.
This chapter examines the basis of income-contingent loans for higher education 
financing, focusing on the Australian experience with HECS.2 A key aspect 
of the discussion is an analysis of the benefits in concept, and a difficulty in 
practice, of income-contingent loans. A major issue for the adoption of HECS 
was the potential for the scheme to reduce the access of the disadvantaged to 
Australian higher education; an extensive review of the literature illustrates 
that this has not eventuated. As well, there is evidence to suggest that HECS 
has been associated with significant increases in the size of the higher education 
system and has proved to be administratively inexpensive. 
1 Practically all Australian universities are in the public sector.
2 For simplicity, the discussion does not include consideration of the period since 2005, when the scheme 
was made much more complex. The essential aspect of HECS—income-contingent repayment of the debt—
remains. For analysis of the likely effects of the changes introduced in 2005, see Beer and Chapman (2004).
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An important issue explored in this chapter concerns the benefits of income-
contingent loans with respect to consumption smoothing for borrowers. A 
hypothetical empirical exercise illustrates that, compared with the repayment 
of a similar bank loan, the burden of an income-contingent loan for students—
as measured by the proportion of a graduate’s income that is required to service 
the debt—can be far less than is the case for the bank loan.
The analysis should not be taken to suggest that income-contingent loans are a 
panacea for international higher education funding challenges. This is because 
in many countries there are important institutional difficulties to be overcome 
in the successful adoption of such approaches.
A Brief History of the Introduction of HECS3
1973 to 1986
Australian universities required students to pay fees until 1973, when they 
were abolished. But before then the majority of students had fee obligations 
exempt through the receipt of scholarships awarded on the basis of academic 
merit. Fee abolition meant that from the early 1970s to the late 1980s Australian 
universities were financed without any direct contribution from students. 
This policy stance changed significantly in 1987 with the institution of the 
Higher Education Administration Charge (HEAC), a small up-front fee on all 
university students of A$250 in 1987 terms—a charge that did not vary with 
respect to either discipline or course load. In symbolic terms, the institution 
of HEAC was significant in that it represented government endorsement of the 
charging of fees, and thus set the scene for more radical reforms involving user 
pays.
The revenue raised from HEAC was trivial in comparison with the total costs 
of higher education—amounting to about only 3 per cent of teaching costs. In 
1987, it remained the case that taxpayers provided practically all of the finances 
for higher education. At this time, a conjunction of forces made it inevitable 
that the government would move financing arrangements towards increased 
contributions from students. These forces were as follows.
3 The discussion of this section is based on description from Chapman and Ryan (2002).
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First, over the 1980s there was a significant increase in year 12 (the final year 
of high school) completion rates, but there was not a commensurate expansion 
in higher education places. This resulted in the political problem of large and 
growing queues of qualified prospective students. 
Second, while this problem could have been solved with increased Commonwealth 
budget outlays, the Labor government was intent on fiscal parsimony and 
not prepared to spend the additional taxpayer resources necessary to finance 
additional university places (see Edwards et al. 2001). 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly with respect to the political process, at 
least two cabinet ministers—John Dawkins and Peter Walsh—were strongly 
in favour of student fees on grounds of redistribution. Their view was that 
a system that did not charge higher education students was regressive; after 
all, universities were paid for by all taxpayers, yet students both came from 
relatively privileged backgrounds and, as graduates, received relatively high 
personal economic benefits. It is important to record that Walsh and Dawkins 
were then, respectively, in charge of the critical ministries of finance and higher 
education.
The Introduction of HECS
In 1987, John Dawkins invited the author of this chapter to prepare a report 
outlining the costs and benefits of different approaches to the introduction of a 
user-pays higher education system for Australia. The report presented analyses 
of several financing mechanisms, including up-front fees with scholarships, up-
front fees with government-subsidised bank loans, and an income-contingent 
charge system. The paper recommended the last of these, with repayments to 
be made via the direct tax system. Details were provided of how such a system 
might work, including possible fee levels and repayment parameters.
The minister believed that this report would have a difficult reception—for three 
reasons. First, the Australian Labor Party (ALP) in government had abolished 
university fees in 1973, and this had happened under the larger-than-life Labor 
icon former Prime Minister Gough Whitlam. Second, at that time, the Labor 
Party platform included a statement to the effect that ‘all education should be 
free of charge’. Third, the income-contingent payment system recommended 
was both radical and untested: there was no similar scheme internationally, 
and thus no empirical or political basis to assess its likely economic, social and 
administrative implications. 
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Minister Dawkins’ response was to set up a committee chaired by a popular 
former state Labor Premier, Neville Wran, to examine the relative merits of 
potential options. It was clear from the terms of reference that the government’s 
intent was to set the scene for the introduction of charges.
In May 1988, the Wran committee recommended that all Australian 
undergraduates should be required to pay a uniform charge, with the timing 
and level of payment dependent on income. This became policy in 1989, with 
the income-contingent feature of HECS being unique internationally. At that 
time, the first repayment threshold was about A$50 000 per annum in 2007 
terms.
Labor lost power in 1996, but the new conservative government maintained the 
essence of HECS. In 1997, however, charge levels were increased by about 40 
per cent on average, differential charges by course were introduced and the first 
income threshold at which graduates began to repay their loans was decreased 
to just less than $30 000 per annum in 2007 terms. The last decision was reversed 
in 2005, at which time the government also allowed some price discretion and 
extended HECS to cover full-fee-paying domestic students.
The Advantages of, and a Difficulty with, 
Income-Contingent Loans4
The Failure of Capital Markets for the Financing of 
Higher Education
Some might be tempted to ask why government intervention is required with 
respect to higher education financing. Why not impose charges at the point of 
entry and allow prospective students without access to the financial resources 
needed to pay the tuition to borrow the finances from banks? 
The problem is that commercial banks will not in general be interested in 
providing loans to finance human-capital investments. The concern of a bank 
lending in these circumstances is that, unlike many other purchases from a 
prospective debtor, there is no saleable collateral in the event of default—such 
as would be the case for the housing-capital market—and there is no slavery 
market in which to sell the human capital being developed. As well, and as 
recognised in Barr (2001) and Chapman (2006), investment returns from higher 
education are highly variable and uncertain. This implies a real risk to a bank 
with respect to default in the situation of former students receiving low incomes.
4 Much of the discussion in this section follows that of Chapman et al. (2007).
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The governments of many countries (for example, the United States, Canada 
and the Netherlands) address these problems by acting as a guarantor for 
student loans, and by paying the interest on the debt for the period before 
the borrower’s graduation. A problem inherent in this approach is that because 
the loans are government guaranteed, defaults imply additional government 
subsidies, which can be very high.5 What now follows examines other issues 
pertinent to a comparison between income-contingent and bank loans.
Income-Contingent Repayment and Default Protection
Instead of allowing some prospective students access to a bank loan with a 
government guarantee, other countries (including Australia, New Zealand and 
the United Kingdom) have adopted income-contingent loan systems, in which 
the former student repays the debt through the tax system, with repayments 
being dependent on income. Making repayments conditional on future income 
has a special advantage over other typical debt-repayment schemes—a point 
now explored.
One advantage of an income-contingent repayment approach is that it avoids 
the basic problem of the usual type of loan offered by banks. Unlike income-
contingent loans, normal bank loans require repayments to be made over a 
specified period—for example, the term of the loan. Usually no weight is given 
to the consequences of a borrower’s low income; the contract specifies that 
principal debt and interest payments have to be repaid within a given time.
The essential difference between income-contingent and bank-style loans is 
that the income-contingent variety serves to protect prospective students from 
the costs of the exigencies associated with the financial returns to educational 
investments. So income-contingent loans offer a form of ‘default insurance’, 
such that former students do not have to bear the costs of reneging on their 
debt as a result of periods of low future incomes. This is quite different to a 
bank-style loan, in which the costs of defaulting exist and could be very high, 
particularly if the borrower is locked out of other borrowing markets (most 
notably for housing) through damage to credit reputations. 
Default protection with income-contingent repayment overcomes a fundamental 
problem for prospective borrowers inherent in other loan schemes. With income-
contingent approaches, there is unlikely to be any concern about prospective 
students being unable to repay a loan or making repayment under financial 
duress.
5 See Harrison (1995) for data on US student loan defaults.
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Income-Contingent Repayment and Consumption 
Smoothing
A related problem for students with bank loans concerns possible consumption 
difficulties associated with fixed repayments. If the expected path of future 
incomes has a high variance, a fixed level of a debt payment will be associated 
with a high variance of disposable (after debt repayment) incomes. The point can 
be illustrated with the following simple example, with much more detail being 
presented in section five below.
Imagine that a student incurs a debt with fixed monthly repayments of $500 
after graduation, say, for five years. If her monthly income is expected to be a 
constant amount of $5000 after tax then the debt is also a constant proportion 
of income—in this case, 10 per cent. It is more likely to be the case that she 
expects her income to increase over time, as a result of promotions, for example, 
implying that the bank repayment would be expected to fall as a proportion of 
disposable income. For this example, the bank loan should not be expected to 
significantly affect her welfare.
But in the event of misfortune, such as job loss or sickness, the former student’s 
income stream might be far less stable than for the above circumstances. For 
example, imagine that the student experiences a monthly after-tax income 
stream of $5000 for the first year, but only $1500 for the second year. In this case, 
her ex post loan obligations turn out to be 10 per cent of income initially, but 
then reach 33.3 per cent of income. The fixed loan-repayment obligation is then 
associated with the likelihood of significant consumption hardships. Moreover, 
the uncertainty of future earnings has a greater potential to discourage loan 
take-up from those expecting to not have access to alternative finances in the 
event of low future incomes, and these people are more likely to be members of 
relatively disadvantaged groups.
With income-contingent loan repayments, however, the above difficulties are 
avoided. Imagine that the repayment rule is 12 per cent of income when monthly 
incomes are more than $3000, and zero otherwise. In the above example, the 
former student pays $600 a month of her debt in the first year, but is not required 
to pay anything in the second year. That is, income-contingent loan schemes 
offer insurance against consumption hardship, and this is because they are based 
on capacity to pay, not time, as is the case with a bank-style loan.
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An Important Administrative Concern
In Australia and other countries in which an income-contingent loan system 
has been introduced, this has turned out to be a relatively simple matter 
from an administrative point of view. The reasons for this are that the public 
administration systems of these countries feature a strong legal framework, 
a universal and transparent regime of income taxation and/or social security 
collection, and an efficient repayment mechanism. The last involves computerised 
record keeping of residents’ vital financial particulars and, very importantly, a 
universal system of unique identifiers (often accompanied by an identity card).
Under these circumstances it is not complicated to identify and track individual 
citizens and their incomes over time and space. It is not expensive, moreover, 
to tack onto some existing tax-collection mechanism an additional function: the 
collection of payments from ex-students on the basis of a fixed proportion of 
income. In the developing world, however, the preconditions to allow income-
contingent loans are often lacking.
Chapman and Nicholls (2004) argue that the minimum conditions for a successful 
income-contingent loan (Chapman 2006) seem to be
1. accurate record keeping of the accruing liabilities of students
2. a collection mechanism with a sound and, if possible, computerised record-
keeping system
3. an efficient way of determining with accuracy, over time, the actual incomes 
of former students.
Some would argue that a further basic requirement for the introduction of an 
income-contingent loan is a strong legal framework and functional judicial 
system. Indeed, it is hard, from a developed-world perspective, to imagine 
implementing a workable scheme outside this context. 
It is worth emphasising that of the three conditions noted above for the 
implementation of an income-contingent loan, two apply also to the collection 
of any kind of loan. The exception involves determining with accuracy, over 
time, the actual incomes of former students. This seems to require an effective 
income tax system including a reliable—preferably universal—system of unique 
identifiers; accordingly, this particular criterion is likely to be the most difficult 
institutional barrier to reform in developing countries.
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Australia’s Experience with HECS6
At the time of the introduction of HECS, close to nothing was known about the 
effects of income-contingent loans, because the scheme was the first of its kind. 
This section describes and evaluates the Australian higher education experience 
under this financing mechanism.
HECS Revenue, Changes in the Size of the System 
and Administration Costs
As illustrated in Figure 5.1, HECS has been associated with considerable increases 
in revenue for the government—of the order of about A$13 billion in total, with 
annual receipts currently in the order of A$1.2 billion. In lieu of a real rate of 
interest, the policy involves a discount for up-front payments (currently of 10 
per cent), and it is clear from the figure that this feature has contributed quite 
significantly to total annual revenue. Essentially, governments have used the 
revenue both to increase the size of the sector and to reduce considerably the 
proportion of the financing that is funded by taxpayers.
Figure 5.1 HECS revenue, 1989–90 to 2005 (A$)
Note: The figure for 2005–06 is a government estimate. Up-front payments are based on annual figures 
from 1989 through to 2005, rather than financial-year amounts.
Source: Commonwealth Department of Education, Science and Technology, as reported in Higher Education 
Report 2005.
6  Some of the analysis of this section follows discussion in Chapman (2006).
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Arguably, a major consequence of the substantial revenue received from HECS is 
that the government increased the number of places available, with the number 
of domestic students being shown for the period 1988–2000 in Figure 5.2. The 
data show a very large increase in the total number of domestic students since 
the introduction of HECS in 1989. In 12 years, female numbers had grown by 
63 per cent from 208 309 to 337 981, with the male figures increasing by 35 per 
cent, from 194 334 to 261 897. 
Figure 5.2 Student numbers (full-time equivalent), 1988–2000
Source: Commonwealth Department of Education, Science and Technology, Students (2000–2005) [Full 
Year]: Selected Higher Education Student Statistics; and Selected Higher Education Student Statistics 1999 
and 1997. 
In administrative terms, the costs of running HECS, for the Australian Taxation 
Office and the universities together, have been estimated by Chapman (2006) to 
be of the order of A$60 million per annum, which is less than 5 per cent of the 
annual receipts from the scheme.
Studies of the Participation of Disadvantaged Groups
The biggest policy and political concern with respect to the introduction of 
HECS was whether or not imposing a charge on students to be repaid in this 
way would have adverse consequences for the participation of poor prospective 
students. In the two instances in which the policy was changed after 1989—that 
is, in both 1997 and 2005—the same issue has arisen. There have been a large 
number of different investigations into this matter.
Financing Higher Education and Economic Development in East Asia
92
For example, Aungles et al. (2002) used the local area socioeconomic averages 
concerning education and occupation, as did Andrews (1999), to explore 
the possibility of there being an effect on commencements of the relatively 
disadvantaged from the very significant increases in HECS changes in 1997. In 
general, they found that the share of university commencements of students 
from low socioeconomic backgrounds did not change. There was, however, 
apparently an effect of differential HECS on subject choice, with a decrease in 
enrolments of low socioeconomic status males in courses in which the HECS 
charge increased most. The actual numbers involved were very small (less 
than 200 people) and these individuals were not discouraged from attending 
university per se; they simply changed their course choice. Chapman and Ryan 
(2005) report a similar effect in direction for this group using a measure of family 
wealth, but it was not found to be statistically significant.
Other studies have used individually based socioeconomic status measures in 
analyses of Australian higher education participation. Long et al. (1999) and 
Marks et al. (2000) used four and five panels of longitudinal data respectively 
to identify how education participation changed in Australia from the 1980s 
to the late 1990s. Long et al. (1999) used parental education and occupation 
to identify differences in education participation by socioeconomic status, as 
well as an indirect wealth index constructed from responses by individuals 
to questions about the presence of material possessions in their houses. They 
found no apparent effect of HECS on the access of the poor.
Chapman (1997) analysed university participation among eighteen-year-olds in 
the last two cohorts analysed by Long et al. (1999) and also concluded that 
the introduction of HECS had not affected university participation by students 
from disadvantaged backgrounds. Chapman’s approach had the advantage of 
measuring university participation in 1988 for the third cohort, prior to the 
introduction of HECS. Not everyone aged eighteen in these data had, however, 
completed school when surveyed in the relevant years, so the estimates 
understated university participation among young Australians.
Marks et al. (2000) measured participation by the proportion of individuals in 
higher education in 1999 who had been in year nine in 1995. This measure 
differed from that used for the earlier cohorts by Long et al. (1999). The wealth 
measure used by Marks et al. (2000) for the last panel also differed from the earlier 
ones. This research confirmed the positive impact of wealth on higher education 
participation. In general, however, their results suggested that socioeconomic 
status was less important in determining higher education participation in the 
1999 data than had been the case in the earlier panels.
Marks and McMillan (2006) analyse university participation within ranges of 
the entrance scores used by universities to select students for undergraduate 
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courses in 1999. They find that within these entrance score ranges, individuals 
whose parental occupational backgrounds are non-professional are as likely to 
participate in university as those whose parental occupational backgrounds are 
professional. They conclude that since occupational origins have little influence 
on university participation once entrance scores are taken into account, HECS 
has not deterred students from less-privileged backgrounds from attending 
university.
Cardak and Ryan (2006) produced similar results. They found that students from 
the most disadvantaged social backgrounds entered university at similar rates 
to those from the most advantaged backgrounds who had the same university 
entrance scores as them. Their university participation rates were much lower 
than those from the most advantaged backgrounds because they were less 
likely to obtain an entrance score and obtained a much lower one on average 
when they did. Among students with the same levels of school achievement in 
year nine, those from more advantaged backgrounds were able to convert that 
achievement into substantially higher university entrance scores by the end of 
their schooling than otherwise similar students from poorer backgrounds. 
Chapman and Ryan (2005) analyse the access effects of HECS using three of the 
longitudinal panels of data used in the Long et al. (1999) and Marks et al. (2000) 
studies. They use a consistent definition of university participation across these 
three cohorts. Chapman and Ryan (2005) analyse the participation in higher 
education of eighteen-year-olds in the first year they could potentially attend 
university. Thus, for the first two cohorts, they estimated the participation in 
higher education in 1988 and 1993 of individuals who should have reached 
year 12 in 1987 and 1992 respectively. For the 1999 cohort analysed in Marks et 
al. (2000), Chapman and Ryan analysed higher education participation among 
eighteen-year-olds.
Chapman and Ryan concluded that the introduction of HECS did not affect 
the access of the disadvantaged, in terms of enrolments. They found that the 
socioeconomic composition of the higher education student body changed 
somewhat between 1988 and 1993 in Australia, with the main change being 
the relative increase in participation by individuals in the middle of the wealth 
distribution.
In the period after significant modifications to HECS, all socioeconomic groups 
experienced the same proportionate increases in participation. Further, while 
there was an across-the-board decrease in the intentions of secondary students 
concerning university participation in 1996 after the announcement of the 
changes, in the next year (for all socioeconomic groups), enrolment intentions 
rebounded to their previous levels. Finally, for those who had not intended 
to participate in university, no differences associated with socioeconomic 
background were found in the proportion who eventually did participate.
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More generally, Chapman and Ryan (2005) concluded that changes in overall 
university participation appeared to reflect different behaviour across genders 
rather than across socioeconomic groups, with the exception that growth was 
highest among the middle of the wealth distribution.
The conclusions from the Australian research with respect to socioeconomic 
mix and access are as follows.
1. The relatively disadvantaged in Australia were less likely to attend university 
even when there were no student fees. This provides further support for 
the view that a no-charge public university system (that is, financed by all 
taxpayers) is regressive.
2. The introduction of HECS was associated with aggregate increases in higher 
education enrolments.
3. HECS was associated with decreases in the participation of prospective 
students from relatively poor families (although the percentage point 
increases were higher for less-disadvantaged students, especially in the 
middle of the wealth distribution).
4. There was a small decrease in the aggregate number of applications after the 
1997 changes, but no apparent decreases in commencements of members of 
low socioeconomic groups, except perhaps for a small number of males into 
courses with the highest charges.
5. The significant changes to HECS introduced in 1997 were associated 
generally with increases in the participation of individuals to 1999, 
irrespective of their family wealth. Even so, the growth in participation has 
slowed since then.
It appears that there have been few consequences for the accessibility to higher 
education for students from relatively disadvantaged backgrounds, at least as 
represented by enrolments. Broadly speaking, the socioeconomic make-up of the 
higher education student body was about the same in the late 1990s and early 
2000s as it was before HECS was introduced. This might have also happened 
with other financing approaches, of course.
A Caveat 
A qualification to the above conclusions is warranted. It is that the findings with 
respect to revenue, the number of places and student access cannot be traced 
directly to the fact that HECS is an income-contingent loan per se. Much of 
the 1989–2007 Australian higher education experience might well have resulted 
from the introduction of charges financed in other ways, such as up-front fees 
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with scholarships or bank loans. As well, before it is decided that income-
contingent loans constitute a broad panacea for higher education financing, it 
is critical to reinforce that the institutional and administrative arrangements 
need to be appropriate to allow such schemes to be implemented, and in many 
developing countries this will not be the case.
A Comment on the Form of the HECS Interest Rate
A proper understanding of the way HECS operates is to note that after it is 
incurred a HECS debt is adjusted only for changes in the consumer price index 
(CPI), implying that the real rate of interest is zero. This is not, however, in 
reality the case—a point now explained. The nature of the rate of interest on 
the charge is important. HECS has a form of a real rate of interest, but it is rarely 
reported as such. This comes from the 20 per cent discount for the up-front 
payment, meaning that those who choose to pay later are initially in debt to the 
tune of 25 per cent more than those who take the discount.
Calculations from Chapman and Kiananan (2008) reveal that (assuming a real 
discount rate of 3 per cent) there is very little interest rate subsidy associated 
with this form of a real rate of interest when it comes to the sizes of debts 
typically incurred in public-sector undergraduate courses. The story is very 
different when the scheme is transferred to the private sector, however, and it 
is in this context that the current form of the real interest rate on HECS needs 
to be revisited.
HECS Repayments and Consumption Smoothing
This section examines issues associated with the repayment of HECS. With the 
use of cross-sectional age–earnings profiles, the time paths and length of HECS 
repayments are shown for hypothetical male and female graduates working 
full-time, and these are compared with the repayment of an equivalent bank 
loan under typical arrangements. In terms of the welfare of borrowers, it is 
shown that there is a close similarity between the two types of loans for full-
time workers, as represented by the proportion of earnings required to repay 
the different debts.
Through the construction of a hypothetical graduate who experiences substantial 
variation in earnings, however, the differences in the effects of the two types of 
loans become very clear. This exercise highlights the critical importance with 
income-contingent loans of the feature of consumption smoothing.
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HECS Repayments for Full-Time Workers
To illustrate typical repayment scenarios for HECS debtors, three things are required
1. information concerning the HECS repayment rates
2. the construction of a hypothetical study, debt and working path
3. data concerning graduate earnings by age and sex.
Table 5.1 presents the repayment rates in operation in 2004–05.
Table 5.1 HECS income thresholds and repayment rates, 2004–05
HECS repayment incomes in the 
range (A$ p.a.)
Percentage of income applied to 
repayment
Below 35 000 Nil
35 001–38 987 4 .0
38 988–42 972 4 .5
42 973–45 232 5 .0
45 233–48 621 5 .5
48 622–52 657 6 .0
52 658–55 429 6 .5
55 430–60 971 7 .0
60 972–64 999 7 .5
65 000 and above 8 .0
Source: Australian Taxation Office, Repaying Your HECS Debt 2004–05, Commonwealth Government, Canberra.
The information available in Table 5.1 should be interpreted in the follow context. 
When students incur a debt, it is recorded in conjunction with their unique 
tax file numbers in the Australian Tax Office. From Table 5.1, in 2004–05, no 
repayments were required if the income of the former student fell below $35 000 
per annum, and above this level progressive proportions of income are subtracted 
from income until the debt is paid in full. For example, in a year in which the 
graduate earns $43 000, she will pay 0.05 x $43 000 = $2150 off her debt.
It is instructive to illustrate the effect of these charge levels and repayment 
parameters on the after-tax incomes of graduates by age. In what follows, the 
2004–05 HECS repayment parameters have been applied for male and female 
students, assuming: they begin a four-year science degree at age eighteen, which 
incurs an annual charge of $5367 (or $21 468 in total), graduating at age twenty-
two; and, after graduation, they take a full-time job earning the average income by 
age of graduates of their sex. The income data are taken from earnings functions 
estimated from the 2003 Household, Income and Labour Dynamics of Australia 
(HILDA) survey, updated to 2004–05 dollars, and as reported in Chapman (2006). 
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The results for males and females respectively are shown in Figures 5.3 and 5.4, 
which present taxable incomes before and after HECS repayments for the higher 
education investment scenarios described above. The data show that both male 
and female science graduates earning average graduate incomes for full-time 
workers will repay their total HECS debt about 10 years after graduating, or at 
about age thirty-one for our hypothetical students.
Figure 5.3 Earnings before and after HECS: males (A$ 2004)
Figure 5.4 Earnings before and after HECS: females (A$ 2004)
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To help motivate the important discussion below concerning the consequences of 
income-contingent loans with respect to consumption smoothing, it is instructive 
to compare the HECS repayment experience illustrated above for full-time earnings 
with what would have been the case with a bank loan of the same amount repaid 
on the basis of time.7 In what now follows, we compare these repayments with 
what would be forthcoming from a bank loan of the same amount, repaid over 10 
years. The dollar amounts by age and sex are illustrated in Figure 5.5.
The data from Figure 5.5 suggest that in absolute dollar terms the payment 
of bank loans and HECS per annum are roughly the same for both men and 
women: just more than $2000 per annum for 10 years with the bank loan, and 
about $2500 per annum for HECS payments for eight–nine years. 
Figure 5.5 HECS payments and bank payments with full-time employment
Again, to further help motivate the consumption-smoothing discussion, we 
can express these repayments as a proportion of earnings for male and female 
graduates expecting to earn the average salaries for full-time workers. The data 
are shown in Figures 5.6 and 5.7. 
The results are as follows. For both male and female graduates expecting to earn 
the average salaries of graduates of their sex, there is little difference between 
the borrowing regimes. With the bank loan, male and female graduates pay 
about 4 to 5 per cent of incomes per annum for 10 years, and for HECS the 
proportions are 4.5 to 6 per cent per annum for eight–nine years; it would be fair 
to describe these differences as minimal. In what now follows, the critical issue 
of consumption smoothing is explored in an earnings context quite different to 
that illustrated above.
7 For details of the hypothetical bank-loan arrangement, see Chapman (2006).
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Figure 5.6 Debt repayments as a proportion of taxable income: full-time 
male graduate workers
Figure 5.7 Debt repayments as a proportion of taxable income: full-time 
female graduate workers
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HECS and Consumption Smoothing
In many cases, HECS repayments will be significantly different to those 
illustrated above, and comparisons of the effects of the different loan 
arrangements become much more interesting when graduate incomes are 
assumed to change markedly over time. This can be illustrated through the 
construction of the following scenario. Imagine our graduates have a serious 
accident at age twenty-five, which leads to job loss and a period of welfare 
dependency until they are aged twenty-eight. At age twenty-nine, it is 
assumed that they are sufficiently recovered to work part-time until age thirty-
two, when part-time work is assumed to be half the hours and thus half the 
earnings of a full-time worker. At age thirty-two, they are fully recovered and 
resume full-time work, earning the same income as an average graduate with 
their level of full-time labour-market experience. The assumed income streams 
are shown in Figure 5.8 and Figure 5.9—again, taken from wage estimations 
using the HILDA survey and reported in Chapman (2006).
The above income streams will then be associated with substantially different 
loan repayments for HECS than was the case for the scenarios reported above 
for full-time workers. This raises the very obvious likelihood that compared 
with the bank loan considered above there will be a very different experience 
in terms of repayment hardships for members of the groups with highly 
variable incomes. To illustrate the importance of the consumption-smoothing 
point, we begin with an illustration of the structure of repayments of both 
men and women graduates for each type of loan in absolute dollar terms—
now shown in Figure 5.10. 
The data from Figure 5.10 show that, because repayments are fixed over time, 
the dollar level of bank-loan repayments does not change year to year, and is 
just more than $2000 per annum. Things are very different, however, for the 
income-contingent loan since in periods in which the graduate’s income falls 
below $35 000 there are no HECS payments. Thus, in our example, the periods 
in which the graduate is either on welfare or working part-time are associated 
with no loan-related decreases in disposable income. Instead, the borrower is 
required to repay the loan for additional years.
5 . The Australian University Student Financing System
101
Figure 5.8 Earnings before and after HECS: graduate males experiencing 
unemployment and part-time work (A$ 2004)
Figure 5.9 Earnings before and after HECS: graduate females experiencing 
unemployment and part-time work (A$ 2004)
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Figure 5.10 HECS payments and bank payments with unemployment and 
part-time work
That is, there are now payments of between $2500 and $3000 per annum from 
age thirty-three to age thirty-eight when incomes have risen to their full-time 
equivalents. Thus, both male and female graduates experiencing low salaries 
from ages twenty-five to thirty-one pay considerably more for a bank loan in 
periods of low earnings than is the case for the repayment of the HECS debt. 
With the latter there are no repayments when incomes are low, thus reflecting 
the critical benefit of an income-contingent loan. What this means in terms of 
proportions of taxable incomes is illustrated in Figures 5.11 and 5.12.
Figure 5.11 Debt repayments as a proportion of taxable income with 
unemployment and part-time work: graduate males
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Figure 5.12 Debt repayments as a proportion of taxable income with 
unemployment and part-time work: graduate females
Modelling the consequences of HECS under various future income streams 
highlights the clear disadvantage of the bank loan. Repayment obligations of 
the latter, as a proportion of income, fluctuate between 5 and nearly 25 per cent, 
but HECS repayments do not exceed 6 per cent of taxable income at any stage.
The extreme situation is for the period in which the graduate is jobless and 
receiving only unemployment benefits. In those years, the bank loan takes 
about 24 per cent of taxable income for both males and females. As well, when 
graduates are working half-time, the proportion of income going to repay the 
bank debt is still almost 10 per cent. In contrast, HECS payments are zero in the 
periods of low incomes, and are not more than 6 per cent even when graduate 
incomes recover. The consequence for HECS debtors, of course, is that while the 
bank loan is repaid fully in 10 years (at age thirty-one), graduates experiencing 
periods of low income take until age thirty-eight to repay their HECS debts. 
In summary, the exercises reveal that compared with the repayment of a bank 
loan, HECS delivers important potential consumption-smoothing benefits. 
For situations in which former students experience very low incomes, the 
repayment of normal loans results in very high proportions of incomes being 
obliged to pay debt, and thus being unavailable for consumption. HECS has no 
such implication, and this is a critical benefit of an income-contingent loan.
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Conclusion
The Australian higher education financing system incorporated an income-
contingent loan for the payment of tuition in 1989 through the income tax 
system, and this was the first time that such an approach to student financing 
had been used internationally. This chapter has: analysed the rationale for 
income-contingent loans; documented Australia’s experience with HECS; and 
illustrated the major benefits of consumption smoothing of income-contingent 
loans.
The two major points are as follows. One, even though HECS meant that students 
would now be paying for some part of higher education, extensive research 
into the implications of the scheme for the access of the poor to universities 
reveals that there have been no discernible effects. Two, through a hypothetical 
exercise using the HECS rules and contemporary Australian data, it is shown 
that for those graduates receiving low incomes at some part of their lives there 
is a considerable potential for the system to provide consumption smoothing.
As noted at the beginning, and reinforced in the discussion concerning the 
administrative bases required for the institution of an income-contingent 
loan, the main policy conclusions of the chapter need to be handled with 
care. This is because in some countries the institutional framework might be 
currently inappropriate to allow efficient, even workable, collection of income-
contingent loans. If this is the case, fruitful policy reform would seem to involve 
improvements in public-sector management.
References
Aungles, P., Buchanan, I., Karmel, T. and MacLachlan, M. 2002, HECS and 
Opportunities in Higher Education, Research, Analysis and Evaluation Group, 
Commonwealth Department of Education, Science and Training, Canberra.
Andrews, L. 1999, The effect of HECS on access, Research Report, Department of 
Education, Employment, Training and Youth Affairs, Canberra.
Barr, N. 2001, The Welfare State as Piggy Bank, Cambridge University Press, UK.
Beer, G. and Chapman, B. 2004, ‘HECS system changes: impact on students’, 
Agenda, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 157–74.
Cardak, B. and Ryan, C. 2006, Why are high ability individuals from poor 
backgrounds under-represented at university?, La Trobe School of Business 
Discussion Paper A06.04, La Trobe University, Melbourne.
5 . The Australian University Student Financing System
105
Chapman, B. 1997, ‘Conceptual issues and the Australian experience with 
income contingent charges for higher education’, The Economic Journal, vol. 
107, no. 442, pp. 738–51.
Chapman, B. 2006, Government Managing Risk: Income contingent loans for social 
and economic progress, Routledge, London.
Chapman, B. and Nicholls, J. 2004, Income Contingent Loans for Higher Education: 
Implementation issues for developing countries, The World Bank, Washington, 
DC.
Chapman, B. and Ryan, C. 2002, ‘Income contingent financing of student charges 
for higher education: assessing the Australian innovation’, Welsh Journal of 
Education, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 45–63.
Chapman, B. and Ryan, C. 2005, ‘The access implications of income related 
charges for higher education: lessons from Australia’, Economics of Education 
Review, vol. 24, no. 5, pp. 491–512.
Chapman, B., Rodrigues, M. and Ryan, C. 2007, HECS for TAFE: the case for 
extending income contingent loans to the vocational education and training 
sector, Treasury Working Paper 2007–2, April, Commonwealth Treasury, 
Canberra.
Edwards, M., Howard, C. and Miller, R. 2001, Social Policy, Public Policy, Allen 
& Unwin, Sydney.
Harrison, M. 1995, ‘Default in guaranteed student loan programs’, Journal of 
Student Financial Aid, vol. 25, pp. 25–42.
Long, M., Carpenter, P. and Hayden, M. 1999, Participation in education and 
training: 1980–1994, Longitudinal Surveys of Australian Youth Research 
Report No. 13, Australian Council for Educational Research, Melbourne.
Marks, G. and McMillan, J. 2007, ‘Australia: changes in socioeconomic inequalities 
in university participation’, in Y. Shavit, R. Arum and A. Gamoran (eds), 
Stratification in Higher Education: A comparative study, Stanford University 
Press, Calif.
Marks, G., Fleming, N., Long, M. and McMillan, J. 2000, Patterns of participation 
in year 12 and higher education in Australia: trends and issues, Longitudinal 
Surveys of Australian Youth Research Report No. 17, Australian Council for 
Educational Research, Melbourne.
Ryan, C. 2002, Individual Returns to Vocational Education and Training 
Qualifications: Their implications for lifelong learning, National Centre for 
Vocational Education Research, South Australia.

107
6. Higher Education Policies and 
Development: Approaches to funding 
higher education in Japan
Motohisa Kaneko 
The University of Tokyo
Introduction
Japan’s higher education system is similar to those in many East Asian counties 
in the sense that it comprises both public and private sectors. The public sector 
consists of the national universities, which are established by the national 
government, and local public universities, which are established by prefectures 
and other local governments. While the private institutions enrol three-quarters 
of undergraduates, the national institutions play significant roles in research 
and graduate education.
With the advent of globalisation and ‘the knowledge society’ on the one hand 
and the increasing pressure of financial stringency on the other, both national 
and private institutions are faced with pressures for change. Private institutions 
will have to respond to the challenge of the declining number of eighteen-year-
olds. Meanwhile, from the perspective of the restructuring of the Japanese 
economy and society for the coming ages, reshaping higher education certainly 
assumes particular importance. 
It is for these reasons that over the past decade the national government has 
set out radical changes for the institutional basis of higher education. The 
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) sought 
to change the nature of national universities. The Law for Incorporation of 
National University was enacted in 2004, thus transforming the legal status of 
the national universities as a kind of governmental facility with an independent 
legal entity. The new legal form, ‘Kokuritsu Daigaku Hojin’, can be roughly 
translated as ‘National University Corporation’. 
The private institutions have experienced a radical shift of governmental 
subsidies, with their weight shifted from the mandatory current-cost subsidy 
to discretionary subsidies. For 2007, the current-cost subsidy fell from the 
previous year for the first time in 30 years. The government also revised the 
Private School Law to enhance accountability in the governance and financing 
of private institutions. 
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Yet, reforms are incomplete. There are various political initiatives to bring 
in further changes in the higher education system. In this sense, the future 
of Japan’s higher education is still open. How is Japanese higher education 
constructed? What are its major consequences for the society and the economy? 
How is the Japanese government trying to change the system, and what are the 
major issues in this context?
In order to answer these questions, this chapter describes the outline of the 
higher education system and its socioeconomic contexts, describes the scheme 
of incorporated national universities and its problems, examines policies on 
private institutions in the context of declining demands, and summarises 
current policy debates over the level of higher education expenditure in the 
national economy. 
Outline of the System and Socioeconomic Contexts
The Higher Education System and Enrolment
At the post-secondary level there are three types of institutions. First, technical 
colleges (Koto Senmon Gakko) admit graduates from junior high schools and 
require five years for completion, implying two years at post-secondary level 
(total enrolment in this type of institution is minor, making up less than 1 
per cent of total enrolments at post-secondary level). Second, miscellaneous 
schools (Kakushu Gakko) include various types of schools—mostly private—
offering a wide range of education and training. The entrance requirement 
varies, from completion of compulsory education to high-school completion, 
or even higher. Third, special training schools (Senshu Gakko), which require a 
high-school diploma for admission, provide occupational or technical training 
lasting usually two years. They constitute the second-largest segment of the 
higher education system. In most cases, these institutions had originally been 
proprietary schools offering various types of occupational training before they 
received charter from the MEXT. 
Two types of institutions offer higher education: universities and colleges (both 
called daigaku, and referred to as universities hereafter), which in most cases 
require four years for completion, except in the cases of departments of medicine 
and dentistry, which require six years. Of these institutions, about two-thirds 
offer graduate courses, in which 99 000 students are studying for a Master’s or 
Doctor’s degree. Junior colleges resemble universities in the basic structure of 
their curriculum, but require two years for completion. With student bodies 
predominantly female (90 per cent), most of these institutions offer terminal 
education in non-technical subjects such as literature and home economics. 
Unlike the case of the community college in the United States, here, transfer 
from a two-year to a four-year institution is exceptional. 
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Figure 6.1 The school system
Recent statistics show that more than 70 per cent of eighteen-year-olds advanced 
to some form of post-secondary and higher education in 2007. Of those, more 
than half (about 37 per cent) went to four-year institutions. The distribution 
across different types of post-secondary education differed considerably 
by gender. Girls tended to go to junior colleges, but the difference has been 
diminishing in recent years. The shares of those entering the post-secondary 
courses at special training schools are similar between males and females. 
Table 6.1 Size of enrolment, 2007
Total National Local public Private
Number of institutions
Four-year institutions 756 87 89 580
Two-year institutions 434 2 34 398
Special training schools 2995 11 202 2782
Number of institutions (5)
Graduate 262 113 153 900 14 471 93 742
Undergraduate 2 566 595 473 502 115 121 1 977 972
Two-year institutions 186 667 184 10 815 175 660
Special training schools 663 349 765 27 281 635 303
Number of students (%)
Graduate 100.0 58.7 5.5 35.8
Undergraduate 100.0 18.4 4.5 77.1
Two-year institutions 100.0 0.1 5.8 94.1
Special training schools 100.0 0.1 4.1 95.8
Source: School Basic Survey 2007.
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Legal Framework
The legal framework in which Japan’s education is set is rather complex, because 
it comprises both public and private institutions. These differ significantly from 
each other with respect to the relationship with the government. 
National Institutions
National universities play the most important role in developing academic 
research, in training researchers and in providing postgraduate education. 
Located almost evenly throughout the country, national universities have 
supported the infrastructure of regional education, culture and industry, and 
provided opportunities for higher education that are less dependent than 
others on students’ economic situations. The national policy agenda, including 
the provision of certain professional courses and the promotion of science and 
technology, has been reflected more in funding of national universities than in 
that of private universities.
There was a major change in the legal definition of national universities in 2004. 
Under the old system, the national universities—established by the National 
School Establishment Law—were part of the government’s administrative 
structure. The assets—including land and buildings—for the use of 
national universities are owned by the state. Their staff, including academic, 
administrative and technical staff, are civil servants. Under the National 
University Corporation (NUC) Law, implemented on 1 April 2004, the national 
universities were incorporated. Through incorporation, each of the former 
national universities was assigned a legal personality to become a ‘National 
University Corporation’. The land and buildings of the universities are owned 
by the National University Corporations. Staff are no longer civil servants.
Private Institutions
To be officially qualified as a ‘private school’, an institution has to be established 
by a ‘School Judiciary Person’. Usually, one school has its own Judiciary Person, 
but sometimes a few schools are established by a single Legal Person. The Board 
of Governors governs the Legal Person. The School Judiciary Person is a legal 
entity who can act similarly to regular judiciary persons such as in private 
enterprises; they may borrow funds from private financial agencies. They are, 
however, subject to government regulation. 
Finances are not directly audited by the Ministry of Education, but by a 
certified public accountant. The regulation on finances has evolved over the 
years. In principle, School Judiciary Persons are not allowed to make a profit. 
Moreover, the present regulation allows transfers from the annual budget 
only for building and maintenance of the facility. In other words, they are not 
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allowed to accumulate what would be called capital in business corporations. 
This is intended to ensure that the contribution from the present student body 
has to be returned in the form of service to that body. 
Financial Flow
The national government, through the MEXT, contributes to the finances of higher 
education institutions through several channels, including institutional and non-
institutional funding. Public expenditure on higher education is provided chiefly 
by the MEXT. In the national budget, its contributions to the finances of higher 
education are channelled mainly through the following three expenditure items: 1) 
transfer to the National Schools Special Account; 2) current-costs subsidy to private 
schools; and 3) non-institutional subsidy including grants-in-aid for science research 
and lending to the Japan Scholarship Foundation.
1) Subsidy to National University Corporations
The National Schools Special Account (NSSA) collectively financed the 
expenditure on national institutions of higher education before their 
incorporation. Transfer from the national government to the account was the 
major means for the national government to support these institutions. It is also 
the largest item of public expenditure on higher education. 
The National University Corporations are a markedly different funding 
mechanism from the present one. After the reform, the new National University 
Corporation remains basically ‘national’ in the sense that the state remains 
responsible for its function, providing the major part of the funds needed. Their 
personnel and other operational costs will be covered by ‘operational grants’ 
from the government. The grants will be ‘block grants’, which may be used 
at the discretion of each university without designated applications. It will be 
possible also to carry the grants over to subsequent years. The costs necessary 
for construction of new facilities will be funded separately.
In the budget for 2008, as much as ¥1181 billion was allocated to this item. It 
accounted for 60 per cent of total government expenditure on higher education.
2) Current-Cost Subsidy to Private Institutions
The total amount of this subsidy was ¥428 billion for 2008—or 22 per cent of 
the total expenditure on higher education.
The government subsidy to the current expenditures on private universities 
and colleges accounted for more than 20 per cent in 1980. The proportion has 
declined since then—down to 10 per cent. The subsidy is channelled, together 
with the subsidies to private institutions at lower levels, through the Japan 
Private School Promotion Foundation.
Financing Higher Education and Economic Development in East Asia
112
Substantial national subsidies to private institutions for their current 
expenditures started in 1970. In 1975, the Private Schools Promotion and 
Assistance Law was enacted to allow the government to contribute to private 
institutions of higher education the amount not exceeding half of the current 
expenditure. Since the provision did not specify any obligation on the part of 
the government, the actual amount allocated to the subsidy fund is determined 
by the government every year. 
In the actual process of distribution, the Japan Private Promotion Foundation first 
estimates, according to a predetermined formula, the total current expenditures 
of the applying private institutions. At the same time, the educational condition 
of the institution is measured with one or two simple indices, such as the size of 
actual relative to standard enrolment, or the size of the full-time faculty relative 
to actual enrolment. Based on the indices, a proper value is found in a table of 
‘coefficients’ that represents the proportion of the current costs to be subsidised. 
The amount of subsidy is obtained through multiplying the estimated total 
current cost by the particular value of coefficient. The table of multiplication 
coefficients thus functions as an incentive system to encourage changes desired 
by the Ministry of Education. The table is also adjusted to account for the total 
amount of government appropriations.
3) Non-Institutional Subsidies
Two types of government expenditure do not go directly to either public or 
private institutions. One is the Scientific Research Subsidy, which is given to 
a group of researchers in academic institutions. The other is the subsidy to the 
Japan Scholarship Foundation, which in turn will become the basis for loans to 
students in various types of schools. These indirect expenditures account for a 
relatively small proportion of the whole expenditure. 
Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research (Science Research Grants) constitute the 
major vehicle for the national government to provide financial support for 
research activities in addition to direct institutional support. In 2008, the total 
government expenditure for this purpose amounted to ¥193 billion, or 10 per 
cent of the total national expenditure on higher education. It should be noted 
that this amount does not include the direct expenditure on various types 
of research institutions supported by the Ministry of Education or by other 
branches of the national government. 
These grants are given primarily to the research projects undertaken in 
institutions of higher education or in academic research institutions. Qualified 
researchers may apply to the Ministry of Education for grants. A typical 
grant would encompass one to three years. The applications are reviewed by 
appropriate selection committees, whose members are nominated partly by the 
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Science Council of Japan. The selected projects are then administered by the 
Ministry of Education. The awarded grant is in principle administered by the 
institution to which the researcher belongs, and is subject to auditing by the 
Ministry of Education and by the governmental Board of Audit. 
Government Loans
The government provides loans through the Japan Scholarship Foundation. 
There are two categories of loans: one without any interest, and the other 
with a subsidised interest rate of about 2 per cent per annum. For 2008, the 
government earmarked ¥152 billion—or 8 per cent of the total expenditure—
for this purpose. 
The government contribution accounts for only 16 per cent of the revenue of 
the Japan Scholarship Foundation. Borrowing in various forms constitutes as 
much as 58 per cent of revenue. The repayment of loans from past recipients 
provides another 26 per cent of revenue. 
Socioeconomic Contexts
Background: Mass participation and its legacies 
In the postwar period, various post-secondary institutions were integrated to 
form new national universities and colleges. Since most of these institutions 
lacked adequate facilities, the priority in higher education finance has been 
their development. In order to secure enough resources for this purpose, the 
finances of the national institutions were standardised, and the budgets for 
each institution were allocated according to standardised units. The mechanism 
still constitutes the basis for financing the national institutions, and has been 
attracting criticism for its inflexibility. 
In the 1960s, policies continued to concentrate the limited resources available 
for higher education upon the upgrading of existing national universities 
and colleges, rather than upon increasing their number. Popular demands 
for higher education, however, led to an expansion of enrolment in private-
sector institutions. By the end of the 1960s, the private sector accounted for 
three-quarters of total enrolments. At the same time, since most of the private 
institutions were financially dependent solely upon tuition fees, they had to 
charge considerably higher fees, and yet offered less favourable educational 
conditions than the public institutions. The quantitative predominance of the 
private institutions, together with qualitative disparities between the public 
and the private sectors, thus created one of the most basic characteristics of the 
Japanese higher education system.
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Number of Institutions Total National Public Private
Four year institutions 756 87 89 580
Two year institutions 434 2 34 398
Special Training school 2995 11 202 2782
Number of Institutions (%)
Four year institutions 100 11.5 11.8 76.7
Two year institutions 100 0.5 7.8 91.7
Special training school 100 0.4 6.7 92.9
Number of Students
Graduate 262.113 153900 14471 93742
Undergraduate 2566595 473502 115121 1977972
Two year institutions 186667 184 10815 175668
Special Training school 663349 765 27281 635303
Number of students (%)
Graduate 100 58.7 5.5 35.8
Undergraduate 100 18.4 4.5 77.1
Two year institutions 100 0.1 5.8 84.1
Special Training school 100 0.1 4.1 95.8
Figure 6.2 Change in participation rates
Source: School Basic Survey, various years.
Equity
Japanese society deems equity in educational opportunities among the highest 
priorities in the public sphere. Any incidence of mistreatment in entrance 
examinations causes a major social reaction. There is strong social resistance 
to raising tuition fees—not only in national institutions but also in private 
institutions. Japanese families have tended to sacrifice their wellbeing to send 
their offspring to university.
Indeed, various surveys and studies have shown that the chance of advancing 
to higher education is determined by academic achievement at high school to 
a much higher degree than by economic factors. If a student demonstrates a 
high level of academic achievement, their chances of participating in higher 
education are likely to be very high, irrespective of the family’s income. 
Nonetheless, there are significant differences in participation rates across family 
income levels. Figure 6.3 summarises the estimated participation rate in higher 
education among high-school graduates by family-income quintile class.
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Figure 6.3 Participation rates by family income
Source: 2007 Tracer Survey on High School Students, University of Tokyo Center for Research in University 
Management and Policy Studies.
From the figure, it is apparent that the participation rate is as high as 50 per 
cent for males even in the lowest quintile class. Nonetheless, it is apparent that 
there are distinct differences in participation rates by family-income class. The 
elasticity of the participation rate with respect to family income tends to be 
greater with females and with students in rural areas. 
It should be noted that a substantial part of these differences by family income 
rises from the indirect effect through academic achievement: the children from 
low-income families tend to achieve less academically in high school, and this 
causes the major hindrance to participation in higher education. Nonetheless, 
there are distinct direct effects of family income, and these tend to be strongest 
with female and rural residents.
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Another dimension of the equity issue is the sharp hierarchy among the 
institutions with respect to selectivity, which implies that it is not whether 
you ever enter university, but which university you enter, that really matters. 
It is also known that students at prestigious universities tend to have family 
backgrounds characterised by the higher educational and occupational status 
of their fathers. It is likely that the indirect influences of the parents on their 
offspring are routed through non-school investment. If it were true, the non-
school expenditure could be significant in reproducing social inequality. Yet, 
researchers have not found conclusive evidence that such expenditures in fact 
affected achievements in examinations. 
Policy Environment
At the same time as Japan is struggling to rectify the negative consequences and 
confusion arising from the legacies of past expansion, it is faced with similar 
challenges to those experienced in other countries.
One such current is the coming of what might be called the ‘knowledge society’, 
in which knowledge assumes an increasingly central role. That such trends 
are becoming salient will be apparent to many. Fierce competition and rapid 
innovation have made it inevitable that research and development become 
critically important in producing competitive consumption goods. 
Another important trend is the move away from the predominance of the 
government and towards the utilisation of market mechanisms. Some argue that 
these moves are a reflection of financial crises brought about by exponential 
increases in social spending. Others argue that such moves reflect more 
fundamental shifts in the mode and direction of social development. Since 
the increased diversity and complexity of the modern society and its needs 
necessarily have made centralised decision and control obsolete, it is argued 
that market mechanisms will be the only way to deal with the diversified and 
multidimensional changes. 
In this context, Japanese higher education is faced with serious challenges. 
Among them there are three major issues with significant implications for the 
future of higher education. The first is the incorporation of national universities, 
which will significantly alter not only the nature of national universities and 
colleges, but also the structure of higher education finance. Second is the 
restructuring of the private sector of higher education due to the decrease in 
the size of the college-going population. The third is the current debate over 
the size of expenditure on higher education in the national economy, which 
presumes a particular importance in envisaging the new stage of development 
of higher education in Japan.
Each of these three issues will be examined in the following sections.
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Incorporation of National Universities
National universities were transformed into National University Corporations in 2004.
Background
The idea of transition from the old national universities to the new model can be 
summarised as in Figure 6.4. In the old concept, the national university had two 
sides. On one hand, it was part of the government organisation. Its budget was 
specified in the national budget, and the purpose of the expenditure was specified 
in the budget details. The faculty members and administrators were government 
employees. The facilities were the property of the government. On the other hand, 
the academic side of the operation was governed by the faculty members.
Figure 6.4 The relationship between the government and the university
In the new model, the government and the university are two separate legal 
entities. This raises two questions. First, how should the national university 
be governed as an independent entity? Second, how should the relationship 
between the government and the university be regulated? Obviously, the 
government loses its direct power to control the university, yet the government 
provides support to the university. The support and the performance of the 
university have to be balanced, and proper incentives for efficient use of 
resources should be built into this regulation. In a way, it is a contract between 
the government and the university. 
These questions show that incorporation of national universities is critically 
dependent upon the design of the governance of the institution and the device 
of a latent or overt contract between the government and the university.
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While the creation of the NUC scheme was a direct product of many political 
and economic factors, the design of the scheme was based on a body of logic. 
Basically, it was influenced by the ‘New Public Management’ or institutional 
economics that has gained momentum in the past two decades. At the core 
of that thought are the relationship between the ‘principal’ and the ‘agent’, 
and the explicit contract between the two. The scheme of the independent 
administrative institution is built on this concept: the government as the 
principal commissions an independent administrative agency to achieve 
a public purpose. The terms are specified in the mid-term goals and plan; 
subsequently, the level of achievement will be evaluated, the result of which 
will lead to consequences including financial rewards or punishment, or even 
discontinuation of the contract. 
It is argued that by separating the principal and the agent, the agent will 
gain efficiency. The agent—free from the strict and minute control by the 
government—has to face competition with other agents, and is able to exploit 
local knowledge and initiate innovation. Moreover, it is given an incentive to 
gain efficiency through explicit goals. Provided with these mechanisms, the 
government is able to gain efficiency in the provision of its services and become 
more accountable.
In order to realise the assumed function, it is imperative that the contract should 
be clearly set out with an instrument to measure the level of achievement. It 
is also necessary that the chief executive of the agent should be designated 
as personally responsible for the contract, although the institution as a whole 
functions as an agent of the government. The chief executive then directs the 
whole organisation towards achievement of the set goal, and the members of the 
executive board assist the chief executive. 
The same argument should be applied as the justification for the construction 
of the NUCs, as one of the variations of the independent administrative 
agency. From this perspective, it is natural that the mid-term goals and 
plans, and the corresponding evaluation, should assume the core of the new 
relationship between the government and the NUC. It is also understandable 
that the president of the NUC has to be given unusually strong powers. There 
are arguments that the theoretical framework cannot be simply applied to 
universities, which encompass a very wide range of objectives, and rely on the 
spontaneous intellectual activities among the members. 
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Legal Status and Governance
The basic framework of the NUC is outlined in the NUC Law of 2004.
Legal Status
Under the NUC Law, each NUC constitutes a legal person under the Civil Law. 
As a legal person, it is able to sue other legal entities and can possibly be sued 
by others. It owns its own assets, which are called the capital of the corporation, 
comprising mainly the buildings and land that were contributed from the 
government at the time of incorporation. In principle, it is supposed to be able 
to borrow funds, issue bonds or invest in other entities, but the government 
maintains strict conditions and restrictions. 
Governance
By stipulations of the law, each NUC has a president, an executive board, an 
academic senate, a management council and auditors. The relations among these 
bodies are presented in Figure 6.5. In this scheme, the president assumes the 
ultimate power and responsibility for decision making and execution, while 
important decisions have to go through deliberation of the executive board. 
The academic council, upon request by the president, deliberates on academic 
matters and reports to the executive council and the president. Meanwhile, 
the management council—more than half of the members of which should be 
selected from outside the university—gives advice to the president. The auditors 
are selected by the university, but appointed by the Minister of Education and 
report directly to the minister. 
The president—who was elected by the academic senate under the old system—
is now elected by the committee for selection of the president. The committee 
consists of equal numbers of representatives from the management council and 
the academic senate; the president and the members of the executive board may 
join as members. The person elected is, in principle, appointed by the Minister 
of Education as the president. The length of term and the exact procedure 
taken for election are to be decided by each university. The committee also has 
the power to relieve the president of duty through a procedure similar to the 
election. 
The scheme of incorporation does not necessarily require a change in the status 
of the workers from government employees. The cabinet, however, which was 
politically committed to the restructuring plan of the government organisations, 
pushed forcefully to change the employment status. Meanwhile, resistance 
from the national universities failed to gain momentum. Consequently, all 
the academic and administrative members of the NUCs changed their status 
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from government employees to employees belonging to one of the NUCs. The 
pension and healthcare funds, however, remain practically a part of those for 
government employees.
Figure 6.5 Governance structure of the National University Corporation
Because of the strong power given to the president, their selection process 
bears not only symbolic but also practical significance to the governance of the 
NUC. While the NUC Law required that the president should be selected by a 
presidential selection committee consisting of equal numbers of representatives 
from the academic and management councils, it does not stipulate the details 
for the procedure. Depending on the design of the procedure, it could lead to a 
significant departure from the tradition of participatory governance. 
As it turned out, most NUCs bypassed this problem by implanting the 
participation of faculty members in the new selection process. In most cases, 
the presidential selection committee decided to include a ‘reference ballot’, in 
which individual faculty members cast a vote for their preferred candidate. The 
details of selection of the candidates and the specific rules for the reference 
ballot differed substantially by institution. 
Nonetheless, a few NUCs started considering alternative schemes. The 
Board of Directors of Tohoku University—one of the seven former imperial 
universities—decided in early 2005 that the next president would be elected 
by the presidential selection committee itself, and direct involvement of the 
faculty members would not be allowed. It remains to be seen if this practice will 
be diffused to other NUCs. 
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Governance Structure
For each NUC, the first task for transition was to organise the basic governance 
structure. According to the NUC Law described above, each NUC organised an 
executive board, academic council and management council. 
The number of members of the executive board is stipulated by an ordinance 
issued by the government basically according to the size of the institution. 
Various surveys showed that by far the majority of the board members were 
recruited from the professoriate—most of them former vice-presidents and 
faculty deans. In many NUCs—mostly those of large size—the boards included 
a non-academic, who was assigned to oversee managerial and financial matters. 
Many board members carried the title of vice-president.
The academic board—as the NUC Law stipulates—consists mainly of faculty 
members. In most universities, the size of the board, while not stipulated by any 
ordinance, tended to be smaller than the former university council it replaced. 
In most universities, the members were elected in the faculty meetings. The 
new council practically retained the conventions and procedures taken in the 
old council. 
The size of the management council was subject to the discretion of each NUC. 
In most cases, they included executives in local businesses. It was common 
to include a member of the local mass media. Some NUCs appointed former 
government officials. 
In most NUCs, each executive board member was assigned to a specific area 
of administration such as education, research or financial management. The 
board members were designated to direct the particular administrative section 
corresponding with his/her assigned function. There were differences among 
NUCs with respect to the secretary of the university, who had been practically 
nominated by the Ministry of Education. In some NUCs, the secretary was 
appointed to be one of the board members, and the title was abolished. In others, 
the title and the position were retained.
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Figure 6.6 Old and new schemes of financing national universities
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Finances
In the old system, the finances of national universities were constituted as part 
of the government budget; they were classified into separate lines, and the 
expenditure had to be made for the designated purpose of each line. Tuition fees 
collected at the national universities were treated as revenue for the national 
treasury. On the expenditure side, the national universities had to follow the 
budget and various government regulations in spending the funds. Moreover, 
the number of personnel was under the strict control of the government. On 
the other hand, necessary costs for the operation of the university were, in 
principle, assumed to be borne by the government. 
The NUC Law stipulates that the NUCs are financially autonomous entities with 
their own budgets. After incorporation, the government subsidy was given to 
each university as a lump sum, without any division by line item. The NUC was, 
in principle, given basic autonomy over the expenditure of the budget.
With the enactment of the NUC Law, the government contributed most of the 
facilities, land and buildings to the NUCs. The evaluated prices of those facilities 
constituted the capital fund of each NUC. In contrast with the old system, in 
which the budget for a fiscal year had to be executed in the designated year and 
accounted for within the fiscal year, in the new system, the NUCs were allowed to 
carry the balance to the next accounting period. Within a limit, each university 
is free to make investments: it may borrow money either from government or 
from commercial banks; it also may issue a bond with the permission of the 
government. 
At the same time, the NUC Law stipulates that the finances of NUCs will be 
accounted for according to the NUC Accounting Standards, which are similar 
to the accounting standards required for business corporations. In the old 
system, the budget was divided into line items, and the accounting procedure 
simply implied executing the budget accordingly without any infringement 
of governmental regulations. In the new system, accounting takes the form of 
double-entry bookkeeping. The financial report should include a balance sheet, 
profit-and-loss statement, cash-flow statement and other necessary statements. 
One of the critical issues in this reform was, naturally, the level of government 
contribution to the NUCs. While the law does not provide for specific mechanisms 
to determine the level of government contribution to the NUCs, the 2003 Report 
of the Expert Committee for Incorporation of National Universities outlined the 
basic principle. First, the necessary amount of total costs was calculated for 
individual areas of study employing a formula that involves such indices as the 
number of students and teachers and other expenses and their corresponding 
unit costs. From the required amount, the institution’s revenue is subtracted 
Financing Higher Education and Economic Development in East Asia
124
to derive the necessary amount of government subsidy. In other words, this 
method assumed the basic principle that the government had the responsibility 
to secure the necessary level of funding for each institution. 
The last, and probably most significant, aspect is finance. While the NUC Law 
stipulates the framework of the NUCs and their relationship with the government, 
it does not specify the financial obligation on the part of the government to 
support the NUCs. As a result, there is a substantial range of alternatives in the 
level and methods for government financial support. That, however, will be a 
decisive factor for the nature of the NUC in significant aspects. There are three 
sets of important issues revealed in the process of implementation. 
Government Subsidy
It was stated above that the original design laid out in the 2003 Report of the 
Expert Committee for Incorporation of National Universities assumed that the 
government remained responsible for securing necessary levels of revenue, 
calculated on a formula, for each institution. In other words, the government 
would maintain the ‘compensation principle’—implying that the government 
will fully compensate for the gap between the calculated cost and the actual 
income of each university. This principle had to undergo a series of significant 
alterations in the following periods.
In the autumn of 2003, when the NUC Law had been enacted and the national 
universities started preparation for incorporation, the Ministry of Finance 
released its own plan for funding the NUCs. This plan did not follow the expert 
committee that proposed a set of formulas to derive the amount of government 
contribution to each institution. Instead, the Ministry of Finance indicated 
that each NUC would be given the amount that the institution received in 
the previous year irrespective of any change in the numbers of students and 
faculty members. A fixed rate of across-the-board reduction in government 
expenditures would apply to the allocated amount. In the case of NUCs, the 
rate will be 1 or 2 per cent. The Ministry of Education, in a political climate of 
government restructuring, had no alternative but to oblige. 
In the short run, this might not make much difference to the original design 
with respect to the amount of subsidy, but it implied a significant shift in 
the principle of government contribution—not only were any prospects for 
increasing the allocated budget closed, but also the compensation principle was 
abandoned. 
Government Regulations
Meanwhile, the Ministry of Education retained a substantial number of 
regulations on finances. Even though the government subsidy is allocated 
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in a lump sum including wage costs, the ministry enforces NUCs to limit the 
numbers of academic and administrative employees to the level specified in the 
mid-term plan. This in effect allowed the ministry to maintain a significant level 
of control over the management of NUCs. Also, each NUC has to get approval 
from the Ministry of Education to record either a surplus or a deficit for a given 
fiscal year, to borrow funds from banks, to issue bonds, or to make investments. 
In each of these cases, the NUC has to satisfy rigorous conditions. 
Under these circumstances, the NUCs are left in a situation where they have to 
seek to survive with gradually decreasing funds under still heavy government 
control. Over time, it is likely that these regulations will be gradually reduced 
to allow increased levels of financial autonomy to the NUCs. On the other hand, 
that would necessitate a new set of instruments for the ministry to oversee 
management. How such arrangements should be made is still unclear. 
Financial Management and Accounting
Prior to the reform, each national university was given the budget separated 
into line items. Because the formula to calculate the allocated budget was 
known, it was clear how much each faculty received in the budget. Under these 
conditions, the faculties had a strong basis for demanding allocation. On the 
other hand, the university administration was given little room in which to 
manoeuvre. 
With the transformation to NUCs—which receive government subsidies in a 
lump sum—the university administrators are given a considerable degree of 
arbitration. In distributing the funds to faculties and other constituent units, 
most universities set the basis as the previous year and then deduce institutional 
funds by applying the same rate across the board. Through this measure, most 
institutions increased the resources at the discretion of the institutional level. 
Some institutions introduced redistribution schemes to provide incentives 
related to achievements in research. These reforms appear to indicate that 
management at the institutional level is increasing resources at their discretion. 
Meanwhile, the disappearance of line items implies that each institution has to 
have sufficient ability in financial management in order to gain efficiency on the 
one hand and to avoid risks on the other. The Accounting Standards for NUCs 
were designated exactly for that purpose. For most of the administrative sections, 
however, it was difficult to introduce the new bookkeeping system. Moreover, 
the organisation of universities is extremely complex, with numerous sub-units 
cutting across each other. It is, in a sense, a nightmare for cost accounting. 
Moreover, each unit has its own source of income through research funding. 
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It will take time to use the new accounting system for strategic financial 
management. This implies that the financial mechanism of NUCs, as it currently 
stands, is not only incapable of leading to appreciative gains in efficiency, it also 
involves substantial risks. 
Relations with the Government
The relationship between the government and each NUC—which is legally 
independent of the government—is regulated mainly by mid-term (six-year) 
goals and the corresponding mid-term plan, which is in effect a contract between 
the two. Figure 6.7 presents the basic framework.
Mid-Term Goals and Plan
As the law stipulates, the Ministry of Education assigns each NUC mid-term 
goals that specify the goals to be achieved within six years in enhancing the 
level of education and research, in improving efficiency of management of the 
institution, and in other areas. Based on these goals, the university should prepare 
a mid-term plan to achieve the specified goals, which should be approved by 
the government. Reflecting criticism that this clause will give the government 
overwhelming power over the NUCs, both Houses of Parliament passed attached 
resolutions that required the government to respect the autonomy of the NUCs. 
In practice, the Ministry of Education asked each NUC to draft its mid-term 
goals, and then approved them without substantive changes. 
Evaluation
Towards the end of the six-year period, the newly established Council for 
Evaluation of NUCs will evaluate the levels of achievement of the goals with 
the assistance of the National Institute for Academic Degrees. The law states 
that, depending on the results of evaluation, the government will examine 
the need for continuation of the institution and necessary actions to be taken 
by the institutions. The last clause implies that the results might be related to 
government subsidy to the institution. The attached resolutions of both Houses 
of Parliament again draw attention to the possibility that this mechanism 
could lead to encroachment on academic freedom, and request the government 
to take precautions. Further details in either the method of evaluation or the 
consequences of evaluation have not yet been worked out. 
As stated above, each NUC is, in principle, an independent organisation under 
the Public Law, implying that the finances are completely separated from the 
government even though it may receive subsidies from the government. 
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The above discussion indicates that the backbone of the scheme of the NUC lies 
in the cycle encompassing goal–evaluation–reward. That is, the success of the 
scheme is critically dependent on the power of the evaluation methods as the 
key of the cycle. 
The Independent Administration Agency Law stipulates that the government 
may take a range of actions, including discontinuation, against the institution 
after deliberation on the results of evaluation. This principle applies to NUCs. 
The report of the experts committee under the Ministry of Education indicated 
that evaluation results in a mid-term period would be reflected in the mid-term 
goals, and, as a consequence, the level of government subsidy, for the following 
period. Exactly how they are related was not specified in the report, leaving the 
issue to be solved after the new scheme is implemented. 
The process involves a wide range of practical questions. The central problem 
is that the mid-term goals, and accordingly the corresponding process of 
evaluation, have to cover the whole activity of a university. At the same time, 
the results of evaluation should be given a reasonable level of reliability. Since 
the results entail significant consequences for the NUCs, including budget 
allocation, the lack of reliability should lead to a number of problems including 
with the credibility of the scheme as a whole and the collapse of the incentive 
system that the scheme was supposed to create. 
Figure 6.7 Mid-term goals and plan cycle
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Reactions and Problems in the Future
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to describe the complex process of 
evaluation. This is probably the most comprehensive and the most ambitious 
scheme of evaluation in the world. It is comprehensive in three ways.
First, it involves both judgment on achieving the goals specified in the mid-
term plan on one hand and evaluation of the absolute levels of education and 
research on the other. While the logical construct of incorporation requires only 
the judgment of whether the mid-term goals have been achieved, it does not 
necessarily demand judgment on the absolute levels of academic abilities. The 
government and the National Institution for Academic Degrees (NIAD) argued, 
however, that in order to make judgments on goal attainment, one needs the 
basis of evaluation on the levels. 
Second, it requires both self-evaluation by the university and objective 
evaluation by NIAD. The Incorporation Law requires that the incorporated 
universities not be subject to arbitrary control by the Ministry of Education. In 
other words, the mid-term goals are set as an agreement between the ministry 
and individual universities. This principle applies to the evaluation procedure. 
Self-evaluation is also indispensable for practical reasons. Since the evaluation 
has to be undertaken for all 80 NUCs at the same time, NIAD is not able to start 
gathering information by itself. 
Third, its scope covers both education and research—at the institutional as well 
as the school level. Even though evaluation of research is difficult, it might still 
be feasible if enough time and resources are provided. In contrast, evaluation 
of education raises more serious problems. One might remember that in the 
United Kingdom, where research assessment exercises have been undertaken for 
some time, assessment of education has not been implemented even though it 
was persistently proposed by the government. In the case of the incorporation 
scheme in Japan, evaluation of the mid-term goals, which play the role of a 
comprehensive contract between the government and the university, has to 
cover the whole scope of those goals including education. 
These issues point to the fundamental assumptions of the scheme built on 
contract and evaluation. If the contract covers a single or very small number 
of objectives, it is likely that the results can be easily evaluated and translated 
into rewards or punishment. That could lead to higher levels of accountability 
and efficiency. On the other hand, to the extent that the contract covers a 
wider range of objectives, and for longer periods, the evaluation could become 
technically involved and difficult. 
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It is evident that such a comprehensive evaluation entails an enormous amount 
of costs, if it is feasible at all. A more serious problem is how the results will be 
connected to the next mid-term goals. This critical point is still unclear.
It should be evident from the discussion above that incorporation in fact 
introduced a range of radical changes in the ways the national universities 
operate. How was it received by the universities, and where are the problems?
In 2006, two years after incorporation, a survey was undertaken to ask the 
opinions of the presidents of NUCs about the consequences of incorporation 
(Figure 6.8). The results show that, so far, the presidents believe incorporation 
has, on the whole, had positive effects. They particularly thought the reforms 
made management easier and activities more efficient. It is, in a way, a reflection 
of the frustration they harboured under the old system.
Figure 6.8 Presidents’ opinions of the consequences of incorporation
Source: Center for National University Finance and Management (2007:Appendix).
The ultimate judgment, therefore, should be given after the cycle of the first 
mid-term is completed—that is, after the scheme of evaluation is implemented 
and the next mid-term goals are set. 
The uniqueness of the NUC model derives from its direct application of the 
theoretical scheme based on the principal–agent relation with contract–
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evaluation sequence. Even though such concepts are used in the analyses of 
the existing economic institutions, the Japanese NUC system is probably the 
first case to apply it to the design of public institutions. As discussed above, 
such a construct engendered a number of contradictions and ambiguities. 
At present, the factors of the state facility model still remain strong, and 
they function as an adhesive to prevent the contractions from creating real 
problems. Remaining regulations from the Ministry of Education, academic 
participation in the election of the president, and inertia among administrators 
are among such factors. 
Over time, however, such compromises will have to be replaced with a more 
realistic scheme for the relationship between the government and the NUCs 
and the internal governance and finance in each NUC. Such a scheme will 
include a regime of government monitoring and partial evaluation, together 
with stronger capacity in financial management. One thing that is clear is that, 
for the time being, the reform has created among a substantial proportion of 
academics an atmosphere that each national university has to seek its own 
way to realise its wishes. 
Moreover, the current political climate, moving towards radical restructuring 
of the government organisation and reduction of government outlays, has 
started to threaten the basis on which the original design of the NUC scheme 
was built. If things move further in that direction, the NUC scheme could lose 
its original characteristics and shift to become a different entity. 
Between the innate problems in details of the original design on one hand, 
and the political climate shifting towards further radical restructuring of the 
government on the other, NUCs will keep exploring their destination for some 
years to come. 
Financial Crisis Among Private Institutions
The second issue is the decline in the demand for higher education as a 
consequence of the diminishing size of the population of eighteen-year-olds.
Demographic Shift and Private Institutions
Japan’s higher education sector experienced a major rise in participation rates 
until the mid-1970s. Since then, the momentum of expansion has been rather 
contained, due to the policy of restraint of the Ministry of Education on the 
establishment of new institutions and the expansion of existing institutions. 
The policy was concomitant with a new government subsidy to private 
institutions. Through these schemes, the Ministry of Education regained the 
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power to control the total enrolments in the private sector of higher education. 
Through this power, the ministry has been able to sustain the quality of 
higher education by limiting the proportion of high-school graduates entering 
college. At the same time, existing private institutions have been able to enjoy 
a practical monopoly in the market for higher education at the undergraduate 
level. Such a situation had to change due to the decreases in the college-going 
population. 
The size of the college-going population reached its second peak after World 
War II when the second baby-boom generation reached eighteen years of age in 
about 1990 (Figure 6.9). The growth of the population under limited expansion 
of supply resulted in a decrease in the participation rate. The following cohort, 
however, started shrinking rapidly. The size of the eighteen-year-old cohort, 
after reaching the two-million level, shrank to about 1.5 million by 2000. 
Since then, the decline has become slower, but it is continuing steadily. It is 
envisaged that the population of eighteen-year-olds will drop to about 1.2 
million in 2010. The population will remain at that level for the foreseeable 
future.
Until recently, the participation rate had been steadily increasing—to cancel 
out the effect of the decrease in the number of eighteen-year-olds. In fact, the 
participation rate, which was less than 25 per cent in the early 1990s, grew to 
46 per cent in the spring of 1998. 
Nonetheless, it is unlikely that the participation rate will keep growing at 
the same pace as before. The decline of the number of eighteen-year-olds will 
create redundant enrolment capacity in universities, and the supply–demand 
gap will disappear. The selection of students will undergo significant changes, 
and it is likely that the economic benefits of a university education will decline 
at least for some students. Moreover, some private institutions have begun to 
face the possibility of insufficient applicants for admission, and hence the 
chance of closure.
In fact, many institutions—most of them with a relatively short history and 
small in scale—are faced with the effects of demographic shift already. 
The direct consequence of the shrinking market will be the prospect of 
institutional closure. Some institutions are already facing a decline in applicants, 
and, in a number of cases, the freshman class failed to fill the legal sitting 
capacity. The situation will be further aggravated towards the next decade. It 
should be noted that the effect of the demographic shift is not the same across the 
institutions. In general, those institutions at the higher tiers in the institutional 
hierarchy are least affected by this change. On the other hand, those at the 
bottom will be hit hardest. Most of these institutions are new and small—the 
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newcomers among the entrepreneurial type of institution. Because the average 
size of enrolment is small, the number of institutions affected will be large for a 
given size of total reduction in demand. 
Figure 6.9 Number of eighteen-year-olds
The reduction in the size of enrolment will inevitably affect the financial health 
of the institutions, in some cases leading to closure of the institution. In a sense, 
such a crisis has already started. The risk of closure can be measured by two 
indices 
•	 fulfillment rate: (number of entrants)/(enrolment capacity) 
•	 application rate: (number of applications for enrolment)/(enrolment capacity).
The ‘enrolment capacity’ is prescribed by the National Council on University 
Establishment for each institution. Even though the government does not 
have authority to enforce the capacity, admission of students significantly 
above this capacity will result in reduction in, or in severe cases cancellation 
of, the Current-Cost Subsidy from the government. On the other hand, if the 
institution is enrolling less than the capacity (and therefore the fulfilment rate 
falls significantly below 1.00), the institution will not be able to collect sufficient 
tuition income to support its operations. 
Meanwhile, some of those institutions admitting capacity might be very 
selective in accepting students. Those institutions are receiving fewer students 
than the capacity to maintain the academic standard for admission as dictated 
by their policy. From this perspective, the application rate is an important 
source of information.
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The two indices for the year 2004, derived from the data made available for 493 
institutions, or about 90 per cent of the total number of private institutions, are 
presented in Figure 6.10. Each institution is represented by the dots in the space 
where the vertical axis stands for the fulfilment rate, while the horizontal axis 
for the application rate is in logarithmic scale. 
The space is further divided by two lines. The horizontal line represents the 
fulfilment rate of 0.9, implying that the institutions below this line are admitting 
less than 90 per cent of capacity. The vertical line indicates the application rate 
of 1.0, signifying that the institutions to the left of this line are receiving less 
applications than the capacity. By combining these lines, the institutions can be 
divided into three groups: 1) low-risk institutions accepting more than 90 per 
cent of capacity; 2) medium-risk institutions, which are receiving less than 90 
per cent of capacity, but for whom the application rate is higher than 1.0; and 3) 
high-risk institutions that are located in the lower-left quadrant, receiving fewer 
than 90 per cent of capacity and for whom the number of applying students 
does not reach capacity. 
The figure shows that more than 100 institutions belong to the medium and high-
risk categories thus defined. There are 44 institutions, or 9 per cent of the total, that 
belong to the high-risk group. Most of the institutions in the high-risk group are 
small and relatively new. This implies that their financial basis tends to be weak. 
Figure 6.10 Distribution of private institutions by fulfilment rate and 
application/capacity ratio
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Viability of Institutions
Despite the large number of institutions in the high and medium-risk groups, 
there have been very few cases of closure as a consequence of genuinely fiscal 
reasons. Many institutions appear to have sizeable margins in their current 
revenue over costs. Some of them have succeeded in slashing costs by either 
decreasing the number of employees or cutting wage levels. Nonetheless, the 
prospect of closure is definitely looming. How many, and when, institutions 
will have to close depends on many factors and remains uncertain at this point.
What will happen if an institution is faced with financial difficulty? There are 
a few scenarios. In the most peaceful case, the institution might seek financial 
help from an individual or an organisation. Or, another institution might try to 
acquire the university in difficulty to take them under its wing. If the prospect 
for such a solution is small then the institution can declare bankruptcy: the 
students will be transferred to neighbouring institutions. In the worst case, the 
School Juristic Person (SJP) may stop operations, and, even after liquidation, 
significant debt and unpaid salary for the employees might remain. Not only 
might the employees and creditors not be able to recover their losses, the 
students might have to move to another institution and pay for tuition again 
(MEXT 2005).
Social attitudes towards the prospect of closure remain ambiguous. The media 
has been reporting the likelihood of closure with a tone that suggests such 
incidences are inevitable. Some social critiques are arguing that such natural 
selection is healthy and useful for improving the efficiency of higher education. 
Nonetheless, in the event massive closures take place, the public’s attitude 
might change quickly. 
As a consequence of these changes, private institutions appear to be increasingly 
polarised in their interests. Accordingly, they will seek very different directions 
towards the future. 
On one hand, there are a number of institutions that are positioned at the higher 
echelon of the market and therefore are faced with less acute risk in the market. 
These institutions tend to be large or medium sized, and are either the voluntary 
or the sponsored type. Their strategic goals are to enhance their market position 
and to increase competitiveness not only against their peers but also against the 
national institutions. 
If these institutions wish to achieve these goals, they have to achieve certain 
conditions. They tend to be less attached to the Current-Cost Subsidy. They 
are also less persistent in following the financial scheme of the Accounting 
Standards. They are already receiving subsidies competitive with those of 
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primary institutions. They might welcome the shift from institutional subsidies 
to individual subsidies through either a direct grant to students or some form 
of voucher. 
A more significant issue will be how donations to private institutions are treated 
in the tax system. Under the current system, donations to private institutions 
may be deducted from taxable income (income deduction) to an extent, but 
not from the amount of tax itself (tax amount deduction). The institutions 
will have to seek the tax-deduction status in order to become competitive 
with public institutions. This change should, however, require corresponding 
changes in governance. Being given tax-amount deduction status implies that 
the organisation is permitted to accumulate public funds as assets. The asset 
should be owned by a group of responsible persons who cannot get any benefit 
from the operation of the university. The decision making by the membership 
group, or the practice of participatory management, might have to be seriously 
questioned. 
On the other hand, there are a number of institutions that are faced with the 
pressure of reduction in demand. Many of these institutions are striving to 
strengthen their competitiveness in their segment of the market and survive 
the struggle. From this standpoint, the provision of the Current-Cost Subsidy 
is indispensable not only for its value as a source of stable income, but also 
as a sign of recognition by the national government of their function as an 
educational institution. They would also be opposed to the further disclosure 
of finances, on the ground that such disclosure could generate misinformation. 
The entrepreneurial-type institutions particularly are unlikely to change their 
governance and management. In that sense, they would not expel the element of 
private ownership. In this sense, they might take the direction of entrenchment 
as far as it is possible.
Ironically, the entrenchment strategy could be challenged by an unexpected 
competitor: for-profit institutions currently allowed on a trial basis. The 
proponents of the for-profits argue that the present private institutions 
established under the School Juristic Person are in fact generating interests for 
the people engaged in management. At the same time, it is likely that some of the 
bankrupt universities might be purchased by the enterprises that wish to build 
for-profit institutions. In this sense, some part of the private sector is moving 
towards the private domain. 
The discussion above indicates that the private higher education sector in Japan 
has been changing—and it will keep changing towards the future. There has 
been a wide variation among private institutions, and this will continue—albeit 
in a different way—in the future. Such variation and changes are created by the 
dynamism of the market forces in higher education together with the shifts in 
demographic, social and political factors.
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National Expenditure on Higher Education
The most fundamental issue in the financing of higher education is the level of 
expenditure on higher education in the national economy. Recently, there have 
been public debates concerning this issue. 
Higher Education Expenditure in the National 
Economy
One of the outstanding characteristics of Japan with respect to higher education 
finance is the low level of government expenditure on higher education relative 
to the size of the total economy. According to the statistics of the Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), government expenditure 
on higher education in Japan as a proportion of GDP stands at 0.5 per cent, 
compared with the OECD average of 1 per cent. In fact, Japan, along with Korea, 
is ranked at the bottom among the OECD countries in this respect. On the other 
hand, the higher education system is heavily dependent on private contributions. 
The OECD statistics show that private expenditure on higher education stands 
at 0.8 per cent of GDP, compared with the OECD average of 0.4 per cent. Indeed, 
this level ranks third among OECD nations, after the United States (1.9 per cent) 
and Korea (1.8 per cent). The high level of private contributions is a reflection 
of the high share of private institutions in enrolment and their dependence 
on tuition revenue. This pattern of dependence on private contributions is not 
unique to Japan in the East Asian region. 
In Japan, this characteristic derives from the unique path along which the 
country’s higher education system has developed. As indicated earlier, the 
demands for higher education in Japan started growing at relatively early 
stages of its economic development. As the government still lacked the financial 
resources to supply sufficient rooms in public institutions, the excess demand 
had to be met by expanding the private sector of higher education. After Japan 
went through a period of rapid economic development, it shifted towards a 
welfare society by promptly raising the levels of social expenditure, including 
on higher education. The government started the Current-Cost Subsidy in 1975, 
which was intended to substantially increase the level of public expenditure on 
higher education. This development was, however, short-lived. By the end of 
the 1980s, a rising budget deficit became apparent and the government turned 
to a stringent fiscal policy. This shift had to be accelerated even further in the 
later period by the explosive increases in expenditure on national pensions and 
health plans on one hand, and the economic recession after the boom on the 
other. 
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There have been persistent demands for greater government expenditure on 
higher education, and one of the grounds for the argument is Japan’s low 
standing in international comparisons. The voices advocating this argument 
have been loudest among the associations of national and private institutions 
of higher education and the Central Education Council under MEXT. On 
the other hand, there have been strong criticisms of this argument from the 
Ministry of Finance and various economic advisory committees. It is claimed 
that the low level of government expenditure is not the main issue; after all, 
government expenditure is financed by tax revenues, one of the main sources of 
which are taxes on individuals. Japan’s higher education tends to be financed 
through direct contributions from households, not through tax and government 
expenditure. The latter argument gained even greater momentum in the context 
of fiscal stringency and the popularity of marketisation orientation.
Quality Shift and Funding
A new dimension has been added recently to this debate. A few members 
of the Central Education Council issued a statement claiming that, having 
reached the stage of universalisation of higher education after 50 years of 
quantitative expansion, Japanese higher education should initiate a new drive 
for restructuring towards qualitative upgrading. On one hand, such a shift is 
critical in responding to the challenges created by globalisation and the fierce 
economic competition that requires high competencies among college graduates. 
On the other hand, it is necessitated by the changing behaviours and values 
among youth.
The group claimed further that such a shift towards a qualitative leap was 
impossible without substantial increases in expenditure on higher education. 
One of the grounds for this argument is, again, an international comparison. 
Figure 6.11 presents the distribution of OECD countries with respect to unit 
costs of higher education institutions (vertical axis) and the level of per capita 
GDP (horizontal axis). The two indices are expressed in equivalent US dollars 
converted using purchasing power parity (PPP). It is shown that, in general, the 
unit cost increases as per capita GDP rises. The difference by country, however, 
is substantial, especially among more wealthy countries. 
Particularly striking is the high level of unit costs among a few countries, 
including the United States, Switzerland and Canada. Especially in the first two 
countries, the unit costs lie in the range of $25 000. On the other hand, a large 
group of OECD countries—including Finland, Denmark, the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom, Germany, France, Australia and Japan—is located in the range 
between $10 000 and $15 000. 
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Figure 6.11 International comparison in per capita costs
Source: OECD Education at a Glance 2006.
Obviously, the figures should be interpreted with caution for there are substantial 
problems with international comparison of unit costs due to the difference in the 
range of higher education institutions and other factors. Nevertheless, it seems 
to be true that there are substantial differences among the OECD countries with 
respect to the unit cost of higher education institutions. 
It should be noted that the differences among the OECD countries have 
developed in the past two decades. In particular, the present high level of unit 
costs in the United States is the result of the steady increase in unit costs since 
the end of 1980s. 
The rapid rise in unit costs in the United States was not necessarily induced 
by explicit government policies either at the federal or the state level. In fact, 
there have been strong criticisms of higher education institutions for the sharp 
increases in tuition fees that partly financed the increase in unit costs. Rather, 
the increase was induced by the leading universities increasing spending on 
education, which was then followed by other institutions. 
Nonetheless, the shift in development appears to have corresponded with the 
economic strategy that the United States has been pursuing. Threatened by the 
rise in productivity of the manufacturing sector in such countries as Japan, 
the US economy had to assume its hegemony by strengthening its power in the 
global economy. It required a number of talented college graduates who could 
handle the particular demands required in the multinational enterprises. And 
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this had to be the area where the United States had the advantage (Reich 1991). 
From this perspective, the increasing investment in higher education constitutes 
a significant part of the strategy for fortifying the strength of the United States 
in the globalised economy.
If Japan is to remain competitive in this environment, it can no longer rely 
entirely on the high productivity on its factory floors. The competence of 
regular white-collar workers and engineers should be the critical factor for 
competitiveness, and higher education is expected to contribute to enhancing 
it. Arguably, that will not be possible without radical reformation of higher 
education through increased investment.
It is interesting to note that, recently, an EU committee made a statement to the 
same effect. 
Benchmarking with the United States
Even if the above argument for the necessity of increased spending is accepted, 
there remain a number of issues to be considered. Who should pay, how should 
it be delivered and who should receive the spending? From this perspective, 
it will be informative to compare closely the components of higher education 
expenditure in Japan with those in the United States. 
Figure 6.12 presents the results of a benchmarking exercise to estimate national 
expenditure on higher education by different forms (direct government 
subsidy to higher education institutions, government funding for research on a 
competitive basis, tuition fees and donations to higher education institutions). 
These amounts are further divided into revenues to public institutions and 
those to private institutions. Observations from this figure can be summarised 
in the following three points.
First, the contributions from households through tuition fees are similar in the 
two countries—about 0.7 per cent of GDP. The distributions by public and 
private sectors are different, reflecting the relative sizes of the two sectors in 
the two countries. The difference in total expenditure on higher education 
between the two countries arises from the differences in the other three sources 
of funding.
Second, the major source of difference between the two countries comes from 
government expenditure. Direct institutional subsidies amount to 0.8 per cent 
of GDP in the United States compared with less than 0.5 per cent in Japan. 
Funding for research activities through competition stands at 0.2 per cent of 
GDP in the United States compared with less than 0.1 per cent in Japan.
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Figure 6.12 Components of national expenditure on higher education: 
Japan and the United States, 2003
Source: Author’s estimations from various sources.
Third, there is a substantial difference in private contributions in the form 
of donations. In the United States, this source stands at 0.2 per cent of GDP, 
compared with about 0.05 per cent in Japan. This is particularly important for 
private institutions.
These results do not necessarily imply that Japan will inevitably have to follow 
the United States in its pattern of expenditure if it is to increase the total amount 
of expenditure. It is also unrealistic, because it implies a doubling of the present 
level of government expenditure. Private donations will be welcome, but it 
could take a while to foster the culture for voluntary contributions to social 
causes. More realistically, significant increases in tuition fees will be inevitable 
if Japan is to raise the level of expenditure on higher education. 
Nonetheless, the exercise does seem to indicate that the further increases in 
expenditure will necessitate, along with tuition revenues, at least a marginal 
increase in government expenditure on higher education in the form of various 
incentives for qualitative improvement and a reorganisation of the national 
student loan system. Whether that option is viable in the present political 
climate remains to be seen. 
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Conclusions
After a half-century of robust expansion, higher education in Japan is clearly 
at a crossroad. In order to respond to the new challenges, it has to undergo 
a significant transformation in which changes in financing assume the critical 
role. 
Some of the changes have already been translated into concrete policies—
most prominent of which is the incorporation of national universities that 
took place in 2004. The other changes are about to take place, as in the case of 
reconfiguration of the private sector of higher education. There are also debates 
taking place about the macroscopic basis of higher education expenditure. 
All of these developments involve a number of issues about which there are 
significant differences of opinion. In this sense, Japanese society is struggling 
to find a definite direction for higher education financing towards the future.
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7. Student Loan Reform in China: 
Problems and challenges
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China Institute for Educational Finance Research, 
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Development of Student Loans in China
The development of student loans in China accompanies China’s higher education 
‘massification’. In 1999, the Chinese government launched a policy onhigher 
education expansion. Since then, Chinese higher education has shifted rapidly 
from elite education to mass education. In 2002, China’s gross enrolment rate in 
higher education increased to 15 per cent from 9.8 per cent in 1998—meeting 
the minimum standards of mass higher education defined by Professor Martin 
Trow. The rate increased to 23 per cent in 2007. In the process of promoting 
mass higher education, the Chinese government has also reformed the previous 
free tuition policies. Starting in 1997, all students who are enrolled at public 
higher education institutions (HEIs) are required to pay for tuition. According 
to the latest statistics, revenue from tuition and fees in 2007 accounted for 
33.66 per cent of the total expenditure of Chinese ordinary HEIs (Ministry of 
Education 2008:28). The introduction of these macro-policies brought about a 
real problem: how to help the growing number of needy students to successfully 
complete their higher education.
Many countries have adopted student loan schemes to share the cost of higher 
education. To resolve the above-mentioned problem, China has also launched 
a student loan policy.1 So far, four patterns of student loan programs have 
developed in China: commercial bank loans from an agency in the HEI’s region;2 
1 In addition to student loans, financial assistance to Chinese students includes: grants, national incentive 
scholarships, work–study programs, tuition waivers and reductions, subsidies for needy students, ‘one-stop 
student assistance stations for financially needy students’, and so on.
2 The student loans originated by commercial banks—that is, state-subsidised student loans, which will be mentioned below.
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rural credit cooperative3 loans from an agency in the household’s region; a 
China Development Bank4 loan from an agency in the HEI’s region; and a China 
Development Bank loan from an agency in household’s region.5
In 1999, state-subsidised student loans were experimented with in HEIs 
controlled by the relevant ministries of the State Council in eight pilot cities, 
and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) was the bank that 
handled the matter. In 2000, the program expanded across the country, and its 
administering bank expanded from the ICBC to also include the Agricultural 
Bank of China, the Bank of China and the China Construction Bank.6
When the state-subsidised student loan program was implemented nationally, 
some provinces startedinstitutional innovations in student loans. In July 2001, 
Zhejiang Province launched a Rural Credit Cooperative loan from an agency in 
the household region, which was the first in China. At present, this pattern of 
student loans is carried out in many other areas.
In 2003, the origination of state-subsidised student loans encountered 
obstacles. As the program has the features of large quantities, high cost and 
high risk, commercial banks do not want to get involved. The provision of 
state-subsidised student loans stopped in nearly all parts of the country. In 
order to promote state-subsidised student loans, the Ministry of Education, 
the Ministry of Finance, the People’s Bank of China and the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission jointly issued ‘Several Opinions on Further Improving 
the Work on the State-Subsidised Students Loans’ in June 2004—reforming 
previous policies of the program. During the same period, the China 
Development Bank distributed student loans in some provinces. This program 
originated in Henan Province, so it is also known as the ‘Henan Pattern’. After 
the adjustment of the state-subsidised student loan policies in 2004, student 
loans in Henan have not been provided completely. In December 2004, the 
country’s only pilot province, Henan, cooperated with the China Development 
Bank (Henan Branch) in student loan business. Afterwards Qinghai Province 
followed suit. At present, that pattern has also been adopted in Shanxi, 
Hunan, Guangdong, Inner Mongolia, and other places.
3 Rural credit cooperatives are rural financial institutions providing financial services for their members. 
They are set up with the approval of the People’s Bank of China. Their shares come from their members and 
therefore are under democratic administration. At present, rural credit cooperatives are undergoing reform 
and some have shifted to become rural cooperative banks.
4 The China Development Bank is different from the commercial banks mentioned previously. It was established 
in 1994 and is a policy financial institution controlled directly by the State Council. Its funds come mainly from the 
domestic and foreign bond markets. At present, reform of the China Development Bank is also under way.
5 The HEI’s region refers to the location of the HEI at which the student studies; the household region refers 
to the place where the home of the student is located.
6 These banks are operated in accordance with the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Commercial 
Banks.
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In 2007, the State Council issued the ‘Opinions on Establishing and Improving 
the Policies for Subsidising Students in Universities of Regular Undergraduate 
Education, Post-Secondary Vocational Schools and Secondary Vocational 
Schools from Families with Financial Difficulties’, making a major adjustment 
to the student-assistance system, which is also the biggest step since the higher 
education expansion. The document also suggested the China Development 
Bank loan from an agency in the household region and experimented with this 
in Jiangsu, Hubei, Chongqing, Shaanxi and Gansu.
Comparison of Four Patterns of Student Loan 
Programs in China
Below we provide a comparison of China’s four types of student loan programs 
from aspects of the principal provider, the borrower’s eligibility, loan size, 
loan origination, interest subsidy, risk-sharing, repayment conditions, loan 
collection, and so on (see Table 7.1 for a summary).
Principal Provider
The principal of the current four types of Chinese student loans is provided 
by financial institutions and not directly by the government. The principal 
of the commercial bank loan from an agency in the HEI’s region is provided 
by the commercial banks in the HEI’s region. The principal of the rural credit 
cooperative loan from an agency in the household region is provided by the 
rural credit cooperatives in the student’s household region.
Borrower’s Eligibility
The borrowers of a commercial bank loan from an agency in the HEI’s region 
should be full-time junior-college students, undergraduate students, second 
bachelor’sdegree students or graduate students from public ordinary colleges 
and universities. For a rural credit cooperative loan from an agency in the 
household region, it is more complicated. In some provinces, the students 
themselves apply for loans, but in others, parents apply instead; in some areas, 
loans are not granted to students in private HEIs and independent colleges,7 
and in others they are accessible to all; some loans are given to second 
bachelor’s degree students and graduate students, but other loans are given 
7 Independent college results from China’s higher education reform; they are set up by ordinary universities 
under the new mechanism and models. They are not public institutions of higher education. Enterprises, 
institutions, social groups or individuals may serve as partners and provide the necessary conditions and facilities 
for operating the colleges and participating in their management and supervision. The colleges independently 
enrol, grant certificates and conduct financial accounting. They have legal personality and bear civil liability.
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only to ordinary junior-college students and undergraduate students. For the 
China Development Bank loan from an agency in the HEI’s region, eligible 
borrowers are similar to those in the commercial bank loan from an agency in 
the HEI’s region. For the China Development Bank loan from an agency in the 
household region, it is required that the borrowers be ordinary junior-college 
students or undergraduate students, excluding postgraduates and second 
bachelor’s degree students. It is also required that students and their parents 
sign the loan contracts as co-borrowers. In addition, students in private HEIs 
and independent colleges may apply for the China Development Bank loan 
from an agency in the HEI’s and the household’s regions. Apart from the above 
requirements, applicants for all four types of student loans must be students 
from families with financial difficulties.
Loan Size 
The loan size of all four patterns of student loan is generally limited to no 
more than RMB6000 each year.
Loan Origination 
The originations of the four student loan patternsvary greatly. Under the 
commercial bank loan from an agency in the HEI’s region, the loan origination 
is completed by HEIs and commercial banks. Under rural credit cooperative 
loans from an agency in the household’s region, the rural credit cooperatives 
originate the loans themselves. For the China Development Bank loan from an 
agency in the HEI’s region, HEIs are mainly responsible for loan origination. 
For the China Development Bank loan from an agency in the household’s 
region, all counties or districtsin pilot provinces have been required to set 
up student-assistance management centres in charge of the loan’s origination. 
Interest Subsidy 
It is the government that will subsidise the interest of all four patterns when 
the students are in school. Under a commercial bank loan from an agency in 
the HEI’s region, the loan’s interest is centrally controlled by the HEIs but 
is borne by the central government, and that of students in locally owned 
HEIs is borne by the local government. For rural credit cooperative loans from 
an agency in the household’s region, the interest is borne by the provincial 
government sometimes, but otherwise is borne by the corresponding local 
government according to the affiliation of the HEIs. For the China Development 
Bank loan from an agency in the HEI’s region, the interest is generally borne 
by the corresponding local government. For the China Development Bank loan 
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from an agency in the household’s region, the level of government that will 
bear the interest is determined by the affiliation and location of the HEI the 
student is enrolled in. 
Risk-Sharing 
A risk compensation fund is generally established to share risk in China’s 
student loans. The system was introduced during the reform in 2004. The 
amount of risk compensation is equal to the loan amount multiplied by the 
ratio of the risk compensation fund. Under commercial bank loans from 
an agency in the HEI’s region, the HEI and the government that the HEI 
is affiliated with each bears half of the risk compensation fund. The ratio 
of the risk compensation fund is determined when banks bid for the final 
selection of the administration of the student loan. It is more complicated for 
risk compensation funds in a rural credit cooperative loan from an agency in 
the household’s region.8 For example, the HEI and the local government each 
bears half in some provinces, but in others, the local government shouldersthe 
whole amount. For the China Development Bank loan from an agency in the 
HEI’s region, the ratio is determined when negotiation between the provincial 
student assistance centre and the provincial branch of the China Development 
Bank is carried out and it is shared equally by the provincial government 
and the HEI. For the China Development Bank loan from an agency in the 
household’s region, the ratio of risk compensation is 15 per cent, according 
to the policies governing pilot areas. Which level of government will bear the 
risk compensation fund is determined by the affiliation and location of the 
HEI the student is enrolled in. 
Repayment Conditions
The interest on the loan incurred from the date of the student’s graduation 
is paid by the student (or their parents). Under the commercial bank loan 
from an agency in the HEI’s region, students may choose to repay the 
principal within one–two years after their graduation according to their 
employment and income. The principal and interest must be paid off within 
six years after graduation.9 Under the rural credit cooperative loan from 
an agency in the household’s region and the China Development Bank loan 
from an agency in the HEI’s region, the principal and interest also must be 
paid off within six years after graduation. The loan-repayment term of the 
China Development Bank loan from an agency in the household’s region is 
8 In this type of student loan, in some provinces borrowers are also required to provide a guarantee.
9 The students who signed their loan contract before the reform in 2004 must pay off the principal and 
interest within four years after graduation.
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determined in accordance with the full-time study period of junior college 
or university with an addition of 10-year limits, reaching a maximum of 14 
years. The grace period is the time while students are studying at the HEI 
and two years after graduation. After that period, students and their parents 
must repay the principal in yearly instalments in accordance with their loan 
contracts. An undergraduate must pay off all the principal and interest within 
eight years after the grace period. In terms of the repayment mode, for both 
the China Development Bank and the rural credit cooperative loan from an 
agency in the household’s region, in some provinces this is paid yearly, while 
the principal and interest of the commercial bank loan from an agency in 
the HEI’s region may be paid by yearly, quarterly or monthly. All loans may 
be repaid ahead of schedule. Borrowers need to pay the actual interest only. 
Under the commercial bank loan from an agency in the HEI’s region and the 
China Development Bank loan from an agency in the HEI’s region, if a student 
borrower continues their postgraduate study, the banks will provide him with 
a loan-repayment extension. The government subsidises the interest at the 
corresponding level. In addition, if graduates from centrally controlled HEIs 
work in the grassroots units in the western regions or remote areas for three 
or more years, the central government will repay the loan’s principal they 
receive in school and the interest incurred previously. Such a system has also 
been implemented in some provinces so that when graduates of provincially 
owned HEIs work in designated places, the provincial government will pay 
the principal and interest of student loans.
Loan Collection
Different loan types vary in their method of collection. Under the commercial 
bank loan from an agency in the HEI’s region, HEIs and banks are responsible 
for collection.10 Under the rural credit cooperative loan from an agency in the 
household’s region, rural credit cooperatives themselves are responsible for 
collection. Under the China Development Bank loan from an agency in the 
HEI’s region, HEIs are responsible for the collection. The final settlement of 
the risk compensation fund links to the HEIs’ loan-collection performance. 
If the loans are collected well and the loan default amount is less than the 
risk compensation fund then the HEIs will be able to receive the remainder 
as rewards. Under the China Development Bank loan from an agency in 
the household’s region, the student assistance centre at the county level is 
responsible for the loan recovery. If the loans are collected well, the student 
assistance centre at the county level is also correspondingly rewarded by the 
risk compensation fund as an incentive.
10 As the commercial banks are reluctant to offer student loans, generally, HEIs are responsible for loan 
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Problems and Challenges Confronting Chinese 
Student Loan Reform 
The four types of student loans play an important role in helping needy students 
successfully complete their studies. It is noteworthy that none of the current 
four types is perfect. At the national level, as an important part of the student-
assistance system, student loans have not yet functioned to their full extent. The 
development of Chinese student loansis facing many problems and challenges.
1. Some students are not yet eligible to apply for student loans. There are 
restrictions on the eligibility of applicants from private HEIs and independent 
colleges. Some loans are not accessible to graduate students.
2. The loan size fails to meet the needs of some students. At present, the 
maximum amount of all loan types is RMB6000 per annum. According to 
the study of Song Yingquan, however, the private educational expenditure 
of a student in a locally owned HEI, on average, is more than RMB10 000 
(Yingquan n.d.), including tuition and fees, accommodation, board expenses, 
and transportation fees. In addition, the tuition fees for medicine and art 
majors are higher than for other majors. Generally, the tuition fees of private 
HEIs and independent colleges are more than RMB10 000. As a result, for 
students with nogrant or other form of financial assistance, the current loan 
size is not enough to pay for their higher education costs.
3. The distribution of student loans cannot fully meet the needs of the students. 
According unpublished data from the Ministry of Education,11 since the 
adjustment of student loan policies in 2004 (see Table 7.2), there is still a wide 
gap between the number of students receiving student loans and the number 
of applicants. In addition, according to a survey we conducted in 2007,12 
the success rate of applications for loans is not high. Of the 8120 students in 
the sample survey, a total of 1434 applied for student loans, accounting for 
18.54 per cent of valid samples; 6312 did not apply; and 374 students did not 
provide any information. Of the 1434 students who applied for student loans, 
only 961 eventually received a loan. The success rate of applications for 
student loans is 67.02 per cent. These data show that the loan requirements 
for students from families with financial difficulties have not been met.
11 The summary data include data for all types of student loans.
12 The survey was conducted in 30 HEIs in Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Hubei, Sichuan, Qinghai and Ningxia 
provinces and autonomous regions. A total of 8152 student questionnaires were handed out and 8120 valid, 
completed questionnaires were returned.
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Table 7.2 Statistics of distribution of student loans nationwide, 2004–06
2004 2005 2006
The total number of on-campus 
students (10 000 people) 1350 1387 1849
The number of loan applicants  
(10 000 people) 70.32 118.31 190.00
The number of students receiving 
loans (10 000 people) 36.73 91.61 85.50
The success rate of loan 
applications 52.23% 77.43% 44.74%
Source: Ministry of Education, unpublished data.
4. The student loan coverage varies in different colleges and universities. The 
coverage in centrally controlled HEIs is higher than in locally owned HEIs. 
In 2004, the student loan coverage of HEIs controlled by the Ministry of 
Education, those controlled by other ministries and locally owned HEIs was 
9.04 per cent, 7.13 per cent and 1.60 per cent, respectively. In 2005, the 
corresponding coverage was 7.11 per cent, 7.55 per cent and 6.50 per cent 
(see Tables 7.3 and 7.4). In addition, the situation in locally owned vocational 
colleges is not as good as in regular undergraduate colleges and universities. 
According to a survey carried out in 2007, we can see the differences of 
coverage between locally owned regular undergraduate colleges and 
universities and vocational colleges. In locally owned regular undergraduate 
colleges and universities, 391 of the 2349 students in our sample survey 
received student loans—accounting for 18.55 per cent. In the case of locally 
owned vocational colleges, 459 of the 4213 students in our sample survey 
received student loans—accounting for 12.16 per cent. In addition, there 
are no considerable differences between the tuition fees of vocational 
colleges and regular undergraduate colleges and universities. Moreover, the 
family economic situations of students in vocational colleges are even worse 
(Yingquan n.d.). These factors make it more difficult for vocational-college 
students to pay for higher education. In addition, compared with students in 
public HEIs, students from private HEIs and independent colleges face more 
difficulties in receiving student loans. Though the rural credit cooperative 
loan from an agency in the household’s region and the two types of China 
Development Bank loans allow students from these two types of colleges to 
apply for loans in some provinces, they do not enjoyequal treatment with 
those from public HEIs. According to the 2007 survey mentioned previously, 
114 of the 1652 sample students from private HEIs and independent colleges 
received student loans—accounting for only 7.7 per cent, which is much 
lower than the percentage of students from locally owned ordinary colleges 
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5. It is difficult to identify a student’s family’s financial conditions. All types 
of student loan programs offer loans with a government financial subsidy to 
needy students. When a loan application is examined, the student’s family’s 
economic situation will be identified. Since there is no strict and sound 
individual income tax declaration system in China and many taxpayers 
cannot meet the current standard of individual income tax deduction 
expenses, it is impossible to collect the information on all the students’ 
families’ economic situations. 
6. There is no sound risk-sharing mechanism. As mentioned previously, instead 
of providing guarantees, the Chinese government shares and controls the 
risks of student loans by way of a risk compensation fund. This risk-sharing 
approach is not sound. Its main problems are as follows. HEIs bear half of the 
risk of the compensation fund. The number of students receiving loans will 
affect the amount of risk of the compensation fund the HEI bears. Unfairness 
could arise among different HEIs. More importantly, is it reasonable to 
require HEIs to bear the risk of the compensation fund? The specific meaning 
of the risk compensation fund is not the same for different types of loans. 
Under the commercial bank loan from an agency in the HEI’s region and 
the rural credit cooperative loan from an agency in the household’s region, 
the risk compensation fund is derived from income for the current period. 
No matter what the loan repayment is in the future, banks may receive a 
fixed amount of the risk compensation fund. This institutional arrangement 
will not solve the possible future risk-control problems. After getting the 
risk compensation fund, financial institutions will bear all the losses arising 
from loan defaults in the future. The financial institutions’ worries about 
the future uncertainties have not been completely resolved. Under the China 
Development Bank loan from an agency in the HEI’s and the household’s 
regions, the risk compensation fund is not the bank’s income for the current 
period. The final settlement depends on the collection performance. There is a 
loss-sharing system that defines that the China Development Bank, HEIs and 
provincial student assistance centres (or the China Development Bank and 
county-level government) share the loss together when the loan default amount 
is bigger than the risk compensation fund. This institutional arrangement 
defines the control and sharing mechanism of the future uncertain risks and 
there is also an incentive mechanism. There are, however, also problems in 
this system. With regard to incentives, the motivation chain is too long. The 
final settlement is after the expired repaymentdate. During this period, there 
could be many changes in personnel of the various agencies. There are no 
efficient indicators to give them day-to-day, real-time incentives. The reason 
is not strong enough for HEIs and county-level governments to bear the 
losses. As with bearing the risk compensation fund mentioned above, it is 
risky to require colleges and universities to share the loss. That the losses 
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of loan defaults are borne by the county-level governments is not sufficient 
since students work in all parts of the country after graduation.
7. There are disadvantages with the repayment options. The repayment period 
for all types of student loans is six years, except for the China Development 
Bank loan from an agency in the household’s region (its repayment period 
is 10 years for undergraduates). The repayment period of six years seems 
too short whether in comparison with international student loans or in 
consideration of the repayment burden of Chinese student loans. None of 
the four patterns takes into consideration all the exceptions when designing 
the repayment period, such as unemployment, low income, major diseases, 
emergencies, and so on. Regarding the forgiveness of student loans, the 
current policies of some provinces support only the student borrowers from 
the locally owned HEIs who work in designated areas of the same province, 
but do not support the above-mentioned students who work in poor areas of 
other provinces. Therefore, the issue of forgiveness will be considered from 
the central government’s point of view. In addition, there is an extension 
system for postgraduates only for the commercial bank loan from an agency 
in the HEI’s region and the China Development Bank loan from an agency in 
the HEI’s region. Improvements to the other loan types should be made in a 
timely manner. The interest subsidy in loan-repayment extension is a very 
complicated issue. Local governments are reluctant to continue to subsidise 
the loan interest for locally owned HEI graduates who pursue their Master’s 
degrees in other provinces. Like the forgiveness mentioned above, this issue 
will also be considered from the central government’s point of view.
8. The coexistence and competition of the US Federal Family Education Loan 
(FFEL) and Federal Direct Loan (DL) give us positive inspiration (Galloway 
and Wilson 2005). Since none of the Chinese student loan patterns has 
obvious advantages, the strategy of coexistence and competition of various 
loan types should be adopted. The disadvantages mentioned above exist in 
basically all the student loan types. At present, the commercial bank loan 
from an agency in the HEI’s region is applied across the country with regard 
to the policy coverage. But in some areas this pattern has stopped or has not 
been carried out at all. A rural credit cooperative loan from an agency in 
the household’s region, the China Development Bank loan from an agency in 
the HEI’s region and the China Development Bank loan from an agency in 
the household’s region are offered in some areas.The feasible option for the 
future is to allow the coexistence and competition of a variety of student 
loan types, rather than choosing a single type, so as to find the most suitable 
type for each place through practice. This might offer friendly conditions for 
the formation of more mature patterns of student loans. 
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Introduction
Secular higher education in Indonesia has a relatively short history. It began 
with the establishment by the Dutch colonialists of tertiary schools training 
indigenous people in medicine and engineering. Before the colonial education 
system, higher education was considered an Islamic institution. The growth 
in higher education post independence has, however, been very swift. Since 
the endorsement of the very first Education Act in 1961, Indonesian higher 
education has continuously experienced rapid expansion. The development of 
higher education grew during the period from the 1970s to the 1990s, when 
Indonesia was experiencing strong economic growth, fuelled by an oil-price 
boom and solid non-oil and gas export performance. Nizam (2006) recorded that 
the student population in higher education institutions (HEIs) increased from 
about 200 000 students in 1975 to 2.5 millions students in 1995. By 2005, there 
were nearly 2300 HEIs, consisting of 86 public HEIs and about 2200 private 
HEIs. More than 3.5 million students were educated in these HEIs.
Though this rosy trend gives a good signal, some observers addressed crucial 
problems behind the growing HEIs. Moeliodihardjo et al. (2000), for example, 
argue that the rapid expansion of HEIs has not been in parallel with appropriate 
planning and funding mechanisms. The higher education system has suffered 
internal inefficiency and poor initiatives due to a centralised education system. 
In addition, the bureaucratic dependency on a central authority has made HEIs 
(particularly public HEIs) unable to respond to external changes or receive 
appropriate support (Nizam 2006). Further, the public HEIs have lacked any 
sense of public accountability, as, according to a bureaucratic structure, they are 
part of the institution of government under the Ministry of National Education.
Consequently, the absence of any autonomy and the diminished sense of 
community in HEIs have resulted in a lack of accountability and responsibility 
to society (World Bank 1996). This has had an adverse impact on the quality, 
efficiency and relevance of higher education in Indonesia. The poor quality 
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of higher education can be seen from the low levels of qualification of the 
teaching staff, inadequate laboratory facilities (especially in the private HEIs) 
and limited library holdings. Meanwhile, low efficiency is best demonstrated 
by the extended enrolment period in which a typical undergraduate—in both 
public and private HEIs—spends about five to six years completing their 
studies instead of the four years required. Low internal efficiency can also be 
seen from the low student–teacher ratios of about 12:1, limited utilisation of 
physical space, and the low number of student/staff contact hours.
As far as public financing is concerned, it has long been recognised that the 
government is facing strained resources to support higher education. Before 
the economic crises hit the country, higher education was not a top priority 
in education policy. This is understandable, as the country is still struggling 
to achieve its nine-year compulsory education policy (primary and junior 
high school), which consumes a large amount of resources. The financial crisis 
has aggravated critical conditions for HEIs, particularly public HEIs that rely 
mostly on the government for support. Public HEIs have to compete for public 
resources not only with primary education but also with other social sectors and 
issues such as health, poverty alleviation and social security. 
This recent study is an attempt to outline the main characteristics of the higher 
education sector in Indonesia and review major policy developments affecting the 
financial mechanism and the delivery of tertiary education over the past few decades. 
It will pay particular attention to the effective roles of government-funding schemes 
and types of student loan arrangements in the broader policy setting. 
This chapter will discuss the evolution of the structure of institutions of 
higher education in Indonesia. It focuses on the access to and equality of 
higher education services, and reviews several issues related to the financing 
mechanisms of higher education in Indonesia, including the general trend and 
composition of public expenditure, the sources of funds, and the impact of the 
economic crisis and decentralisation on the allocation of finances. 
Overview of Higher Education in Indonesia: 
Structure, institution and type
The Evolution of the Structure of Institutions
Indonesian higher education witnessed a massive expansion in tertiary 
education post independence. In the colonial period, there were very few HEIs 
in the country. These institutions were designed to provide professional training 
to local people mainly in the areas of medicine and engineering. Academic and 
research programs were not established in this time. Due to the social stratification 
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in colonial times, there were students only from elite groups enrolled in 
universities. It is estimated that only 200 students enrolled in universities in 
the colonial period (KJPP 2003). Post independence, the political climate and 
the national spirit have meant the country aspired to have at least one public 
university in each province. About 23 new HEIs were established during the 
1960s, and these institutions covered almost 26 provinces in Indonesia (Nizam 
2006). This policy has brought higher education to a mass scale. 
Another important point in the 1960s was the enactment of the first education 
law—Law No. 15 of 1961—which detailed the structure for higher education. 
Under the law, universities have a standardised division of faculties and structure 
of governance (Buchori and Malik 2004). The law defines the mission of HEIs 
and details the ‘Tri Dharma Perguruan Tinggi’ (Three Pillars of National Higher 
Education): learning, research and community service. The law also encouraged 
diversification in higher education programs. Before the endorsement of the 
law, private HEIs were not recognised as part of the national education system. 
With the implementation of the law, private HEIs, along with public HEIs, were 
standardised and brought in as part of the national education system. This 
provision has encouraged private HEIs to flourish around the country.
The demand for education increased in the 1970s, which corresponded with 
a shift in the economy from the traditional sector to a more modernised 
one. Indonesia’s economy experienced high economic growth thanks to an 
accelerating process of industrialisation in the export industry. This process led 
to mounting demand for skilled workers, particularly science and technology 
graduates. As the government could provide only limited support for higher 
education, in 1975, it made considerable changes to the higher education system. 
In 1975, the Ministry of Education through the Directorate-General of Higher 
Education (DGHE) established a framework for the development of higher 
education. This framework worked as a basic guide to standardise the national 
higher education system. It covered the structure of academic programs 
(undergraduate and graduate), governance, and the roles and responsibilities of 
faculty members. 
A dual system—academic and vocational—was also initiated in the same 
period. According to the framework, academic programs consist of a four-year 
undergraduate degree (strata 1-S1), two-year Master’s level (strata 2, S2) and 
a three-year doctorate program (Strata 3-S3). Vocational programs offer one to 
four-year non-degree training places. 
It could be argued that these considerable changes taken by the DGHE were 
influenced by the end of European or continental influence in Indonesia’s higher 
education system. By the end of the 1970s, the government adopted the US-
style system of including the accumulation of credit points in the curriculum. 
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A student of a three-year diploma program is required to complete 110 to 120 
credit units. A student of an undergraduate degree (s1) has to complete 144 
to 160 credit units. This significant change could be attributed to the large 
number of faculty members and bureaucrats who studied in the United States. 
The credit system is also more desirable as it monitors student performances 
easily and reduces the length of study. This shift in the education system sent 
a signal that the government valued the role of HEIs in creating skilled workers 
and responding to labour-market changes. 
In 2003, the House of Representatives endorsed a new education law—Law 
No. 20 2003—which also outlines the structure and purpose of HEIs. The new 
law essentially adopts the same groundwork for the higher education system; 
however, it provides greater autonomy to HEIs than the previous law. 
The Types of Higher Education in Indonesia
The higher education system cannot be analysed separately from Indonesia’s 
entire education system. Figure 8.1 illustrates the organisational structure of 
the country’s education system. Recently, the organisational structure of the 
school system was separated into two streams: the Islamic stream under the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs (public and private), and the secular stream under 
the Ministry of National Education (public and private). These two steams are 
separated over three levels of education: basic education, middle or secondary 
education, and higher education. 
Children are not required to go to preschool, however, the government makes 
every effort to encourage parents to send their children to preschool before 
entering them into elementary schools. In May 1994, the President of the 
Republic of Indonesia affirmed that basic education in Indonesia included 
nine years of compulsory schooling. The basic education includes six years 
of elementary school and three years of junior secondary school. Middle or 
secondary education includes three years of general senior secondary school or 
vocational senior secondary school.
Higher education is an extension of secondary education. The Indonesian 
higher education system consists of academic and professional learning. 
Academic education is designed at mastering science, technology and research. 
Professional education is aimed at developing practical skills. The institutions 
providing higher education are categorised into universities, institutes, collages, 
academies, and polytechnics in both the public and the private sectors. 
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Figure 8.1 School system in Indonesia
Source: Mohandas (2004).
In addition, a university consists of several faculties conducting academic 
and/or professional education in several disciplines. An institute consists of 
faculties conducting academic and/or professional education in disciplines that 
align with a set profession. In comparison, a college conducts academic and 
professional education in one particular discipline. Meanwhile, an academy and 
a polytechnic are vocational HEIs that provide professional skills and diploma 
degrees.
Based on their status, the HEIs in Indonesia can be divided into two groups: the 
public HEIs and the private HEIs. The public HEIs are under the jurisdiction of 
the state treasury law, education system law and civil servant law and are treated 
as part of the ministry. Private HEIs are regulated under the Foundation and 
Education System Law, and are considered the business arm of the foundation. 
Brodjonegoro (2000) argues that, under these regulations, the HEIs have no 
independent means of carrying out their mission as a moral force and they 
become less accountable and less innovative.
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There is also a difference in the admissions processes. The admission process 
in public HEIs is done through the national examination for higher education 
(Seleksi Penerimaan Mahasiswa Baru). As seats in public HEIs are limited, a 
prospective applicant has to compete nationally for a specific field. Usually the 
applicant submits for acceptance to two to three prospective programs. This 
system ensures that only those with the highest scores are admitted. Admission 
into private HEIs is considered to be less competitive. As several private HEIs 
have a very good reputation, admission to these institutions is, however, as 
competitive as it is for public HEIs. 
The Recent Issues of Higher Education in Indonesia
Access and Equality
As in many places, in Indonesia, equality in education has become a hotly debated 
issue, particularly in regard to higher education. There are several reasons 
that could explain this. The first is due to a common perception that higher 
education is a public good. Second, the function of higher education is to train 
future elite groups who will be an important part of the country’s development, 
which has led HEIs to be politico-imperative educational institutions. History 
shows that critical moments in Indonesia’s political and economic progress 
were strongly linked to the roles of HEIs. Indonesia’s independence movement, 
for example, was prompted mainly by well-educated young Indonesians. 
Political turbulence in the country was closely related to the political activities 
of university students. Therefore, graduates of HEIs carry high social status. 
The third reason for inequality in education is the expectation of graduates 
in the job market. Graduates are expected to enjoy well-paid jobs and work 
in the formal sector, whose members are considered better off than those in 
the informal sector. Therefore, there is a strong political aspiration to produce 
opportunities in higher education for all groups in society. 
Although higher education has expanded rapidly in the post-independence 
era, the growth in supply of HEIs still does not meet the growing demand. 
Meanwhile, the government’s ability to expand the supply of public HEIs is 
constrained by the budget, and the fact that the private sector has dominated 
the tertiary education market for the past 20 years. Most private HEIs, however, 
rely on student fees in running their institutions, which means they are quite 
expensive for those who come from a disadvantaged background. As such, 
participation rates in higher education have been low for years.
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Recent data gathered by the National Socio-Economic Survey (Survei Sosio-Ekonomi 
Nasional; Susenas) of Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS; Central Statistics Agency) shows 
that the enrolment rate in higher education is quite low in Indonesia. It is worth 
noting, however, that Susenas data might underestimate the numbers enrolled in 
tertiary education in Indonesia. This might be due to the fact that a large proportion 
of students are from middle–high-income households, while those from an upper-
class background are not included in the data. 
Another issue with the data is demographic mobility. It is likely that Susenas 
does not sample students who are still living with their parents. Also, the 
sampling method of Susenas excludes students who live in boarding houses 
(off-campus and on-campus). This is due to the sampling guide of Susenas for 
which a person who lives in a boarding house, military barracks or prison will 
not be surveyed. Despite this, Susenas data are the best available considering 
the sample size and national coverage.
By 2006, the gross enrolment rate1 (GER) in tertiary education reached only 
12.16 per cent. Figure 8.2 illustrates that, during 1993–2003, the GER in higher 
education tended to stagnate. The economic crisis that hit the country in 
1998 seemed to have no strong effect on the enrolment rate. Generally, a low 
participation rate indicates high inequality of access to HEIs. This presumption 
is confirmed by Figure 8.3. 
According to Susenas, the GER of students from a low-income family background 
was about 0.63 per cent in 1993.2 This was far lower than the enrolment rate of 
students from the top 20 per cent bracket of income per capita household (about 
27.78 per cent in the same year). After more than a decade, the gap has not 
narrowed significantly. In 2006, the number of low-income students enrolled in 
tertiary education was 2.67 per cent. This number was still far lower than that 
for students from the top 20 per cent income bracket (about 33.9 per cent). 
1 The GER of tertiary education is the ratio of all tertiary school students to all tertiary school-aged people 
(nineteen–twenty-four). The age range (nineteen–twenty-four years old) is based on BPS’s definition. Even 
though this range covers only undergraduate-aged persons and ignores graduate-aged persons, this approach 
is still appropriate and convenient considering the very low number of people going in at graduate level. 
2 Low income means the 40 per cent lowest expenditure per capita distribution. In this context, we assume 
that household expenditure will be a good proxy for household income. Regarding expenditure itself, it is 
the current household expenditure per capita of the student (total expenditure is divided by the number of 
household members regardless of the age of the members).
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Figure 8.2 Gross enrolment rate in higher education
Source: National Socio-Economic Survey (Susenas) 1993–2006.
Figure 8.3 Gross enrolment rate in higher education by income group
Source: National Socio-Economic Survey (Susenas) 1993–2006.
We have found that the gender gap in tertiary education has tended to decline 
in recent years. The trend between 1993 and 2006 shows that the participation 
rate of females became closer to that of males at a relatively fast pace. In 1993, 
the female GER was 6.7 per cent and, by 2006, it reached 12.1 per cent—or, it 
increased proportionally by 81.17 per cent. Meanwhile, the male GER in the 
same period increased proportionally by only 18.9 per cent in 2006.
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Interestingly, the gap between the sexes is relatively lower in the low-income 
group than in the high-income group. Figure 8.3 demonstrates that the average 
male enrolment rates from both the low-income and the high-income groups3 are 
higher than the female enrolment rates. In terms of progress, however, female 
participation grew faster than male participation between 1993 and 2006. In 
1993, the female GER from low-income families was very small: only 0.46 per 
cent. This was lower than the GER for males from the same family background, 
which was about 0.82 per cent. After a decade, female participation in this 
group had grown rapidly and, by 2006, there was a sixfold increase in the 
participation rate. 
Figure 8.4 Gross enrolment rate in higher education by sex
Source: National Socio-Economic Survey (Susenas) 1993–2006.
Female students from a higher income group have also achieved rapid progress. 
Within more than a decade, the female GER from the high-income group 
increased, proportionally, by 49.3 per cent—from 22 per cent in 1993 to 32.8 
per cent in 2006. Meanwhile, the male GER grew, proportionally, slower, with 
16.6 per cent difference between 1993 and 2006. The relatively low gender 
gap in participation essentially supports studies arguing that parents rarely 
discriminate daughters over sons in getting an education, including at the 
tertiary level. In some cases, discrimination against women within the household 
can occur due to economic shocks (Oey-Gardiner 1997). 
3 The low-income group is defined as the 40 per cent lowest expenditure per capita household; meanwhile, 
the high-income group is defined as the 20 per cent highest expenditure per capita household.
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Figure 8.5 Gross enrolment rate: tertiary education of low-income 
students by sex 
Source: National Socio-Economic Survey (Susenas) 1993–2006.
Some education observers argue that a low participation rate at the tertiary 
level is caused mainly by few HEIs relative to growing demand. Though this 
argument might sound reasonable, it must be taken with caution. Based on 
our findings, a low participation rate in higher education is not spurred by 
supply-side problems. A low participation rate in secondary education and a 
low continuation rate from secondary education to higher education are the 
main reasons for a low enrolment rate in tertiary-level education. This suggests 
that the policy to improve access to higher education cannot be separated from 
education policies aimed at other educational levels, particularly secondary 
education. Figure 8.7 shows that there was an upward trend in the GER of 
senior secondary education between 1993 and 2006. In addition, there was no 
significant gap in enrolment between males and females. Indeed, the female 
participation rate in secondary education tended to catch up with the male rate 
in recent years and this could explain the relatively swift increase of female 
participation in higher education.
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Figure 8.6 Gross enrolment rate: tertiary education of the 20 per cent 
richest students by sex
Source: National Socio-Economic Survey (Susenas) 1993–2006.
Figure 8.7 Gross enrolment rate in senior secondary education by gender
Source: National Socio-Economic Survey (Susenas) 1993–2006.
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Accreditation, Quality Assurance and Research Capacity 
The quality control of HEIs is run through an external and internal accreditation 
system in Indonesia. The internal accreditation system at some of the more 
established universities, such as the University of Indonesia and Gajah Mada 
University, was introduced in the late 1990s as part of a good-practice process 
within the universities. The quality assurance is run internally and aims to 
improve the quality of higher education services. Meanwhile, the external 
accreditation is carried out by the National Education Board for Higher 
Education (Badan Akreditasi Nasional Perguruan Tinggi; BAN-PT), which was 
establish in 1994 to conduct academic program assessments and evaluation for 
both public and private HEIs. 
Mandated by the National Education Act No. 2/1989 and Government Regulation 
on Higher Education No. 60/1999, the BAN-PT is the only accreditation body 
in Indonesia’s higher education system and is based on Ministerial Decree 
188/U/1998. The accreditation process was conducted for the first time in 1996, 
and all programs had to be accredited by BAN-PT by 2001. 
The BAN-PT carries out several functions. The first is to monitor the quality 
and efficiency of HEIs through the accreditation process in all programs of every 
institution. The second is to ensure public confidence in the quality of higher 
education and to guarantee that the quality can be maintained and enhanced. 
The third is to give recommendations on how study programs can be improved. 
In order to carry out these functions, the BAN-PT conducts regular quality and 
efficiency assessment for all HEIs in Indonesia. The assessment covers many 
aspects: curriculum, the quality and quantity of lectures, student welfare, the 
institution’s facilities and infrastructure, and the management administration. 
Through the accreditation process, undergraduate and diploma programs are 
categorised into four levels—from A (satisfactory) to D (unsatisfactory)—while 
postgraduate programs are categorised into three levels: U (excellent), B (good), 
and T (fair). Figure 8.8 describes the flow of the accreditation process carried 
out by BAN-PT.
According to BAN-PT’s report, the quality of many HEIs is still poor. As 
reported by BAN-PT in 2002, of 6777 programs, 84 per cent were undergraduate 
programs, 85 per cent of which were categorised as B and C. About 15.73 per cent 
of public HEIs were accredited A, while only 5.26 per cent of private HEIs were 
accredited A. This result indicates that the public universities are considerably 
superior to private HEIs—further reflecting the role of public HEIs as quality 
leaders and private HEIs as expansion absorbers. 
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Figure 8.8 The flow of the accreditation process
Source: BAN-PT.
The low quality of HEIs in Indonesia is caused by the fact that the HEI system 
has grown so fast there has been no allowance for ensuring high standards for 
academic staff. As explained by Buchori and Malik (2004), many academic 
staff in Indonesia’s public HEIs have not been well paid. This means that many 
faculty members at public HEIs dedicate their energy and time to off-campus 
work: managing or teaching at private HEIs. The conditions in the private HEIs 
are even worse, as there is a lower proportion of qualified and full-time staff.
In addition, the proportion of staff with higher degrees (Master’s or PhD) varies 
significantly across the sectors. As explained by Nizam (2006), the extensive program 
of human resource development in the 1980s aimed to develop the research capacity of 
public universities. Prior to this, most university staff did not have the opportunity to 
be trained beyond undergraduate level. Mochtar and Buchori (2004) have illustrated 
that in public HEIs there is only 8.6 per cent of academic staff who hold a PhD and 
29.2 per cent who possess a Master’s-level qualification. These statistics are better 
for public HEIs than for private HEIs. In 2006, the World Bank showed that the 
difference was almost 300 per cent; only 11 per cent of academic staff in private HEIs 
were trained beyond their first degree, compared with 30 per cent in public HEIs. As 
argued by Welch (1997, 1998), this was due to few HEIs offering graduate programs 
and the fact of very low salaries in HEIs compared with other occupations where 
high-level degrees are needed.
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Recently, the increased funding from the government for the development of 
human resources has directly generated an increased number of academic staff 
holding PhDs and Master’s degrees. As shown in Figure 8.9, the number of PhDs 
and Master’s from overseas and in-country universities increased in the past 
decade. During 1996–2000, for example, the number of PhDs and Master’s from 
overseas increased by 32 per cent and 40 per cent, respectively, while the new 
in-country PhDs also grew significantly and even surpassed those from overseas 
in 1998. According to the 2000 Directory of Doctors—as seen in Table 8.1—
about 75 per cent of registered PhDs worked in the four established public HEIs 
in Java (University of Indonesia, Institut Pertanian Bogor, Institut Teknologi 
Bandung and University of Gajah Mada). This shows a high disparity of staff 
qualification between universities on the most-populated island in Indonesia, 
Java, and outside Java. We need to also consider, however, that 74 per cent of 
total students in Indonesia are enrolled on Java. 
Figure 8.9 The number of new in-country and overseas PhD graduates
Sources: Nizam et al. (2003).
Table 8.1 Distribution of staff with PhDs, 2000
Location Private Public Autonomous Total
Java 333 (9%) 1054 (28%) 1420 (38%) 2807 (75%)
Outside Java 47 (1%) 891 (24%) 938 (25%)
Total 380 (10%) 1945 (52%) 1420 (38%) 3745 (100%)
Source: Directory of Doctors, 2000.
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In addition to the poor quality of teaching staff, the HEIs lack a solid system to 
support high-quality study programs and research. The quality of Indonesian 
HEIs, particularly the private HEIs, is weakening due to low staff–student 
ratios. Welch (2006) shows that staff–student ratios deteriorated in the past few 
decades. The staff–student ratio decreased from 1:6.6 to 1:10.1 in 1980, to 1:12.4 
in 1990, and to 1:13.7 in 1998. In the same vein, the quality of HEIs has been 
reduced due to low investment. Welch (2006) states that the levels of computer 
equipment and software are ‘below the performance standard’ for the number 
of students enrolled.
Trend and Composition of Public Expenditure on Education
Even though public expenditure on education (in terms of the absolute and the 
percentage of total national expenditure) increased in recent years, Indonesia’s 
spending on education remains below 20 per cent of total national expenditure. 
The Constitution obliges the government to spend at least 20 per cent on 
education. Table 8.2 shows the national public expenditure during 2001–07. 
This table reveals that both the percentage of national education expenditure 
to GDP and the proportion of total education expenditure to total national 
expenditure remained low, despite recent improvements. In 2007, for example, 
the national education expenditure was only 3.8 per cent of GDP, while it 
accounted for about 17.2 per cent of total national expenditure.
Table 8.2 National public expenditure (central + province + district), 
2001–07 (Rp trillion) 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006* 2007**
Nominal national education 
expenditure 40 .5 48 .2 64 .8 61 .8 74 .0 118 .2 135 .4
National education 
expenditure (2001 prices) 40 .5 43 .1 54 .3 48 .8 52 .9 74 .9 80 .7
Growth in real national 
education expenditure (%) 40 .3 6 .4 26 .2 –10 .2 8 .4 41 .6 7 .8
Education expenditure 
(% total of national 
expenditure) 11 .4 14 .3 16 .0 14 .0 13 .9 16 .9 17 .2
National education 
expenditure (% of GDP) 2 .4 2 .6 3 .2 2 .7 2 .7 3 .8 3 .8
Total nominal national 
expenditure 353 .6 337 .6 405 .4 441 .8 531 .7 698 .2 785 .4
Total real national 
expenditure (2001 prices) 353 .6 301 .8 340 .0 348 .9 380 .0 442 .4 468 .3
Government size (total 
expenditure as % of GDP) 21 .0 18 .1 19 .8 19 .4 19 .5 22 .4 22 .2
* preliminary realisation of APBN and estimates for sub-national spending
** central government budget (APBN) and estimates for sub-national government
Source: World Bank (2007).
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Compared with its neighbouring countries, in Indonesia, total education 
expenditure is still relatively low. Table 8.3 illustrates public education 
expenditure in Indonesia and its neighbouring countries. This table shows 
how Indonesia’s education expenditure is almost the same as other developing 
countries with a similar per capita income. The latest data from the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) show that education expenditure 
as a percentage of total national expenditure in Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Thailand is 16.9 per cent, 27 per cent and 27 per cent, respectively.
Table 8.3 Education public expenditure in Indonesia and its neighbouring 
countries
Highest Lowest
Education public expenditure 
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Source: World Bank (2007).
In Indonesia, the allocation of money to public education has been dominated 
by the basic education level. A recent study by the World Bank demonstrates 
education spending per program and level of government (Figure 8.10). As 
shown in the diagram, tertiary education received less than 10 per cent of 
education spending, while primary education (preschool, primary school and 
junior secondary) and middle or secondary education obtained about 75 per 
cent and 15 per cent of the total education budget, respectively. In this respect, 
the government policy seems to focus on the provision of basic education for 
the masses. 
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Figure 8.10 Education spending per program and level of government, 2004
Source: World Bank (2007).
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Compared with other countries in the Asia-Pacific, in Indonesia, the resources 
allocated to tertiary education are roughly similar. Table 8.4 reveals the public 
expenditure on higher education of some countries in the Asia-Pacific. As seen 
in the table, although it is below Australia and United States, the proportion 
of expenditure for higher education in Indonesia is higher than in Japan, 
Republic of Korea, Mexico and India. Indonesia’s public expenditure per pupil 
as a percentage of GDP per capita is, however, the second-lowest in the group.
Table 8.4 Public expenditure on higher education of some countries in the 
Asia-Pacific





per pupil as 
% of GDP 
per capita





% of total 
educational 
expenditure
23 .92 23 .16 16 .80 34 .99 13 .60 16 .86 26 .25 20 .09
Source: Fahmi (2007).
The largest part of the outlay of expenditure at the tertiary level goes to 
recurrent costs, such as salaries for academic and non-academic staff. Figure 
8.11 illustrates the tertiary education expenditure by nature of spending during 
2000–03. Based on this table, we can see that in that period, more than 80 per 
cent of tertiary education expenditure was spent for the current activities 
expenditure, while the remaining 20 per cent was used for capital expenditure. 
The capital expenditure consists of land acquisitions, university building 
development, and equipment purchases.
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Figure 8.11 Tertiary education expenditure by nature of spending, 2000–03
Source: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation.
Student Fees, Student Loans and Scholarships
Higher education expenses borne by parents and students vary greatly and 
depend on the degree taken, the study program, the status of the HEI and the 
location of the HEI. As a consequence of higher education reform, public HEIs 
may now set their own tuition fees, whereas they were previously set by the 
central government. 
Table 8.5 illustrates the total higher education expenses borne by parents 
and students for undergraduate programs for the academic year 2004–05. The 
expenses for higher education cover not only tuition fees but also other items 
such as books, lodging, food, transportation and other personal expenses. In 
the academic year 2004–05, for example, the total cost carried by the parents 
and students of first degrees ranged from more than Rp6.8 million for the lower 
public HEIs to Rp20.8 million for the higher public HEIs, while it was about 
Rp31 million for private HEIs.
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Table 8.5 Higher education expenses borne by parents and students for a 
first degree, academic year 2004–05 (rupiah converted to US$ by 2004 
PPP estimate: $1 = Rp2255)
Public Private








Rp1 000 000 
[$443]
Rp4 000 000 
[$1773]
Other fees   





Rp1 350 000 
[$598]




Rp1 200 000 
[$532]
Rp2 350 000 
[$1042]







Rp9 000 000 
[$3990]
Rp10 800 000 
[$4790]
Food
Rp3 600 000 
[$1596]
Rp6 300 000 
[$2 793]













Rp2 700 000 
[$1197]
Rp3 600 000 
[$1,596]
Subtotal expenses of 
student living
Rp5 615 000 
[$2490]
Rp18 450 000 
[$8180]
Rp24 750 000 
[$10 975]
Total cost to 
parent & student
Rp6 815 000 
[$3022]
Rp20 800 000 
[$9223]
Rp31 000 000 
[$13 747]
Low public: low public tuition, living at home with parents.
High public: high public tuition, living as ‘independent adult’.
High private: high private tuition, living in dormitory or shared apartment.
Source: Collected from web sites of Indonesian universities, 2005 (quoted from World Bank 2007).
This high level of expenses would have an adverse effect on students coming 
from a poor family background. To help disadvantaged students, the government 
works closely with HEIs to provide financial assistance schemes in the form 
of scholarships. Before the recent reform in higher education, scholarship 
programs allocated to students in private HEIs were relatively limited. Yet 
a recent policy change has increased the allocated funds for scholarships to 
private HEIs; however, students of public HEIs are still the larger beneficiaries. 
Based on our interview with a government official, about 25 per cent of the total 
government scholarship program is allocated to students at private HEIs. Instead 
of giving directly to private institutions, as the government does to public 
HEIs, the government allocates the funds to the Koordinasi Perguruan Tinggi 
Swasta (Kopertis; Coordination of Private Higher Education Institution), and 
the Kopertis authority then allocates the funds amongst its members. Kopertis 
itself is a network of private HEIs with only private HEIs as its members. 
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The government offers three types of scholarship: for student achievement in academic 
activities; a social safety net scholarship provided by compensation from the oil-
subsidy reduction; and for student achievement in sport and cultural activities. In 
principle, all the scholarship schemes are targeted at disadvantaged students. The 
government has granted the universities a full set of criteria for recipient students 
and to manage the distribution of the funds. The amount of the scholarship itself 
is about Rp250 000 per month per student (US$25), which covers tuition fees and a 
living allowance, regardless of which HEI the student attends. 
In addition, the universities cooperate with other institutions, such as private 
enterprises, foundations and alumni associations, to provide scholarships. Unlike 
scholarships from the government, scholarships from these other institutions vary 
regarding their schemes and criteria. These scholarship programs are given not only 
to disadvantaged students, but also to students who meet other criteria. Tanoto 
Foundation—which provides scholarships—targets its scholarships at intelligent 
students with potential leadership qualities but who face financial difficulties. 
These scholarships are granted not only for undergraduates but also for 
graduate students. They cover tuition fees and an allowance. The scholarship 
may also be extended to research funding, though case-by-case criteria apply. 
For undergraduate students, the foundation granted Rp500 000 a month for a 
living allowance given directly to the individual student’s bank account and up 
to Rp3 million a semester for tuition fees. About 300 undergraduate students 
and 50 graduate students have received scholarships from Tanoto Foundation. 
These students have been limited to only six public universities. 
Parallel with scholarships, the government is now planning to create a student 
loan program and a voucher program for disadvantaged students that will cover 
their tuition costs. The Ministry of National Education introduced student 
loans in the early 1980s and what was called ‘Kredit Mahasiswa Indonesia’ 
(KMI; Indonesian Student Loan). The high default rate, however, made the 
student loan program unsustainable. According to our interview with several 
key people, the default rate reached 95 per cent. Unfortunately, there are no 
available data that can help evaluate this program. By the end of the 1980s, the 
government ended the student loan program. 
The failure of the KMI was due to poor administration. Many recipient students did 
not repay their loan after finishing their studies. The banks giving the loan had poor 
administration, which failed to monitor and trace the graduates. The banks treated 
the student loans like grants since they thought it was part of the government’s 
development program from the central bank, the Bank of Indonesia. This poor loan 
management was recorded as a non-performing loan and student loans have been 
perceived by the banking sector as a high-risk business. This has meant banks are 
reluctant to once again engage in this program.
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By 2006, a private education foundation called Sampoerna Foundation redesigned 
the student loan program. In designing the program, the foundation cooperated 
with the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and Bank International 
Indonesia (BII) as creditors. The scheme essentially is a risk-sharing mechanism 
to leverage contributions from the foundation into a portfolio of student 
loans (IFC 2006). In this program, BII acts as an administrator of the program. 
According to an estimate, the total budget of the student loan program was 
almost US$20 million, with half of the fund supported by the IFC. 
Based on our interview with a high-ranking manager of Sampoerna Foundation, 
the organisation previously focused only on the scholarship program, but it 
now designs the first private-supported student loan scheme. The decision 
to promote the student loan program was encouraged by the fact that many 
potential students who do not have long-term financial difficulties cannot go to 
college because of cash-flow problems. Their main financial problem usually is 
up-front fees, which are very large. 
The loan is characterised as one without any collateral, although the student or 
their family members who act as guarantor are required to be ‘bankable’ (they 
must have a job and minimum earnings of Rp40 million a year). The loan cap 
provided by the foundation ranges from Rp10 million to Rp200 million, while 
the maximum loan that can be given is up to five times the student’s or their 
family member’s net income per month. The bank charges interest of 1.5 per 
cent a month, with a repayment period ranging from six months to three years. 
This student loan program is different from a typical program in other countries, 
particularly regarding the payment method. The program is best described 
as a mortgage loan in which students, or the parents of the student, have to 
repay the loan every month after the first disbursement of the loan. Sampoerna 
Foundation helps students with short-term cash-flow problems. 
Since the program’s launch in 2007, the number of students receiving a loan is about 
15, suggesting that the program covers very limited recipients. This limitation is due 
not only to the short period of program implementation, but also to the institutional 
or regulatory restrictions. From the institutional or regulatory aspect, banks still 
perceive student loans as very risky and there is no strong incentive given from the 
government or the central bank for banks to lend money to a student loan program.
Recent Major Policy: Higher education reform
Due to increasing globalisation and internationalisation pressures, the 
government has taken a number of measures in the past decades to improve 
the quality, efficiency and relevance of higher education in Indonesia. The first 
initiative started in 1994, when the government through the DGHE formed 
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the Higher Education Strategy Task Force—assigned to develop a strategy 
for higher education in Indonesia for the next few decades. The task force 
introduced ‘The New Paradigm’ for higher education management based on 
quality, autonomy, accountability, accreditation and evaluation. This new 
paradigm has significantly altered the mode of individual HEI operation and 
the overall legal, regulatory and financial controls. 
Structure and Institutional Reform
As part of the paradigm shift to strengthen institutional capacity at the centre 
as well as at individual universities, the DGHE established the Board of Higher 
Education (DPT), with three councils (education, research, and development) 
and the National Accreditation Board for Higher Education (BAN-PT). The DPT 
has responsibility to provide strategic recommendations and to act as the bridge 
between the DGHE and external funding bodies as well as between the DGHE 
and the universities that receive competitive grants. BAN-PT is mandated to 
independently arrange and conduct the accreditation of academic programs 
at private and public HEIs. BAN-PT aims to improve the transparency of 
the higher education system in Indonesia, to guide consumers, to guarantee 
accountability, and to strengthen incentives for individual universities to raise 
quality standards, efficiency and relevance. Based on the National Education 
Act No. 2/1989 and Government Regulation on Higher Education No. 60/1999, 
BAN-PT is the only accreditation body in Indonesia’s higher education system. 
BAN-PT, mandated by Ministerial Decree 188/U/1998, since 2001 has accredited 
all programs in HEIs, both public and private. 
By 1999, the government also issued a new government regulation (PP 61/1999) 
that set out the mechanism to transform state/public HEIs into autonomous 
universities called ‘State Legal Entity Universities’ (Universitas Badan Hukum 
Milik Negara; BHMN). The government asked the four most established public 
HEIs (University of Indonesia, University of Gajah Mada, Institut Teknologi 
Bandung and Institut Pertanian Bogor) to pioneer the transformation. In 
December 2000—based on government regulations PP 152, 153, 154 and 
155/2000—those four universities formally changed to become new public legal 
entity universities. 
Since the transformation, the universities are no longer part of the government 
bureaucracy and, consequently, they are responsible more to the public rather 
than to the Ministry of National Education. Similar to reforms in Latin America, 
here, by creating a ‘para-market relationship’, the government provides the 
operational cost in the form of a block grant based on the performances of the 
HEIs. In addition, university management is structured more like a corporate 
system. In the university transition plans, all staff who used to be civil servants 
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become university employees within 10 years. As argued by Susanto and Nizam 
(2004), however, the inadequate support for legal and financial measures has 
hindered the reform from effectively embedding into the entire system.
Competitive Funding Schemes
Along with the institutional and structural changes, the new paradigm has 
also changed financial aspects of HEIs. The new paradigm has given individual 
public HEIs the power and responsibility to work as if they were private-sector 
institutions. Individual public HEIs are required to conduct self-evaluation, 
prepare institutional development plans based on their own particular needs, 
and arrange budgets according to their projected resources and priority needs 
in order to receive investment funds from the central government. Supported 
by loans from the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the 
government also initiated several competitive funding schemes as a mechanism 
for allocating its funds to universities. 
Before the government launched the new competitive fund scheme—which 
has opened opportunities for private HEIs to participate—there were large 
differences between the funding mechanisms of private and public HEIs. In the 
past, the government supported very limited funding for private institutions. 
The major cause of this is the very limited budget allocation from the state 
budget and the large publicly funded HEIs. Public HEIs have relied on their 
recurrent and development government budgets for their funding, while private 
HEIs relied on student fees and contributions from external sources. Bray and 
Thomas (1998) estimate that about 87.92 per cent of the government budget 
for higher education (about Rp1.3 billion) went to public HEIs in the period 
1995–96. This allocation funded about 853 students enrolled in public HEIs. For 
the same period, only 3.8 per cent of funding from both the recurrent and the 
development budgets went to private HEIs, which enrolled 58 per cent of total 
students. The remainder of the allocation went to Islamic HEIs. 
The competitive funding schemes were initially implemented by the introduction 
of the University Research for Graduate Education (URGE) project, in 1994. 
The project has, however, been limited to public HEIs. URGE was implemented 
through a competitive funding process to develop research capacity for the 
units conducting postgraduate programs. 
In 1996, the DGHE introduced the first special competitive grants through 
the Development of Undergraduate Education (DUE) project, covering all 
disciplines, courses and study programs. This project aimed to advance the 
educational quality of undergraduate programs. It is targeted at 17 of the least-
established public HEIs, which have not seen any major investment in the past 
five to 10 years. The funding for universities is granted on a competitive basis 
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according to proposals from the universities. The funding was granted under 
a block-grant contract and the granted HEIs were required to match funds in 
the amount of 5 per cent of the total grant. The funds were distributed to a 
particular account of the institutions, in order to reduce the existing bureaucratic 
structures. Tadjudin (2007) explains that the evaluation of the DUE project 
was more complicated than those in the URGE projects since the evaluation of 
education projects involves more qualitative performance indicators compared 
with the evaluation of research projects. In addition, unlike in the evaluation of 
research projects, in education projects, there are many dimensions that need to 
be identified. 
During 1998–2004, the DGHE introduced the second competitive funding 
program, called the Quality for Undergraduate Education (QUE) project—80 
per cent of which was funded by a World Bank loan. Like the DUE project, this 
project aimed to enhance undergraduate education. Unlike the DUE project, 
however, which was open only to public HEIs, the QUE project was open to 
private HEIs as well. The QUE project was an open bidding process based 
on a proposal submitted by a study program, and the merit of the proposal 
was essential for success. The main performance indicators of this project 
covered the areas of leadership, relevance, academic atmosphere, institutional 
management, sustainability, efficiency and productivity (L-RAISE). Each 
grant was valued about US$1.8 million, which was provided for five-year 
institutional development programs. Nizam (2006) explains that the project 
was highly competitive and attracted many applicants, as illustrated in Table 
8.6. Furthermore, he argues that this funding mechanism has been considered 
one of the most significant reforms in financing HEIs since it gives a sense of 
ownership and direct accountability to the recipient institutions. 







Batch 1 (1998) 317 45 25 16
Batch 2 (1999) 250 51 27 14
Batch 3 (2000) 249 61 26 16
Source: Nizam (2006).
Pursuing the success of the QUE project, the government adopted this model 
as a mechanism for transferring its funding to HEIs. As a consequence, the 
government has introduced several other competitive funding schemes, 
including the DUE-like project, the Semi-QUE project, and the Competitive 
Funding Program (PHK). These competitive funding schemes are directed 
towards achieving certain targets as measured by performance indicators 
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that have been decided and made by the grantees. The DUE-like project was 
introduced in 1999. This project was analogous with the DUE project, except 
that the source of funding was government funds. In the same vein, the Semi-
QUE project that was launched at the same time as the DUE-like project was 
financed wholly by government funds. This project was similar to the QUE 
project with more weight given to entrepreneurship development. Like the QUE 
project, here, the government used the L-RAISE criteria in selecting the proposal 
process for the funding. The PHK project was introduced in 2001, and was also 
funded by the government in order to continue the quality improvement of 
HEIs. The project was divided into four program categories: PHK-A1 focused 
on the advancement of management and organisational health for units involved 
in running educational programs; PHK-A2 emphasised the improvement of 
internal efficiency at the departmental level; PHK-A3 stressed the importance 
of enhancing a graduate’s skills and competencies; and PHK-AB focused on the 
ability of departments to develop competitive programs. 
In addition, the ADB adopted a similar competitive funding scheme in the region 
when it supported the Indonesian government to launch the Technological and 
Professional Skills Development Project (TPSDP) in 2001. This project used the 
same evaluation criteria as the QUE project, but with some additional criteria, 
including access and equity. This project aims mainly to improve the relevance 
of the learning outcomes and to advance the professionalism of graduates. 
The project was directed to both public and private institutions, except for 
autonomous universities. The loan from the ADB contributed about 80 per 
cent of funding, while the rest came from the government (12 per cent) and 
institutional matching funds from the HEIs (8 per cent). 
The Reform and its Impact on Financing: HEI 
perspectives
The reform has brought significant changes in the financing mechanisms at the 
HEI level, particularly to public HEIs that relied a lot on government support. 
Recent findings show an adverse trend in which public HEIs are becoming 
more reliant upon student fees because of the reform. As a result, public 
universities have responded to the limited funds by offering professional 
and vocational programs. In these programs, they usually charge higher 
tuition fees compared with academic programs (Welch 2007). In the teaching 
activities, these institutions open less-demanding academic programs with 
high tuition fees, creating new professional and vocational programs. In non-
teaching activities, they commercialise the institution’s infrastructure. These 
institutions, as a result of reduced subsidies, have increased tuition fees and 
additional admission fees for regular academic students. For example, in the 
1998–99 academic year, the tuition fee at the University of Indonesia—one 
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of the HEIs involved in the project—was about Rp550 000. By the 2000–01 
academic year, the tuition fee increased almost threefold for social sciences. An 
additional admission fee, even though voluntary, is asked for at the beginning 
of the academic year, particularly for medical and engineering schools. 
The impact of the financing reform is now strongly felt by HEIs that have 
been involved in the pilot project of the reform. Those HEIs are the University 
of Indonesia (UI), Institut Pertanian Bogor (IPB), University of Gadjah Mada 
(UGM) and Institut Teknologi Bandung (ITB). After nearly a decade, these 
HEIs still seek the best formats and practices. Figure 8.12 illustrates significant 
changes in income sources for University of Indonesia—one of the most 
established public HEIs in Indonesia. There is a declining trend of government 
support for University of Indonesia. In 1994, income from the government 
accounted for about 81 per cent (28.5 per cent from the recurrent budget and 
52.5 per cent from the development budget). In 1999, the trend was reversed: 
self-generated and external sources began to replace the government budget, 
which accounted for 46.7 per cent of total income. By 2006, income from the 
development budget shrank considerably—to only 2.7 per cent of the total; 
meanwhile, self-generated and external source contributions increased to 80.2 
per cent .
Figure 8.12 Composition of University of Indonesia’s income sources
Source: Universitas Indonesia 2003, UI dalam Angka.
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Conclusion
Indonesia’s universities have a short history. During the past few decades, we 
have seen a rapid expansion of the higher education sector. This development 
has not, however, been followed by proper long-term planning, vision or 
good funding mechanisms. The universities have suffered internal inefficiency, 
poor initiatives (particularly in research) and lack of public accountability. 
Undoubtedly, these problems have had negative impacts on quality, efficiency 
and the relevance of higher education in Indonesia.
Facing these issues, the government, through the Directorate-General for Higher 
Education (DGHE), has undertaken major reform in order to improve the quality, 
efficiency and relevance of higher education in Indonesia. Some key points of 
the reform are the autonomy of university governance, its funding mechanism, 
the relationship between private and public HEIs, and the curriculum content 
that is set in line with the national development context. The reform has 
brought about considerable challenges for HEIs, particularly regarding financial 
matters, though it also offers opportunities in the context of independence and 
autonomy. After a decade, Indonesia’s universities still seek the best format and 
practices so that they are best equipped to face the challenges of the future.
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9. Strategies for Financing Higher 
Education: The case of Thailand
Somkiat Tangkitvanich and Areeya Manasboonphempool 
Thailand Development Research Institute 
Introduction
Ninety years ago, the first university was established in Thailand. It was an elite 
approach to higher education with the main purpose being to train government 
officials to run the country (Krongkaew 2004). Since then, the Thai higher 
education sector has experienced remarkable development. Most notably, the 
number of higher educational institutions (HEIs) has increased to nearly 800, 
with the total number of students enrolled reaching 2.5 million. Thus, the Thai 
higher education sector has changed from elitist to a mass economic and social 
institution.
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the main characteristics of the higher 
education sector in Thailand and review major policy developments with a special 
focus on how the country’s higher education financing system has changed during 
the past decade. In particular, the chapter will discuss the role of student loan 
arrangements in funding higher education and assess its effectiveness. 
We discuss the major developments of the Thai higher education sector during 
the past decade before exploring the role of the government in financing 
higher education and its effects on the efficiency and equity of the system. 
We then describe the Student Loans Fund (SLF)—the most important student 
loan scheme in Thailand—and provide an empirical assessment of its impacts. 
Finally, we summarise the main findings of the chapter and provide some policy 
recommendations.
Overview of the Thai higher education sector
Some key features of the Thai higher education system should be noted at the 
outset. First, even among East Asian countries that are well known for their 
emphasis on education, Thailand has a relatively high rate of participation in 
higher education. With 41 per cent of the gross enrolment ratio, the country 
ranks second only to Japan and higher than Malaysia and Hong Kong—both of 
which have higher income per capita (see Figure 9.1). 
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Figure 9.1 Gross enrolment ratios in higher education of selected East 
Asian countries, 2004
Source: Edstats, The World Bank.
This high level of enrolment is the result of rapid expansion of the sector in the 
past decade. As shown in Figure 9.2, the enrolment ratio has nearly doubled—
from 22 per cent in 1996 to 43 per cent in 2005. As we will argue later, changes 
in the supply side are the main driving forces of the expansion.
Figure 9.2 Changes in the gross enrolment ratio of higher education in 
Thailand, 1992–2006
Source: Edstats, The World Bank.
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Another key feature of the Thai higher education system is that the public 
sector plays a very dominant role in education provision—with more than 
four-fifths of the total number of students enrolling in public institutions (see 
Figure 9.3). Institutions in the public sector are classified administratively into: 
1) universities with limited admission; 2) open universities; 3) autonomous 
universities; 4) Rajabhat universities (former teachers’ colleges); 5) Rajamangala 
universities of technology (former vocational colleges); and 6) public vocational 
colleges. These public higher educational institutions receive most of their 
funding from the government and a much smaller portion from tuition fees and 
other sources.
Figure 9.3 Student shares by types of education institution, academic 
year 2006
Source: Education statistics, Ministry of Education.
During the past three decades, continued efforts have been made to transform 
major limited-admission public universities into autonomous ones. The purpose 
of such attempts is to provide administrative flexibility to these universities, 
aiming to enhance their quality to an international level (Kirtikara 2004). So far, 
however, only seven public universities have been successfully transformed and 
a few more are in the pipeline.
Due to the domination of the public sector, private educational institutions 
play a relatively minor role in education provision. These institutions consist 
of private Thai universities, vocational colleges and international institutions. 
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International institutions are still marginal players, with a share of only 0.05 
per cent of the total students due to a number of reasons, including the legal 
restrictions on foreign ownership of educational institutions. 
The increase in enrolment during the past decade was driven mainly by the rapid 
expansion in the production capacities of many limited-admission and Rajabhat 
universities through the opening of ‘special programs’. As these programs may 
charge high tuition fees, they are easy solutions to lecturers’ calls for higher 
compensation1 and the universities’ needs to diversify their income sources away 
from the government budget to prepare for the transformation towards autonomous 
universities. In addition, two new limited-admission universities were also established. 
The expansion of the Rajabhat universities and limited-admission public universities 
has come at the cost of the open universities, while the number of students enrolling 
in private institutions in absolute term remains virtually unchanged (see Figure 9.4). 
In relative terms, however, the student share of private institutions has decreased 
from 24 per cent in 1996 to 17 per cent in 2006 (Figure 9.5).
Figure 9.4 New students classified by type of institution, 1997–2006
Source: Education statistics, Ministry of Education.
1 According to our interviews with public university instructors, a lecturer who teaches a special program 
can earn 90 000 baht (US$2500) a month, which is more than four times his or her monthly salary.
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To understand the sources of growth in enrolment from the demand side, we 
classify new higher education students into the group of new high-school 
graduates (that is, those just graduated from high school in the previous academic 
year) and the rest (that is, adult students and graduates from the non-formal 
education system). The analysis shows that while new high-school graduates 
remain the majority by a large margin, there has been a recent increase in the 
participation of adult students and those graduated from the non-formal system 
(Figure 9.6). Most of these students enrol in Rajabhat universities or special 
programs provided by limited-admission universities (Figure 9.7).
Figure 9.5 Changes in student shares of public and private institutions, 
1996–2006
Source: Education statistics, Ministry of Education.
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Figure 9.6 Composition of new enrolment in higher education, 1997–2006
Source: Education statistics, Ministry of Education.
There are at least two reasons for the dominant role of the public universities. 
First, many public universities were established decades before the private ones 
and thus are much better known. Second, due to their limited admission policy 
and the competitive entrance examinations, public universities can attract 
the best and brightest high-school graduates, which in turn reinforces their 
prestige. Finally, public universities have long been heavily subsidised by the 
government and thus can charge lower tuition fees—about half or even one-
fourth of the fees charged by private institutions (see Table 9.1)—making them 
much more attractive from the students’ perspective. 
Another consequence of the rapid expansion of the Thai higher education 
sector is that the share of social science and humanity students has continued 
to increase from an already high level, reaching 73 per cent of the total number 
of students in 2007 (Figure 9.8). This is because the investment cost for training 
social science and humanity students is much less than that for physical and 
medical science students.2
2 To put this into perspective, the proportion of social science and humanity students in Thailand is slightly 
larger than that of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) average, which is 
about 68.5 and 53 per cent for female and male graduates, respectively.
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Figure 9.7 New enrolments by type of study program, 2007
Source: Education statistics, Ministry of Education.
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Table 9.1 Tuition fees for bachelor degree (US$)
Types of 
institution Courses





Science and Technology 147 1224 387
Health Sciences 144 723 395
Social Sciences 152 578 291
Autonomous 
university
Science and Technology 546 1343 673
Health Sciences 701 728 710
Social Sciences 546 658 651
Open university
Science and Technology 47 994 99
Health Sciences 93 106 99
Social Sciences 46 96 82
Private institution
Private university
Science and Technology 731 2571 1684
1766
1072
Health Sciences 1302 4583
Social Science 568 1907
Private college
Science and Technology 1079 2028 1376
Health Sciences 1398 1979 1580
Social Sciences 523 1547 972
Note: Tuition fees are converted from Thai baht to US dollars using the 2003 exchange rate (US$1 = B41.5).
Source: Weesakul et al. (2003).
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Figure 9.8 Total enrolments by field of education, 2007
Source: Education statistics, Ministry of Education.
Problems of the Current Education Financing 
System
Participating in higher education is a form of investment that can generate high 
returns. Using the Labor Force Survey data for 2001–03, Punyasavatsut et al. 
(2005) estimated that the rates of return on higher education were significantly 
higher than those for secondary education (Table 9.2). 
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Table 9.2 Estimates of rates of return on education (per cent)
Educational level 2001 2002 2003
Female Male Female Male Female Male
Secondary school 
(academic) 14 .74 20 .80 14 .22 19 .14 15 .81 18 .72
Secondary school 
(vocational) 9 .95 11 .31 5 .55 10 .74 7 .96 8 .82
University, compared with 
secondary school level 
(academic)
16 .34 20 .40 17 .77 20 .25 17 .51 19 .94
University, compared with 
secondary school level 
(vocational)
13 .51 15 .67 13 .21 16 .05 13 .58 15 .06
Source: Punyasavatsut et al. (2005).
Due to imperfections in the capital market, however, not all high-school 
graduates can participate in higher education, especially those from low-income 
families. Using the 2002 Child and Youth Survey data, we found that high-
school graduates who indicated that they would not enrol in higher education 
were mostly from low-income families. Two major reasons cited by them were 
the lack of financial resources and the need to earn a living (Table 9.3)—both of 
which reflect their financial constraints.
Table 9.3 Reasons cited for not enrolling in higher education 
Reasons Percentage
Lack of financial resources 71
Have to earn one’s living/household’s living 16
Have enough skill/knowledge for one’s career 8
Sick/disability 1
Other 4
Source: Authors’ calculations from the Child and Youth Survey, 2002.
The inability of low-income families to finance investment in higher education 
has implications for economic efficiency in that the investment in higher 
education is below an optimal level. It also has equity impacts in that low-
income families are under-represented in higher education. As a result, 
government intervention is often required to correct this market failure. In the 
case of Thailand, the government intervenes in the higher education market by 
subsidisation of public educational institutions and student loans.3
3 There are also the grants in the form of scholarships to students, but their size has been marginal compared 
with the sizes of loans and subsidies.
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Public funds account for nearly 80 per cent of the total funds for education in 
Thailand. In fact, education expenditures have been the largest component of 
the government’s budget, ranging from 20 to 26 per cent of the total budget, 
or between 3.6 and 4.5 per cent of GDP (Punyasavatsut et al. 2005). Higher 
education expenditure ranges from 3.1 to 4.3 per cent of the total education 
budget, and 0.7 per cent of GDP, and has been relatively constant in the past 
decade (see Figure 9.9). 
Figure 9.9 Public expenditure on higher education, 1996–2007
Source: Budget in Brief (calculated from nominal values).
Although a significant amount of public money has been allocated to the higher 
education sector, the sector’s finances still suffer from a number of problems. 
First, it is mainly a supply-side financing system that cannot flexibly respond 
to the changes in students’ needs. This is because most of the resources are 
channelled to producers of educational services—that is, universities and other 
higher educational institutions. A breakdown of government expenditure in 
Figure 9.10 shows that approximately 80 per cent of public expenditure goes to 
higher educational institutions, while the rest is used for student loans. 
Second, the rapid growth in participation in higher education has exerted a lot of 
pressure on the current education financing system. In particular, the growth of 
budgets for education expenditure has not kept pace with the growth in the number 
of students enrolled (Figure 9.11). As a result, public expenditure on education per 
student has experienced a long-term downward trend (Figure 9.12). Since education 
investment has an impact on education quality, there is a risk of deterioration in 
quality unless there are other financial resources that grow sufficiently quickly. 
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Figure 9.10 Composition of government support to higher education, 
1999–2005
Source: Commission on Higher Education and Office of the Student Loans Fund.
Figure 9.11 Growth rates of students and budget, 1997–2006
Source: Budget in Brief and Ministry of Education statistics (calculated from nominal values).
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Figure 9.12 Public expenditure per student, 1996–2006 (baht p.a.)
Source: Budget in Brief and Ministry of Education statistics. 
Third, enrolment in public HEIs is highly subsidised by the government—
as a result of tuition fees that are set far below the actual costs. A study by 
King Mongkut’s University of Technology Thonburi (KMITT 2005) found 
that, on average, a social science student is subsidised by 57 per cent of the 
operating cost while a public-health student is subsidised by 77 per cent (see 
Table 9.4). Since the poor are generally under-represented in higher education, 
subsidisation of higher education in this way is likely to be regressive. Based on 
a benefit-incidence analysis, we found that subsidy per capita actually grows 
with household income (Table 9.5). 
Thus, there has been an urgent need to reform the Thai financing system for 
higher education. Experiences in other countries have shown that a properly 
designed student loan can provide a solution to the aforementioned problems. 
Table 9.4 Public subsidy as a percentage of the total operating cost of 
educating a student
Field of education Mean Maximum Minimum
Public health 77 93 29
Agriculture 76 94 56
Fine arts/architecture 69 94 24
Engineering/science 67 93 29
Medical sciences 63 91 28
Social sciences/arts 57 89 17
Source: KMUTT (2005).
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Table 9.5 Benefit incidence of public education spending by income 
group, 2006
Decile
Per capita subsidy (baht)
All levels Primary and secondary education Higher education
1 (poorest) 11 188 11 148 40
2 14 860 14 687 173
3 15 751 15 428 323
4 17 744 17 277 467
5 18 891 18 128 763
6 20 725 19 541 1184
7 21 974 20 145 1829
8 23 173 20 436 2738
9 25 616 21 380 4237
10 (richest) 28 959 22 009 6950
Total   19 889              18 018 1871
Source: Authors’ calculations from Socio-Economic Survey and the Bureau of the Budget.
Student loans Scheme in Thailand 
In addition to the direct provision of higher education by public institutions, 
the Thai government has also provided loans to students since 1996. This section 
will discuss the Student Loans Fund (SLF)—so far the most important student 
loan scheme in Thailand—analyse its effectiveness and assess its financial 
sustainability. 
Settings of the Student Loans Fund
The main objective of the SLF is to increase the opportunities for students from 
low-income families to continue their study. Other objectives are to promote a 
more equal income distribution in the long run and to develop a demand-side 
financing system by increasing the capacity of households to contribute more 
resources to education. The SLF loans cover tuition fees, educational-related 
expenses and other living expenses. Only high-school or tertiary-level students 
whose families’ incomes are less than B150 000 per annum are eligible to apply 
for the loan. During the first 10 years of its operation, the SLF has lent to more 
than 2.6 million students, with the loan value totalling nearly B200 billion.
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Organisational Structure of the SLF
Figure 9.13 shows the administrative structure of the SLF. At the top of the 
structure is the SLF Board, chaired by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry 
of Finance. The board has the authority to set student loan policies and related 
regulations, and to decide the amount of budgets and administrative costs to 
allocate to related agencies. The SLF budget for loans is then divided into two 
portions: one for upper secondary level (high school and vocational school), 
which is supervised by the Sub-Committee on the First Expense Account; 
another for undergraduate level, which is supervised by the Sub-Committee on 
the Second Expense Account. The Krung Thai Bank, a major commercial bank 
owned by the government, has been hired to disburse the approved loans and 
collect repayments.
Figure 9.13 Organisational structure of the Student Loans Fund
* MOE = Ministry of Education
* CHE = Commission on Higher Education, under Ministry of Education
Source: Student Loans Fund officers’ handbook, 2005.
Loan Application and Approval Procedures
The annual cycle of loan disbursement starts when the Sub-Committees on 
the First and the Second Expense Accounts allocate the approved budgets to 
educational institutions under their supervision. These institutions then call for 
loan applications from their students before the beginning of a new semester. 
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A committee in each institution then selects students to lend to by examining 
their applications and interviewing them. The time from loan application to the 
first loan disbursement is normally at least three months. As a result, selected 
students usually get their first tranche of loans near the end of the first semester.
Contrary to its objectives, the SLF still operates in a supply-side manner 
since all major decisions rest with the government committees and school 
administrators. Students will not be able to apply for loans before they are 
accepted by an educational institution. In addition, since the SLF loans are open 
to competition, applicants are not guaranteed selection for loans, but, in the 
case of being selected, will be able to borrow the full amount they requested. 
In fact, the amount of money a student may borrow depends on three factors: 
1) the overall loans allocated to his or her educational institution, which is not 
directly linked to his or her financial needs; 2) the level of loan competition in 
his or her educational institution; and 3) the discretion of his or her school’s 
authorised committee. This creates a high degree of uncertainty for applicants 
in need of financial support and is likely to be a barrier for them to enrol in 
higher education. 
Loan Ceilings
The ceiling of loans for borrowing students is determined according to their 
educational levels, fields of education and types of expenses (Table 9.6). For 
example, the ceiling for a high-school student is currently set at B26 000 per 
annum, while that for a vocational-school student is B36 000 per annum. The 
maximum loan for an undergraduate student depends on the field of education, 
ranging from B84 000 per annum for social sciences, arts and humanities to B174 
000 per annum for medical sciences. 
Debt Repayment 
Under the current scheme, borrowers have to begin to repay their debt two years 
after their graduation or after they stop borrowing, regardless of their income 
level. The rates of repayment are set progressively according to a pre-specified 
percentage of the total loan size, as shown in Table 9.7. The total repayment 
period is 15 years, with no interest charged in the first year. Borrowers are then 
charged an interest rate of 1 per cent of the outstanding loan in that year for the 
rest of the repayment period. It is important to note that interest is not charged 
before the repayment period and that even when it is charged, the rate is much 
lower than the commercial lending rates and the government’s cost of capital, 
meaning that the government has to subsidise the interest rate. Borrowers 
would be penalised, however, at the rate of 12–18 per cent of the instalment 
loan for failure to repay their debts on time. Deferral of payment up to two 
years is allowed on a case-by-case basis if the borrowers can prove that they 
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had incomes below B4700 a month or had been negatively affected by natural 
disasters, wars or riots. In addition, the outstanding debts would be forgiven if 
the debtors die or become handicapped.
Table 9.6 Loan ceiling by educational level and type of expense (baht per 
person p.a.)
Educational level/field of 
education





1 . High school 14 000 12 000 26 000
2. Vocational certificate 21 000 15 000 36 000
3. High vocational certificate/associate degree
3 .1 Business administration, arts, 
agriculture, domestic science, 
tourism
25 000 20 000 45 000
3 .2 Manufacturing, information 
technology, communication 30 000 20 000 50 000
4.Undergraduate
4 .1 Social sciences, arts, 
humanities, education 60 000 24 000 84 000
4 .2 Architecture 60 000 24 000 84 000
4 .3 Engineering, sciences and 
technology 70 000 24 000 94 000
4 .4 Agriculture 70 000 24 000 94 000
4 .5 Public health, nursing, 
pharmacology 80 000 24 000 104 000
4 .6 Medical science, veterinary 
science, dentistry 150 000 24 000 174 000
Source: Office of the Student Loans Fund, 2007.
Table 9.7 Repayment rate of the Student Loans Fund
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Total
Repayment 
(% of loan)
1 .5 2 3 3 .5 4 4 .5 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 100
Source: Office of Student Loans Fund, 2007.
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Impacts of Student Loans on Educational 
Opportunities
Although the SLF has been in operation for more than a decade, there has been 
no systematic evaluation of the scheme. In this section, we will present our 
empirical assessment of the impacts of the SLF by answering two questions. 
1. To what extent did the loans reach the target group? 
2. To what extent did the SLF increase educational opportunities for the 
borrowers? 
Description of Data
The data used for evaluating the impacts of the SLF are derived from the Child 
and Youth Survey, which has been undertaken by the National Statistical Office 
every five years since 1974. These nationwide surveys cover information on 
education, employment status, leisure and social participation of children and 
youth, defined as those between three and twenty-four years of age. In our study, 
we use the latest round of the survey, 2002, which is the only round that was 
conducted after the full implementation of the SLF program.4 We distinguish 
the SLF’s borrower and non-borrower groups based on their answers to the 
question on their major sources of educational expenditure. There are 275 of 
8290 students who answered that their major source of educational expenditure 
was the SLF loan.
Distribution of Loans to the Target Group
To begin with, it is natural to ask whether the SLF loans have actually reached 
the target group—that is, the students from families whose annual income is 
less than B150 000 a year. To answer this question, we rank the students by 
their average household income and divide them into five groups. Table 9.8 
shows that, for upper secondary students, the SLF loans were targeted quite 
successfully to the intended group; only 7 per cent of total borrowers were not 
in the target group. For undergraduate students, however, nearly 19 per cent of 
the borrowers were not in the target group. 
4 In fact, a previous survey was conducted, in 1997, right after the implementation of the SLF. Since the 
sample size of the students participating in the SLF was, however, very small in the 1997 survey, we consider 
it is more appropriate to use the 2002 survey for our study.
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Share of total 
borrowers(%)
Upper secondary level
0–50 000 1698 69 54 .76
50 001–100 000 1857 35 27 .78
100 001–150 000 1070 13 10 .32
150 001–200 000 170 0 0 .00
More than 200 000 1230 9 7 .14
Total 6025 126 100.00
Undergraduate level
0–50 000 348 43 28 .86
50 001–100 000 647 53 35 .57
100 001–150 000 466 25 16 .78
150 001–200 000 89 5 3 .36
More than 200 000 715 23 15 .44
Total 2265 149 100.00
Source: Authors’ estimations from the Child and Youth Survey data (2002).
These results indicate that the screening process of borrowers at the 
undergraduate institutions was much less effective than that of high schools. Our 
interviews with loan personnel of high schools and universities reveal that the 
former tend to have more information about the actual economic status of their 
students than the latter due to closer contact with the students’ families. This 
could be the main reason for the differences in effectiveness of the screening. 
Evaluation of Impacts on Educational Opportunity
As discussed in the previous section, there is some evidence that supports 
the view that financial barriers prevent many high-school graduates from 
low-income families from participating in higher education. Theoretically, 
the SLF should help reduce these financial barriers and thus promote greater 
participation in higher education. 
To evaluate the impact of the SLF, we need to compare the actual outcome of 
having the SLF with the outcome of what would have happened in its absence, 
or the counterfactual. The key challenge is to construct a good counterfactual 
that permits us to compare participants (treatment group) and non-participants 
(comparison group) in the SLF. Ideally, we would like to compare the rate of 
higher education enrolment of high-school students who borrow from the 
SLF with that of the non-borrowers. This comparison requires panel data that 
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track a given group of students over time, which are unavailable in Thailand. 
Fortunately, the Child and Youth Survey contains one question that asks 
whether a student borrows from the SLF and another that asks whether he 
or she intends to enrol in higher education after graduation. Combining the 
answers to both questions, we can assess the impacts of the SLF in influencing 
students’ enrolment in higher education by a technique called matching. 
Methodology
We adopt the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) technique to evaluate the impacts 
of the SLF program. The concept of PSM in our study is to find a comparison 
group that has the most similar profile to the borrower group except that they 
did not borrow from the SLF. This technique can help solve the selection-bias 
problems that are likely to occur in naive comparison of borrowers and non-
borrowers. For example, it is likely that students who borrow from the SLF come 
from low-income families since the fund was designed to target poor families. 
Moreover, the poor generally have less educational opportunities than the rich. 
As a result, naively comparing the educational opportunity of borrowers and 
non-borrowers is likely to underestimate the impacts of the SLF in increasing 
educational opportunity for the poor.
The PSM technique solves these selection-bias problems by forming a comparison 
group by selecting an individual who has the probability—also known as the 
‘propensity score’—to borrow close to that of an individual in the borrowing 
group. In our case, the following steps were undertaken. 
1. Final-year students of the upper secondary level (grade 12 students) are 
selected as the samples for the analysis.
2. The propensity-to-borrow score of each sample is estimated by a logit 
regression by using variables considered to affect the probability of 
borrowing. These explanatory variables are: 1) household income; 2) 
educational attainment of the head of the household; 3) the number of persons 
who are financially dependent in the household; 4) sex; 5) age; 6) type of 
educational institution (public or private); 7) field of education (academic 
or vocational); and 8) school location (rural or urban). See Appendix 9.1 for 
results of the logit regressions. 
3. A comparison group is selected from the sample based on a number 
of matching methods (see Appendix 9.1). The treatment group and the 
comparison group are compared along a number of dimensions to ensure 
that the risks of selection bias are reduced by the matching process. As 
the five-nearest neighbours matching method resulted in the most similar 
comparison group, it is adopted as our matching technique.
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4. The impact of SLF is estimated by comparing the intention to attend a higher 
education institution of the students in the treatment and the comparison 
groups. The difference derived from the comparison is called the Average 
Treatment effect for the Treated (ATT). 
Results
Table 9.9 presents the estimated impacts of the SLF on the intention to attend 
higher education of the final-year high-school students. The result shows no 
significant differences between the two groups. Other matching methods also 
produced similar results, showing the robustness of our finding. Thus, it is 
found that the SLF has no significant impact on the intention of borrowing 
students to participate in higher education. 
Table 9.9 Impact of the SLF on the intention of high-school students to 

























95 .65% 94 .78% 0 .87% 0 .23 95 .65% 96 .35% –0 .7% –0 .23
Although it is found that the SLF has no significant impact on the overall 
borrower group, it could have some impact on some subsets of the borrowing 
group, especially low-income subsets. To test this hypothesis, we divide the 
sample into four subsets by household income into: 1) those with household 
income not more than B30 000 a year, which is close to the official poverty 
line of B28 650;5 2) those with household income between B30 000 and B60 
000 a year; 3) those with household income more than B60 000 a year; and 4) 
those with household income not more than B150 000 a year, as set by the SLF’s 
conditions. The results in Table 9.10 show that the intention to attend higher 
education for the treated subset with household income less than B30 000 a year 
is significantly higher than that of the comparison group by nearly 9 percentage 
points. No significant differences, however, for other subsets were found. 
5 The official poverty line is B1190 per person per month (Jitsuchon et al. 2004). We assume that there are 
two income earners in a family: the head of the household and his or her spouse. Hence, the household income 
at the poverty line is B28 560 per annum.
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Table 9.10 Impact of the SLF on intention to attend higher education 
institution, by household income 
Sample group classified 
by household income 
(baht/month)






Income ≤ 30 000 100% 91 .16% 8 .84%** 3 .39
Income 30 001–60 000 88 .89% 94 .44% –5 .56% –0 .26
Income > 60 000 100% 94 .55% 5 .45% 1 .21
Income ≤150 000 95 .76% 96 .77% –1 .0% –0 .24
** significant at the 95 per cent confident level 
Source: Authors’ estimation from the Child and Youth Survey data (2002).
In summary, the SLF seems to have increased the educational opportunities of 
only the borrowers from families with income below the poverty line. Since this 
group constitutes only 13 per cent of the total borrowers, the income threshold 
set by the SLF appears to be far too high. 
Financial Sustainability of the SLF 
We now turn to the issue of the financial sustainability of the SLF. In this section, 
we will investigate the issue based on the approach used by Ziderman (2002).
Repayment Ratio
Based on the information about the repayment conditions described above, we 
estimate the SLF’s repayment ratio, which assumes that all borrowers repay on 
time exactly according to the schedule set by the SLF (Table 9.7). Based on a 
discounted cash-flow calculation using various discount rates and assuming a 
constant inflation rate of 3 per cent per annum, repayment ratios are estimated 
(Table 9.11). It can be seen that the repayment ratios are lower than half in all 
cases—ranging from 24 to 42 per cent—depending on the period of borrowing 
and the discount rate used. The low level of repayment ratios reflects the 
generosity of the SLF’s repayment conditions: the long grace period, the low 
interest rate and the long repayment period allowed.




Upper secondary level (3 years) 41 .81 33 .22 26 .65
Undergraduate (4 years) 40 .48 31 .82 25 .27
Upper secondary plus undergraduate (7 years) 40 .79 30 .88 23 .61
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Recovery Ratio
The repayment ratio assumes that loans are repaid according to the set conditions. 
In addition to ignoring the administrative costs of the SLF, it also fails to take 
into account the fact that many borrowers will not repay on time and might 
even default on their loans. Table 9.12 shows the percentage of borrowers who 
did not repay on time. For instance, it shows that among the group of borrowers 
who were scheduled to repay in 2001, 54.8 per cent did not repay on time. This 
reflects a poor repayment-collection mechanism of the SLF. Since the SLF has 
not been operating long enough to reliably estimate the actual default rate, we 
assume the rate to be in the range of 10 per cent based on the SLF’s estimation 
and 30 per cent based on our estimation using the 2005 repayment data. The 
administrative cost is estimated to be 1.6 per cent of the total outstanding debt.
Table 9.12 Percentage of borrowers who did not declare for obligatory 
repayment
Year
Borrowers who did not declare for repayment by compulsory year
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
2001 19 .58 23 .98 54.80
2002 17 .99 22 .59 32 .32 56.85
2003 15 .96 20 .03 27 .24 36 .06 57.44
2004 12 .45 19 .26 26 .06 33 .02 39 .94 55.61
2005 9 .98 15 .40 23 .32 32 .06 38 .27 36 .17 56.87
Source: Office of the Student Loans Fund.
Table 9.13 shows that the SLF has a very low recovery ratio—ranging from 25 
to 35 per cent. Thus, the fiscal burden of the SLF could be very high in the long 
run unless the repayment conditions are changed or the repayment-collection 
system is strengthened. 
Table 9.13 Estimated recovery ratios of the Student Loans Fund (per cent)
Borrowing period
Discount rate Default rate (for discount rate = 4%)
4% 6% 8% 10% 20% 30%
Three years (loans for upper 
secondary study) 24 .9 19 .6 15 .6 33 .3 29 .2 24 .9
Four years (loans for 
undergraduate study) 25 .0 19 .6 15 .5 33 .2 29 .2 25 .0
Seven years (loans for upper 
secondary and undergraduate 
studies)
26 .4 19 .9 15 .2 34 .7 30 .6 26 .4
212
Financing Higher Education and Economic Development in East Asia
Shifting to Income-Contingent Loans
The SLF was temporarily abolished and replaced with the Income Contingent 
Loan (ICL) scheme under the Thaksin government in 2006. The ICL, which was 
modelled after the loan with the same name in Australia, is different from the 
SLF in many important ways. First, it allows only undergraduates and not high-
school students to borrow. In addition, it sets no condition on the household 
income of the borrowers. This means that all undergraduate students in any field 
may apply for the loan. Second, it covers only tuition fees, not other education-
related expenses and living expenses. Third, it does not require the borrowers to 
start repaying until their incomes reach B16 000 a month (the minimum income 
level for the payment of income tax). The repayment rate is contingent upon the 
borrowers’ incomes, and is progressively increased with higher income. Fourth, 
there is no interest charged under the ICL scheme, but the outstanding debt will 
be adjusted by inflation from the first year of borrowing. Finally, the revenue 
department is responsible for collecting the repayments. 
Even though its supporters claim that the ICL is far superior to the SLF in 
many aspects, the ICL was short lived and the Surayud administration, which 
succeeded the Thaksin administration, decided to put the SLF back in place in 
2007. Critics claim that, regardless of many improvements brought about by the 
ICL, the scheme is too fiscally expensive, especially when enrolments in higher 
education are expanding. The status of the ICL and of the SLF is again uncertain 
now that a new government, backed by Thaksin, gained power in early 2008. 
Concluding Remarks
The Thai higher education sector has expanded quickly during the past decade, 
making a transition from an elitist to a mass institution. To cope with the 
enrolment expansion, the education financing system needs to be reformed. 
The current system of public subsidy to public educational institutions has 
proved to be inefficient, regressive and anti-competitive. The introduction of 
the SLF was supposed to be a step forward. Carefully designed, it has potential 
to be more efficient, fairer and more pro-competition. The current SLF scheme, 
however, contains too many flaws: its loan-screening system is far from perfect; 
it fails to disburse the loans on time; it has a very poor collection mechanism; 
and it is still based on the supply-side financing paradigm. Our analysis shows 
that it could not significantly influence the decisions of high-school students to 
continue their studies to a higher level, except for the poorest group, who were 
a minority among the recipients. In addition, the SLF is suffering from a serious 
financial sustainability problem due to its very low recovery rate. 
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The shift to the ICL brought about many important improvements, especially a 
potentially more effective repayment-collection system. Moreover, it was based 
on a demand-side financing paradigm that promoted more choices for students. 
The ICL is not, however, without its problems; it still unnecessarily subsidises 
the borrowers by charging a zero real interest rate. In addition, the ICL by itself 
cannot bring about the overall changes needed to the educational financing 
system unless other reforms are also undertaken. 
More importantly, policy certainty is a prerequisite for long-term development of 
the system. Frequent policy reversals will not only bring about confusion to all 
stakeholders, they will also raise questions about the government’s commitment to 
any loan programs. To prevent haphazard policy changes, policy makers should seek 
consensus from broad-based stakeholders before making any such major changes. 
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Appendix 9.1
Table A9.1 Results of logistic regression
Variable Coefficient Standard error P-value
Household income  –0 .00001** 0 .000 0 .010
Education attainment of head of household –0 .47789 0 .379 0 .207
Number of members who are a burden on household 0 .25866 0 .268 0 .334
Sex –0 .17533 0 .433 0 .685
Age 0 .22761 0 .146 0 .119
Type of school 0 .47168 0 .732 0 .519
Type of education 1 .48395** 0 .449 0 .001
Location –0 .07549 0 .421 0 .858
Constant –7 .62449** 3 .002 0 .011
** significant at the 95 per cent confidence level
Table A9.2 Methods of matching
1. One-to-one matching (1-nearest neighbour): the method that chooses one comparison 
unit(non-participant) that has the closest propensity score with each treated unit .
2 . One-to-five matching (5-nearest neighbours): the method that chooses five comparison 
units that have the closest propensity score with each treated observation .
3. Radius matching: each treated unit is matched only with the comparison units whose 
propensity score falls in a predefined neighbourhood of the propensity score of the 
treated unit .
4. Kernel matching: all treated are matched with a weighted average of all comparisons 
with weights that are inversely proportional to the distance between the propensity 
scores of the treated and comparisons .
5. Mahalanobis matching: this method does not use the propensity score for matching the 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































10. Thailand’s Student Loans Fund: 
An analysis of interest rate subsidies 
and repayment hardships
Piruna Polsiri, Rangsit Sarachitti and Thitima Sitthipongpanich 
Dhurakij Pundit University
Introduction
Human capital is important for social and economic development. The most 
sensible way to enhance the quality of a country’s human capital is to promote 
education. In developing countries, however, access to education, especially at 
high educational levels, is limited because large numbers of the population are 
poor. Therefore, the government has to play an important role in establishing a 
student loans scheme to reduce inequality in education, which will eventually 
increase the country’s economic growth. 
From the point of view of the government, as a loan provider, some key issues 
regarding a student loans scheme are: allocation and distribution, recovery, 
collection and administration, and repayment conditions.1 The government also 
needs to be concerned about the efficiency of resource allocation to the student 
loan scheme. From the point of view of borrowers, although they receive the 
opportunity to access higher education and earn higher incomes, required loan 
repayments with strict conditions could increase the borrowers’ repayment 
hardship. These issues lead to the trade-off between the government’s subsidy 
and the borrowers’ repayment difficulties. 
Previous studies have investigated student loan schemes in many countries—
for example, in Australia (Chapman 2006; Chapman and Ryan 2002), Europe 
and the United States (Johnstone 1986), Africa (Johnstone 2004; Johnstone 
and Amero 2001), and South-East Asia (Ziderman 2004).2 Our goal is to fully 
analyse both the implicit subsidies related to the Student Loans Fund (SLF) 
and the repayment hardship of loan recipients in Thailand at an undergraduate 
level. An important and similarly motivated study by Ziderman (2003) comes 
to comparable conclusions with respect to both overall implicit subsidies and 
1 Loan repayment conditions refer to interest charges and the repayment schedule.
2 Although Thailand’s student loans cover upper secondary, vocational and undergraduate education, 
most student loan schemes around the world cover only higher education (Ziderman 2003). Therefore, in this 
chapter, our analysis will be based on higher education.
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repayment hardships calculated at the mean of the data.3 Most importantly, 
however, this study is the first to analyse the repayment hardship of SLF loans 
for graduates with very low incomes. 
This chapter first describes the background of the SLF in Thailand, before 
discussing current issues of the SLF. We then analyse the implicit subsidy and 
repayment hardships.
Background of the Student Loans Fund 
History of the Student Loans Fund 
The history of student loans in Thailand began in 1996 when the government, 
led by the Chartthai Party, established the Student Loans Fund (SLF). The idea 
of student loans, nevertheless, originated in 1995 under the government led by 
the Democrat Party.4 The main objective of the SLF is to enhance access to upper 
secondary and higher education for students from low-income families.5 The 
ultimate goals are to reduce the inequality of education between the rich and 
the poor and to develop human resources in the country. This will at least help 
to achieve economic growth and enhance the competitive capacity of Thailand 
(Student Loans Fund Act 1998). 
To serve its purposes, the SLF provides loans for upper secondary, vocational 
and undergraduate education to students whose family income does not exceed 
B150 000 per annum.6 It has been allocated in the national budget, on average, 
B27 billion per annum. As reported by Krung Thai Bank in March 2008, the 
government had subsidised the SLF for the approximate total amount of B280 
billion to about 2.9 million loan recipients from 1996 to 2007.
How the SLF Works
Loan Budget Allocation and Loan Distribution
In each fiscal year, the SLF will estimate the total amount of funds needed 
for loan distribution in that year, and submit a request to the Bureau of the 
3 Examples of previous studies are Tangkitvanich and Manasboonphempool (2006) and Ziderman (2003).
4 Under the Thai Rak Thai Party government, the SLF scheme was changed to Thailand’s Income Contingent 
and Allowance Loan (TICAL) scheme in 2006. When the government was ousted by the coup, the TICAL was 
switched back to the SLF. A detailed discussion of TICAL is provided in Chapman and Luonkaew (2008).
5 The average rate of continuing the upper secondary level, however, declined slightly during the period 
1997–99, which was due mostly to the East Asian economic crisis in 1997 (Weesakul 2006).
6 The threshold family income of a loan recipient was originally set at B120 000 in 1996. It was then raised to 
B300 000 in 1997 and remained in place until 1999, when it was reduced to B150 000, which was the median 
household income in 2002 (Weesakul 2006; Ziderman 2003).
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Budget in the Ministry of Finance. The annual allocated budget of the SLF will 
then be divided into: 1) the loan budget for upper secondary and vocational 
education; and 2) the loan budget for undergraduate education. For our focus, 
the loan budget for undergraduate education will be allocated directly to 
each university, through the Commission on Higher Education (formerly the 
Ministry of University Affairs). The loan budget allocated to a university is 
based on the number of loan recipients in previous years. At the institutional 
level, the university’s loan committee authorises the distribution of the loan 
budget to eligible students and oversees the process of loan applications. Within 
the limitations set by the Commission on Higher Education, a university makes 
decisions on individual loans distributed to its students. 
The SLF loans cover tuition fees and educational-related expenses, as well as 
living allowances during a study period. For the undergraduate level—which 
is the focus of our analysis—the loan ceiling for tuition fees and educational-
related expenses is set differently, depending on the field of study, ranging 
from B60 000 to B150 000 per annum. The living allowance loan, including 
accommodation and personal expenses, is limited to B24 000 per annum (Office 
of Student Loans Fund web site: <www.studentloan.or.th>). 
Loan Repayment 
Since the SLF loans are provided to students from low-income families, the 
conditions for interest charges and principal repayments have been set to lessen 
the debtors’ burden. First, there is a seven-year interest grace period between 
initial enrolment and the first debt repayment. Second, there is a two-year 
repayment grace period after a loan recipient graduates or stops borrowing. 
Following the two-year grace period, the loan recipient is required to repay his 
or her debt for 15 years.7 Third, a flat interest rate of only 1 per cent per annum 
is charged throughout the repayment period. The annual loan repayment is 
calculated as the proportion of the total loan, ranging from 1.5 per cent in year 
one to 13 per cent in year 15.8 It seems that the SLF loans have the potential 
to provide ‘consumption smoothing’, meaning that the proportion of the loan 
repayment grows with the borrower’s expected earnings. Table 10.1 shows an 
example of a loan repayment schedule, assuming a loan amount of B200 000. 
7 A loan recipient may choose to start repaying his or her debt during the two-year grace period. Also, a 
loan recipient may choose to pay off the debt in less than 15 years. 
8 A loan recipient may, however, choose to repay the debt at a higher rate, or more quickly than what is 
specified in the repayment schedule.
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1 1 .5 3000 - 3000 197 000
2 2 .5 5000 1970 6970 192 000
3 3 .0 6000 1920 7920 186 000
4 3 .5 7000 1860 8860 179 000
5 4 .0 8000 1790 9790 171 000
6 4 .5 9000 1710 10 710 162 000
7 5 .0 10 000 1620 11 620 152 000
8 6 .0 12 000 1520 13 520 140 000
9 7 .0 14 000 1400 15 400 126 000
10 8 .0 16 000 1260 17 260 110 000
11 9 .0 18 000 1100 19 100 92 000
12 10 .0 20 000 920 20 920 72 000
13 11 .0 22 000 720 22 720 50 000
14 12 .0 24 000 500 24 500 26 000
15 13 .0 26 000 260 26 260 -
Total 100 .0 200 000
Fourth, if a loan recipient is unemployed or encounters a natural disaster, riot 
or war, he or she may apply for a six-month suspension, but in total not more 
than two years. If a loan recipient’s income falls below the threshold income 
of B4700 a month, he or she may request not to pay the total amount of the 
required payment. In this case, the borrower has to pay a minimum of B300 a 
month or B2400 per annum, and it has to be higher than the interest charged 
for that repayment period. If a loan recipient fails to repay his or her debt, he 
or she will face a penalty between 12 per cent and 18 per cent of the instalment 
principal. Finally, upon a loan recipient’s death or disability preventing work, 
the loan will be automatically forgiven.
Loan Collection
Krung Thai Bank (KTB), a government-owned bank, is responsible for SLF loan 
collection. Once the two-year repayment grace period ends, due borrowers are 
required to contact KTB to arrange the loan repayment by 5 July in that year. 
The borrowers have two choices for paying back the debt. First, they may pay 
the total due amount for the particular period. Second, they may apply for an 
instalment of 12 monthly payments. During 15 years of the loan repayment 
period, the KTB will inform due borrowers of the amounts to be paid one month 
before the due date—that is, 5 July. Again, the borrowers have two choices to 
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settle the repayment schedule for each particular year. If due borrowers fail to 
arrange the payment, follow-up by mail, telephone and a home visit will be 
made depending on the length of the delinquency period. 
The Importance of Our Study
In this study, we focus on the analyses of the implicit subsidy by the government 
and the repayment hardship of SLF loan recipients. We realise that the implicit 
subsidy issues have already been discussed in Shen and Ziderman (2008), 
Tangkitvanich and Manasboonphempool (2006) and Ziderman (2003). There are 
similarities in many dimensions to the analysis of Ziderman and we consider this 
to be an important affirmation of policy concerns with respect to the SLF. As 
is the case with Ziderman (2003), we are able to show the extent to which the 
implicit subsidy can be traced to different policy components of the loan—that 
is, interest rates charged, interest grace periods, and repayment grace periods. 
We find that all components matter and that, roughly, the role of interest rate 
subsidies is about the same as the other factors combined.
As with Ziderman (2003), we calculate repayment hardships for loan repayments 
estimated with respect to average incomes; using more sophisticated earnings 
profiles, we come to quite similar conclusions. More importantly, our study 
contributes to the policy debate in two unusual respects concerning repayment 
hardships. First, we are able to calculate repayment burdens for graduates of 
different ages—and not just at the mean. Second, and most significantly, we 
are able to estimate the extent of repayment hardships for graduates with very 
low incomes—those in the bottom decile of the earnings distribution—by both 
sex and age. Our approach allows us to explore fairly specifically the potential 
policy trade-off between implicit interest rate subsidies and repayment burdens 
Current Issues Concerning the SLF
Nominal Interest Rate of 1 Per Cent
The nominal interest rate charged to SLF loans is fixed at 1 per cent until the 
loans are fully paid. The 1 per cent interest rate assists loan recipients to bear a 
very low cost for their education because it is much lower than market interest 
rates. Currently, the term deposit interest rate of the Government Saving Bank 
is 3 per cent and the interest rate of long-term government bonds is 5 per cent 
(The Bank of Thailand, as of May 2008: <www.bot.or.th>). This means that 
the government has to subsidise the SLF at least 2–3 per cent over the 15-year 
repayment schedule.
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Furthermore, the 1 per cent interest rate charged affects the present value of 
repayments in the future. Assuming that the average inflation rate is 4 per cent, 
the government subsidises loan recipients at about 3 per cent. The amount of 
repayment reduces through time at a real rate of 3 per cent. When the total 
loans—charged with a 1 per cent interest rate—are fully paid after 21 years 
(four-year course of study, two-year grace period and 15-year repayment period), 
the government will receive much less money in real terms. 
Grace Period
The SLF allows loan recipients to start loan repayment two years after their 
graduation. The two-year grace period for repayment benefits loan recipients, 
but increases the government subsidy. Moreover, from the loan application 
date, the borrowers are not obliged to pay interest, or to make a repayment for 
seven years, meaning that the government has to bear a high cost of lending 
for the seven-year interest grace period. In addition to this, the SLF allows the 
borrowers to postpone their repayment for a total period of two years if they are 
unemployed or face a natural disaster, riot or war. 
Administration/Collection Cost
It is arguable that the administration process under the SLF leads to high expenses 
because it involves several parties. The SLF hires KTB to be responsible for the 
loan-approval process and ‘normal’ loan collection. In the fiscal year 2008, KTB 
was allocated overall administration costs of about B227 million.9 The bank is in 
charge of loan approval after receiving all relevant documents from borrowers’ 
educational institutions. Through KTB, tuition-fee loans are paid directly to an 
educational institution, while monthly allowances and expenses are credited to 
borrowers’ KTB accounts. During the loan-collection process, KTB will inform 
borrowers of the amount of payment, and, if the borrowers fail to repay the 
loan, KTB will follow-up by mail and phone.
After five years of the repayment schedule, the unpaid loans will be classified 
as ‘delinquent’ loans. For the delinquent loans, the Legal Affairs Division of 
the Office of the Student Loans Fund contracts out law firms to follow-up. From 
an interview with Professor Dr Boonserm Weesakul, an SLF honorary board 
member, we discovered that, at the steady state, approximately 34 000 cases are 
sent to law firms every year. The total cost for loan collection paid to law firms 
is about B521 million, and the SLF planned to spend B14.5 million to publicise 
the process of loan collection in the fiscal year 2008.10
9 B. Weesakul (Personal communication, 10 May 2008) referred to the figures from the SLF’s 2008 budget.
10 The figures are from the SLF’s 2008 budget.
10 . Thailand’s Student Loans Fund
227
Defaults
The high level of government subsidy to the SLF also stems from default losses. 
Several students might not meet their loan repayment obligation, meaning that 
when and if a borrower’s income is low for a period, he or she will face difficulty 
in repaying the loan. Also, some students might still be unemployed after the 
two-year grace period finishes, or might continue a postgraduate course. In 
addition, the probability of default loss could be increased by contract breach 
or the death of loan recipients. 
Table 10.2 shows the summary of loan repayments for 1999–2006 due for cohorts 
of borrowers. Official figures show that, for each due cohort, about 40 per cent 
of due borrowers commence their repayment in July of the first repayment year, 
while 60 per cent of due borrowers fail to make any repayment. The non-paying 
borrowers could include those who are not able to repay and who request a 
deferral of loan repayment, or those who do not commit to their loan repayment. 
After the first five years of the repayment schedule, the proportion of payers 
to due borrowers increases to about 80 per cent. This five-year period is a cut-
off point for the Legal Affairs Division of the Office of the Student Loans Fund 
to handle delinquent loans. The legal procedure to some degree helps force 
due borrowers to repay loans. Therefore, the first two due cohorts—that is, 
due cohorts for 1999 and for 2000—show that about 15 per cent of the due 
borrowers do not pay after eight years, which should be considered as a steady 
state. This 15 per cent default loss will be used in implicit subsidy calculations. 


























1999 18 672 15 .93 68 .18 76 .84 81 .00 82 .85 85 .56 88 .58 89 .77 88 .51
2000 66 555 38 .92 74 .83 76 .80 79 .15 79 .87 82 .66 87 .79 87 .31
2001 135 314 41 .21 66 .60 72 .00 73 .22 73 .85 80 .05 82 .65
2002 207 102 40 .30 61 .01 66 .21 67 .28 68 .36 74 .60
2003 226 105 39 .19 58 .78 61 .06 62 .63 62 .78
2004 245 961 41 .13 62 .94 65 .31 65 .74
2005 281 070 39 .34 60 .38 63 .50
2006 275 580 45 .89 62 .97
Source: Report on student loan payment and repayment, SLF (1999–2006) by KTB, as of May 2007.
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Implicit Subsidies 
In order to calculate the implicit subsidy, we first assume that an average loan 
per head of university students, including tuition fees and living expenses, is 
equivalent to B200 000 for a four-year course. 
Table 10.3 shows an average tuition fee (four-year course) and the number of 
borrowers at each type of university in Thailand. The average tuition fee varies 
across the type of university. As expected, the average tuition fee per course 
at a private university is the highest: B180 000. A public university charges 
approximately B72 000 per course, while the average tuition fee at a Rajamangala 
university of technology is B48 000 per course. The lowest average tuition fee is 
B48 000 per course at a Rajabhat university. The proportion of borrowers is 37 
per cent at a Rajabhat university, followed by 30 per cent at a private university, 
22 per cent at a public university and 11 per cent at a Rajamangala university 
of technology. 
Table 10.3 Average tuition fee per course and number of borrowers, 2003
Type of university Average tuition fee (baht) No. of borrowers
Private university 180 000 100 489
Public university 72 000 75 469
Rajamangala university of technology 48 000 39 069
Rajabhat university 36 000 125 546
Source: Office of Student Loans Fund.
Weighted average tuition fee =
Average tuition fee per course × Number of borrowers at each type of university
Total number of borrowers
From these figures, we calculate the weighted average tuition fee per course 
in 2003, which is about B88 000 per person. To make a simple calculation, we 
assume that the weighted average tuition fee per course in 2008 is approximately 
B100 000 per borrower. In addition, university students can borrow monthly 
expenses, including accommodation and living expenses, from the SLF. 
According to the borrowing conditions of the SLF, each student may borrow a 
personal expense loan of B2000 a month (Office of Student Loans Fund 2007). 
Hence, the total personal-expense loan amount for a four-year course is B96 000 
per person. We assume that, together with the tuition-fee loan, an approximate 
total loan for a four-year university course is B200 000 per person.
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Furthermore, we assume an inflation rate of 4 per cent, which was the average 
inflation rate from 2004 to 2007.11 The inflation rate is used to adjust the amount 
of loan repayment in each year over the 15-year repayment period to a real term 
of money. We also assume a discount rate of 3 per cent, which is quoted by a 
general agreement of Times Preference Experts. We use the discount rate to 
calculate the present values of total payment, loan amount, and collection costs. 
The collection cost is assumed to be 3 per cent of the total payment over the 15-
year repayment period and it is added to the total loan amount per borrower. 
Referring to the previous section, the total collection cost is B763 million per 
annum, including fees paid to KTB and law firms and expenses to promote loan 
repayment. The approximate collection cost of 3 per cent is the proportion of 
total collection costs (B763 million) to outstanding loans per annum (B27 billion).
The default loss of 15 per cent is used to adjust the total repayment over the 
15-year repayment period. Default loss is assumed to mean that 15 per cent of 
the borrowers pay nothing over the repayment period, while 85 per cent of the 
borrowers pay the full amount. These figures are from Table 10.2, which shows 
that it is likely that 85 per cent of total due borrowers pay back the loan at the 
steady state (B. Weesakul, Personal communication, 10 May 2008). 
The calculation of the implicit subsidy in this study turns out to be similar to 
Shen and Ziderman’s (2008), which is shown in Table 10.4. 
Implicit subsidy = 1 -
PV of total payment adjusted by loan loss
PV of total loan amount + PV of total collection cost[ ]
The current SLF is examined under repayment conditions of a 1 per cent 
nominal interest rate charged to the total loan amount, a two-year grace period 
of repayment, interest charged three years after graduation, and a repayment 
schedule of 15 years. In addition to the analysis of the current SLF, we also 
analyse three comparison SLF schemes, which vary in terms of the number 
of grace periods of repayment and interest charged. Moreover, we propose 
to analyse the schemes with the adjustment of the interest rate—1 per cent 
versus 7 per cent. The nominal interest rate of 7 per cent is equivalent to a 
real rate of interest of 3 per cent, given that the inflation rate is 4 per cent. If 
the government’s cost of borrowing is 3 per cent, this interest subsidy will be 
removed. Table 10.4 shows the results of implicit subsidy calculation of four 
different schemes with two interest rate regimes.
11 The Bank of Thailand reported inflation rates of 2.7 per cent in 2004, 4.5 per cent in 2005, 4.7 per cent in 
2006, and 2.3 per cent in 2007 (<www.bot.or.th>).
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Table 10.4 Implicit subsidies (per cent)
Nominal interest rate 1% 7%
Two-year repayment grace period and interest rate charged three 
years after graduation
65 .68 44 .62
No repayment grace period and interest rate charged three years after 
graduation
60 .57 36 .44
Two-year repayment grace period and interest rate charged on 
enrolment
50 .55 20 .29
No repayment grace period and interest rate charged on enrolment 46 .60 19 .92
Table 10.4 shows that the implicit subsidy of the current SLF is 65.68 per 
cent, which is similar to Shen and Ziderman (2008) and Tangkitvanich and 
Manasboonphempool (2006). Specifically, Shen and Ziderman (2008) report 
28.21 per cent of the loan recovery ratio, incorporating default loss, which is 
equivalent to 71.79 per cent of the implicit subsidy. Using the same approach 
as Shen and Ziderman (2008), Tangkitvanich and Manasboonphempool (2006) 
show that the loan recovery ratio is 33.2 per cent (that is, the implicit subsidy 
is 66.8 per cent), assuming a discount rate of 4 per cent and the default rate of 
10 per cent. The differences in the implicit subsidy calculations derive from 
different estimation formulas and assumptions of inflation rate, discount rate, 
default loss, and collection costs. 
As with Ziderman (2003), our results indicate that the implicit subsidy is affected 
significantly by the interest rate charged, the grace period of repayment, and 
the grace period in which interest is not charged. Interest rate subsidies are an 
important aspect of the government subsidy and these arise because interest 
rates charged on debt are typically lower than the government’s borrowing cost. 
If we adjust the nominal interest rate from 1 per cent to 7 per cent—meaning 
that the real interest rate is 3 per cent (equivalent to the discount rate we use)—
the implicit subsidy decreases to 45 per cent. This could be roughly summarised 
as: 1 per cent of the interest rate charged to the loan reduces the implicit subsidy 
by about 3.5 per cent. 
We estimate also the effect of changes in the repayment grace period on the 
subsidy. Based on other conditions of the current SLF system, the implicit 
subsidy declines from 65.68 per cent to 60.57 per cent if borrowers are required 
to make a repayment after graduation (zero repayment grace period). The 
interest grace period also has an impact on the implicit subsidy. If the interest 
is imposed on enrolment, the implicit subsidy reduces to 50.55 per cent. Even 
assuming no grace period of repayment and interest charged on enrolment, the 
implicit subsidy roughly declines from 65.68 per cent to 46.6 per cent. These 
results indicate that the impact of the interest rate charged on the implicit 
subsidy is much stronger than that of the repayment grace period and that of 
the interest grace period. 
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Under the schemes of a 7 per cent interest rate charged on the SLF, the implicit 
subsidy decreases to 36.44 per cent when there is no grace period of repayment. 
If we drastically alter the current SLF, assuming a 7 per cent interest rate 
charged, zero repayment grace period and interest rate charged on enrolment, 
the implicit subsidy substantially reduces—to 19.92 per cent,12 or to less than 
one-third of the estimate for the current SLF of about 65 per cent. The findings 
of Table 10.4 suggest that the impact of grace period parameters on the implicit 
subsidy is greatest at the high interest rate.  
We also calculate the implicit subsidy assuming that the default loss is 20 per 
cent and everything else remains constant. This 20 per cent default loss refers 
to the proportion of unpaid due borrowers after the five-year cut-off point for 
the Legal Affairs Division of the Office of the Student Loans Fund to handle 
delinquent loans. Results available from the authors show that at the interest 
rate of 1 per cent, the implicit subsidy increases by about 2 per cent, while at 
the interest rate of 7 per cent, it increases by about 4 per cent, compared with 
the current SLF with an assumed 15 per cent default loss. As expected, at a 
higher interest rate charged, the impact of default loss on the implicit subsidy is 
greater. Adjusting the default loss does not, however, significantly change our 
analysis of the implicit subsidy.
Repayment Hardships 
Data and Methodology
To investigate the repayment hardship of loan recipients, we use the age–earnings 
profile of average Thais with an undergraduate degree provided by Chapman and 
Lounkaew (2008).13 They construct age–earnings profiles of Thai graduates using 
data from the 2006 Labour Force Survey conducted by the National Statistical 
Office. The sample is classified into female and male graduates. Their income is 
measured as wages from their main jobs with a minimum of 20 working hours 
a week, and the estimated income of average graduates is constructed based on 
the ordinary least squares (OLS), which is estimated using potential experience 
(in a quadratic form) and educational background.14
12 The fact that some subsidies remain can be traced to overall defaults and administration costs built into 
the analysis.
13 Ziderman (2003) calculates repayment burdens using average earnings only.
14 There is a possible unemployment issue; however, it is probably not very serious because the average 
unemployment rate of female and male graduates during the 15-year repayment period is only about 8 per 
cent and 4 per cent, respectively.
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Table 10.5 shows the descriptive statistics of the sample’s earnings. The number 
of observations is 6899 and 9871 for male and female graduates, respectively. 
On average, female graduates earn approximately B172 000 per annum, which 
is lower than the male graduates’ earnings of about B190 000 per annum. The 
minimum wage of female graduates is B13 200 per annum, while male graduates 
earn at least B18 200 per annum. 
Moreover, to examine how the repayment hardship of loan recipients under 
the SLF scheme will be different when the loan recipients earn much less than 
the average, we use the age–earnings profile of graduates whose income is in 
the bottom 10 per cent—that is, unlucky graduates. To calculate the estimated 
future income of unlucky graduates, we also use the same regression model as 
that for average graduates. The descriptive statistics of unlucky graduates in 
Table 10.5 show that the number of observations for unlucky graduates is 1038 
and 668 for female and male graduates, respectively. The minimum earnings of 
unlucky female graduates is B12 500, but on average they earn B75 994.96. As 
for unlucky male graduates, their average income is B78 972.62, which is higher 
than that for females. 
Table 10.5 Descriptive statistics of age–earnings profile data
Sub-sample No. of observations Min. Max. Mean Median Std dev.
Female graduates 9871 13 200 480 003 172 116 .10 148 800 85 172 .42
Male graduates 6899 18 200 521 440 190 350 .20 180 000 88 589 .68
Unlucky female 
graduates 1038 12 500 130 600 75 994 .96 71 400 25 485 .52
Unlucky male 
graduates 668 6250 149 400 78 972 .62 74 600 22 092 .78
The age–earnings profiles over the working life of average female and male 
graduates and that of unlucky female and male graduates are shown in Figures 
10.1 and 10.2, respectively.
To calculate the repayment hardship, there are four sub-samples in our 
analysis—that is, average female graduates, average male graduates, unlucky 
female graduates and unlucky male graduates. The repayment hardship is 
calculated as below: 
The total loan repayment of each period is adjusted to a real term, using the 
inflation rate of 4 per cent and total income, estimated by the regression model, 
in a real term.
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Figure 10.1 Age–earnings profile of average graduates
Figure 10.2 Age–earnings profile of unlucky graduates
Analysis
Consistent with the implicit subsidy analysis, we calculate the average 
repayment hardship over the 15-year repayment period of average female and 
male graduates as well as unlucky female and male graduates under the four 
different SLF schemes. The results are presented in Table 10.6. 
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Table 10.6 Average repayment hardships (per cent)
Schemes
Interest rate 1% Interest rate 7%
Average Unlucky Average Unlucky
Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male
2 Rep, 3 Inta 4 .19 3 .47 12 .44 9 .72 6 .87 5 .74 20 .13 15 .81
0 Rep, 3 Intb 4 .55 3 .76 14 .20 11 .21 7 .45 6 .22 23 .01 18 .28
2 Rep, 0 Intc 4 .46 3 .70 13 .21 10 .33 9 .72 8 .17 28 .32 22 .30
0 Rep, 0 Intd 5 .12 4 .33 14 .79 11 .69 10 .22 8 .78 28 .95 23 .06
a 2 Rep, 3 Int = ‘Two-year repayment grace period and interest charged three years after graduation’
b 0 Rep, 3 Int = ‘No repayment grace period and interest charged three years after graduation’
c 2 Rep, 0 Int = ‘Two-year repayment grace period and interest charged on enrolment’
d 0 Rep, 0 Int = ‘No repayment grace period and interest charged on enrolment’
As expected, under the current SLF scheme (2 Rep, 3 Int with the interest rate 
of 1 per cent), the average repayment hardship of the borrowers is the lowest 
among all schemes. For females and males, we find repayment burdens of 4.2 
and 3.5 per cent, respectively. Ziderman (2003) has similar findings—of 3.5 and 
2.2 per cent, respectively. The findings of most interest from our exercises relate 
to repayment hardships for our unlucky graduates.
We find that for unlucky female and male graduates, the average repayment 
hardship is about 12 and 10 per cent, respectively. Given that Ziderman (2003) 
argues that repayment burdens of about these levels are acceptable in terms of 
loan design when calculated at the average, it follows that the current SLF can 
be considered quite generous. 
When we design a comparison SLF by changing the interest rate from 1 per 
cent to 7 per cent (2 Rep, 3 Int with the interest rate of 7 per cent), the average 
repayment hardship of average graduates increases by roughly 2–3 per cent. 
The average repayment hardship of unlucky graduates, however, increases 
about 6–8 per cent.15
As previously discussed, the implicit subsidy is very high under the current 
SLF scheme, but it can be lowered considerably if we remove all forms of 
subsidisation. The question here is what will happen to the repayment hardship 
of loan recipients? In other words, how much will the repayment hardship 
change when: 1) the interest rate increases from 1 per cent to 7 per cent; 2) 
there is no grace period for loan repayment; and 3) the interest is charged on 
enrolment? Table 10.6 shows that the average repayment hardship under this 
radically modified SLF scheme (0 Rep, 0 Int with the interest rate of 7 per cent) 
is twice as much for all sub-samples, compared with the current SLF scheme. 
15 Again, these findings, based on average incomes, are not very different to those of Ziderman (2003).
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More precisely, the average repayment hardship increases from 4.19 per cent 
and 3.47 per cent, to 10.22 per cent and 8.78 per cent for average female and 
male graduates, respectively. As for unlucky female and male graduates, the 
average repayment hardship increases from 12.44 per cent and 9.72 per cent, 
to 28.95 per cent and 23.06 per cent, respectively. These findings show that for 
unlucky graduates, if the government decides to reduce the subsidy for student 
loans, they might have to pay as much as one-fourth of their income for the loan, 
on average.
We then compare the repayment hardship over the 15-year repayment period of 
the current SLF with the radically modified SLF scheme (0 Rep, 0 Int with the 
interest rate of 7 per cent) for all sub-samples. Figure 10.3 shows that under the 
current SLF scheme, an average female graduate pays somewhat less than 4 per 
cent of her income at the beginning of the repayment period, reaching about 
5 per cent at the end of the repayment period. Similarly, for an average male 
borrower, the proportion of loan repayment to income increases from about 3 
per cent in the first year to about 4 per cent in the final repayment year.
Figure 10.3 Proportion of total payment to total income of average 
graduates: current SLF
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Figure 10.4 Proportion of total payment to total income of unlucky 
graduates: current SLF
Figure 10.4 shows the repayment hardship of unlucky graduates over the 
repayment period. 
Compared with that of average graduates, the ratio of repayment to income 
for unlucky graduates is much higher. More precisely, the proportion of loan 
repayment to income is the lowest at about 8–11 per cent in the first year of 
repayment, rising to about 12 per cent and 16 per cent for females and males, 
respectively, in the final repayment years.
The proposed SLF scheme that charges 7 per cent interest on enrolment and 
requires borrowers to pay immediately after graduation demonstrates a different 
pattern of repayment hardship than that of the current SLF. This is shown in 
Figure 10.5 for borrowers (male/female) earning average incomes.
With the subsidies considerably reduced, the data from Figure 10.5 show that 
an average female borrower repays about 9 per cent of her annual income at 
the start of the repayment period. This proportion increases consistently, to 
reach nearly 14 per cent of annual income in the final year of the repayment 
period. The results are similar for an average male borrower. Nevertheless, the 
repayment hardship of a male borrower is about 1–3 per cent lower than that for 
a female borrower at any given age during the repayment period.
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Figure 10.5 Proportion of total payment to total income of average graduates, 
7 per cent interest rate, and no repayment and interest grace periods
The repayment hardship of unlucky borrowers is shown in Figure 10.6. 
Figure 10.6 Proportion of total payment to total income of unlucky graduates, 
7 per cent interest rate, and no repayment and interest grace periods
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The clearest point from Figure 10.6 is that the proportion of repayment to income 
for unlucky borrowers is substantially greater than that for graduates earning 
average incomes. Specifically, the proportion peaks about 43 per cent and 32 per 
cent for unlucky female and male graduates, respectively, in the final year of the 
repayment period, after being about 20 per cent and 18 per cent, respectively, 
of annual income in the first repayment period.16
The analyses of the implicit subsidy and the repayment hardship suggest 
that if the government modifies the current SLF by increasing the interest 
rate to 7 per cent with no grace periods on repayment and interest, a very 
significant portion of the subsidy is reduced. More precisely, from Table 10.4, 
the implicit subsidy is reduced by more than two-thirds, while borrowers face 
greater difficulties in repaying the loan, especially in the first several years. 
This, then, is the dilemma facing the Thai government with respect to the SLF: 
the implicit interest rate subsidies are so high as to render the scheme close to 
a grant, but removing these subsidies results in what could be seen as highly 
undesirable repayment hardships for the members of some groups. This will 
undoubtedly lead to higher defaults.
Conclusion
We have analysed for Thailand the implicit subsidy of the current SLF and 
the repayment hardships of borrowers. We compare the current SLF with 
alternative SLF schemes, assuming different grace periods on interest charged 
and loan repayments. In addition, we assume a 7 per cent nominal interest 
rate—instead of 1 per cent—for all schemes. This 7 per cent rate is to make 
the real interest rate of the SLF loan equivalent to the discount rate we have 
used in the analysis.
Our analysis shows that the implicit subsidy drastically reduces—by 
approximately 46 percentage points (to less than one-third)—when the 
nominal interest rate is increased from 1 per cent to 7 per cent and there is 
no grace period for both the interest charge and the loan repayment. With no 
changes to grace periods, but using an interest rate of 7 per cent, the implicit 
subsidy declines by about 21 percentage points. In the case that the interest 
rate remains 1 per cent, and if the grace periods on interest charges and loan 
repayments are removed, the implicit subsidy drops by about 20 percentage 
points. These findings are similar to those reported by Ziderman (2003), 
implying a strong consensus in this area of analysis with respect to the SLF.
16 We allow direct comparisons of the repayment hardships between average and unlucky graduates under 
the current SLF and the three proposed SLF schemes in Appendix 10.1. 
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We considered also repayment hardship under the current SLF, and, as with 
Ziderman (2003), we did the calculations using average earnings data. We 
found the repayment hardships of average female and male graduates to be 
about 4 per cent and 3 per cent, respectively. But the story becomes much 
more interesting when we consider repayment burdens for graduates earning 
in the bottom deciles by age and sex. Specifically, for the SLF, repayment 
hardships for unlucky female and male graduates are about 12 per cent and 10 
per cent, respectively. Given that Ziderman argues that burdens of these levels 
are acceptable (if estimated at the mean of the data), and we are considering the 
outcomes for very poor graduates indeed, the SLF is clearly a very generous 
student loan scheme.
Assuming that the interest rate increases to 7 per cent and the grace periods on 
interest charged and loan repayments are eliminated, the average repayment 
hardship of female graduates increases to about 10 per cent, and is about 9 per 
cent for males (Ziderman 2003 makes very similar findings). A critical finding, 
however, is that under the same conditions, the average repayment hardship 
of unlucky female graduates rises to about 29 per cent and for males the figure 
is 23 per cent. But it is important to note that there are differences between age 
groups in estimations of repayment hardships, with the figures reaching 43 
per cent and 32 per cent for females and males respectively in the last year of 
repayment. These burdens should be considered excessive and unacceptable 
in policy terms.
To sum up, the current SLF is very generous in terms of repayment hardship 
for the borrowers. The scheme appears, however, to be unsatisfactory in terms 
of the extent of the implicit subsidies. In other words, the repayment hardship 
of loan recipients is relatively low, while the implicit subsidy is relatively 
high. Nevertheless, if all forms of subsidy are taken away (that is, the nominal 
interest rate increases and there are no grace periods on repayment and 
interest charges) that proportion of graduates earning very low incomes will 
likely experience great difficulties in repaying the loan.
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11. Income-Contingent Student Loans 
for Thailand: Alternatives compared
Bruce Chapman and Kiatanantha Lounkaew  
Crawford School of Economics and Government,  
The Australian National University
Summary
In Thailand there is an ongoing debate concerning the most desirable form of 
higher education financing, with the critical concern being the form such a 
loan scheme should take. Conceptually, there are two generic possibilities: a 
mortgage-type loan, in which repayments are made on a consistent basis over 
a set period; and an income-contingent loan, in which the level and timing of 
repayments depend on a borrower’s future income stream.
From 1996 to 2006, Thailand’s preferred approach to higher education financing 
took the form of a mortgage-type loan known as the Student Loans Fund (SLF). 
The SLF involved targeted funds being allocated for both income support and 
tuition, with a time-limited repayment period of 17 years after graduation. 
Piruna et al. (2008) analysed the SLF with respect to two important dimensions: 
taxpayer-financed interest rate subsidies; and measures of so-called ‘repayment 
hardships’—calculations of the proportion of borrowers’ future incomes that 
would need to be allocated to SLF repayments.
Very similarly to the findings of Adrian Ziderman and others, Piruna et al. (2008) 
conclude that the SLF is associated with very substantial subsidies—perhaps of 
the order of 65 per cent. The source of the subsidy can be traced overwhelmingly 
to the interest rate regime. Consistent with these high subsidies, and in a unique 
contribution, they find also that the SLF has low rates of repayment hardship 
of about 4 per cent on average and only about 10 per cent for graduates whose 
future earnings are very low. In short, the SLF is a very generous scheme for 
students.
In this chapter, we seek to replicate some significant aspects of Piruna et al. 
(2008) with respect to various suggested forms of income-contingent loan 
schemes for Thailand. By definition, this type of loan has ‘repayment hardship’ 
set as a collection parameter—for example, in the Thai Income Contingent 
Allowance and Loan (TICAL) system explained below and in place in Thailand 
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for 2007 only, the highest rate of repayment was set at 12 per cent of a borrower’s 
income, and with the current Australian system the figure is 8 per cent. For 
these schemes, repayment hardships are not an issue.
There can be, however, considerable implicit interest rate subsidies with income-
contingent loan schemes. The major contribution of this chapter lies in the 
illustration of the extent of these subsidies for four different possible income-
contingent loan policies for Thailand. We show that the size of the subsidies 
is of the order of 25–40 per cent for a TICAL-type arrangement calculated for 
graduates with average earnings, and for this group these subsides can be almost 
eliminated with alternative loan schemes with a form of real rate of interest. 
But a more disaggregated, and preferred, approach to computing loan subsidies 
reveals that TICAL-type schemes have subsidies of 30–55 per cent, and even 
improved loan systems with respect to interest rate regimes have the potential 
to result in subsidies of 3–18 per cent, even for low levels of debt.
A major benefit of our approach is that we have used the same data, econometric 
techniques and present-value methods as employed by Piruna et al. (2008), 
providing a consistent basis from which to assess alternative loan schemes. We 
find that in design terms, and with respect to taxpayer subsidies, there seem to 
be viable possibilities for an income-contingent loan scheme for Thailand. But 
this conclusion is more credible for relatively low levels of debt than for the sizes 
of tuition fees that are more likely to be associated with higher-price private 
institutions. In this latter case, the subsidies of even well-designed schemes can 
be as high as 50 per cent. Whether or not Thai institutional and administrative 
arrangements are well suited to the collection of an income-contingent loan is a 
critical policy issue not addressed in what follows.
Introduction
In 2007, for one year only, Thailand introduced an income-contingent loan 
system for higher education, known as the Thai Income Contingent Allowance 
and Loan (TICAL) system. TICAL was based on Australia’s Higher Education 
Contribution Scheme (HECS)—an income-contingent loan system in which 
tuition charges are collected through the income tax system depending on 
a student’s future income. HECS was instituted in 1989, and similar student 
loan policies commenced throughout the 1990s and beyond in, among other 
countries, New Zealand, Chile, South Africa, Ethiopia, Hungary and the 
United Kingdom. Other countries—notably, Colombia and Israel—are involved 
currently in research-based debate on the usefulness of income-contingent loan 
approaches to higher education financing.
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This chapter examines the conceptual bases of alternative student loan systems, 
and it is argued that income-contingent approaches are generally seen as 
desirable arrangements compared with alternatives. Such an assessment is, 
however, associated with two extremely important qualifications: one is that the 
administrative institutions of a country are such as to allow efficacious collection 
of a former student’s debt; and two, that an income-contingent scheme needs to 
be properly designed with respect to some key parameters. 
We are unable to ascertain with complete certainty if potential Thai 
collection arrangements are such as to enable efficient and fair collection of 
an income-contingent loan, and we leave the answer to that critical question 
to administrative, tax and/or social security specialists.1 Our aim is instead 
to throw significant light on the second concern—the importance of design 
parameters with respect to the likely outcomes of such a system—with our focus 
on the critical issue of implicit taxpayer interest rate subsidies. Internationally, 
this is now perhaps the most important non-administrative design issue for an 
assessment of the efficacy of income-contingent loan schemes.
Interest rate subsidies, along with loan repayment hardships, have been explored 
by Piruna et al. (2008), who are concerned with analysis of the previous Thai 
student loan scheme, the Student Loans Fund (SLF). Piruna et al.’s (2008) and 
our analyses use exactly the same data set and empirical methods, so we can 
compare and contrast confidently the effects of disparate past and prospective 
Thai student loan arrangements.
While interest rate subsidies are a major aspect of our chapter, it is useful to 
make a comment on the other major component of Piruna et al.’s (2008) analysis: 
so-called repayment hardships associated with the SLF. The results of their 
research are summarised below, and it is important to recognise that one of the 
principal benefits of an income-contingent loan system is that, unless the loan 
is designed poorly, it is not possible to incur important repayment hardships, as 
measured by the proportion of a graduate’s income that needs to be allocated to 
the repayment of a student loan. That is, because such a loan is repaid up to a 
maximum percentage of income, there will not be repayment hardships. In the 
Australian system, this maximum is 8 per cent, and for TICAL it is 12 per cent; 
for mortgage-type loans, these figures could be very different.
There are, however, important reasons to explore the findings of Piruna et al. 
(2008) with respect to implicit interest subsidies for the SLF, and, in this chapter, 
various forms of income-contingent loans for Thailand. As implied above, all the 
1 The analysis below of requirements suggests the importance of being able to collect the debt on the basis 
of observed lifetime incomes, and this might imply for Thailand the use of the social security system instead 
of the income tax system. With the former, there are already income-contingent collections of funds for 
pensions.
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authors collaborated closely in the two exercises in order to be in a position to 
make similarly based assessments of the effects of the different schemes in terms 
of subsidies.
Piruna et al.’s (2008) results can be compared with our findings for two different 
interpretations of how TICAL might have worked in practice had it not been 
discontinued, as well as with an alternative proposed income-contingent loan 
scheme for Thailand. Two versions of the latter are explained and explored, 
with these variants having been motivated by our curiosity with respect to the 
possible role played by different forms of the requirement that former students 
cover, at least in part, the opportunity cost to the government of borrowing to 
finance the income-contingent loan. As with Piruna et al. (2008), we use not 
only average predicted lifetime graduate incomes for our empirical exercises, 
but also low, median and high estimates of incomes, and for both sexes.
Our estimates and calculations illustrate the empirical significance of different 
levels of income thresholds for repayment, and for disparate approaches to the 
imposition of real rates of interest for a wide spectrum of graduate incomes, 
and take into account the possible roles of graduate unemployment rates and 
potential loan losses associated with collection inefficiencies. The findings 
suggest that in design terms an income-contingent loan scheme is a viable 
option for Thailand, but this conclusion seems to be more credible for relatively 
low levels of debt than for the sizes of tuition fees that are more likely to be 
associated with higher-price private institutions.
Traditional Student and Income-Contingent 
Loan Schemes: Conceptual issues
The Need for Government Intervention in Higher 
Education Financing
A significant financing issue for higher education is that there is generally seen 
to be a case for both a contribution from students and a taxpayer subsidy (Barr 
2001; Chapman 2006). An important question is: is there a role for government 
beyond the provision of the subsidy? 
An understanding of the issue is facilitated through consideration of what 
would happen if there was no higher education financing assistance involving 
the public sector. That is, a government, convinced that there should be a 
subsidy, could simply provide the appropriate level of taxpayer support to 
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higher education institutions, and then leave market mechanisms to take their 
course. Presumably, this would result in institutions charging students up-front 
on enrolment for the service. 
There are, however, major problems with this arrangement, traceable in most 
instances to the potent presence of risk and uncertainty. This critical point was 
first raised by Friedman (1955). The argument can be best understood with 
reference to the nexus between labour markets and human-capital investments. 
The essential point is that educational investments are risky, with the main areas 
of uncertainty as follows.2
Enrolling students do not know fully their capacities for (and perhaps even 
true interest in) the higher education discipline of their choice. This means, in 
an extreme, they cannot be sure that they will graduate, with, in Australia, for 
example, about 25 per cent of students ending up without a qualification.
Even given that university completion is expected, students will not be aware 
of their likely relative success in the area of study. This will depend not just on 
their own abilities, but also on the skills of others competing for jobs in the area.
There is uncertainty concerning the future value of the investment. For example, 
the labour market—including the labour market for graduates in specific skill 
areas—is undergoing constant change. What looked like a good investment at 
the time it began might turn out to be a poor choice when the process is finished.
Many prospective students, particularly those from disadvantaged backgrounds, 
might not have much information concerning graduate incomes, due in part to 
a lack of contact with graduates.
These uncertainties are associated with important risks for both borrowers and 
lenders. The important point is that if the future incomes of students turn out to 
be lower than expected, the individual is unable to sell part of the investment to 
refinance a different educational path, for example. For a prospective lender—a 
bank—the risk is compounded by the reality that in the event of a student 
borrower defaulting on the loan obligation, there is no available collateral to 
be sold—a fact traceable in part to the illegality of slavery. And even if it was 
possible for a third party to own and sell human capital, its future value might 
turn out to be quite low, taking into account the above-noted uncertainties 
associated with higher education investments.
It follows that, left to itself—and even with subsidies from the government 
to cover the value of externalities—the market will not deliver propitious 
higher education outcomes. Prospective students judged to be relatively risky, 
2 As discussed by Barr (2001), Chapman (2006) and Palacios (2004).
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and/or those without loan-repayment guarantors, will not be able to access 
the financial resources required for both the payment of tuition and to cover 
income support. There would be efficiency losses (talented but poor prospective 
students would be excluded) and distributional inequities (the non-attainment 
of equality of educational opportunity). Government intervention of some form 
is thus required.
The governments of most countries apparently understand the capital-market 
failure with respect to higher education financing, given that public-sector 
loan interventions are commonplace internationally. Until recently, government 
intervention often took the form of public-sector guarantees for commercial 
bank provision of education loans, but over the past decade or so this has 
increasingly involved income-contingent loans. While quite different in practice, 
both approaches are motivated in part by the recognition that, left alone, higher 
education markets will function poorly. 
The Costs and Benefits of Mortgage-Type Loans
A possible solution to the capital-market problem described above used in many 
countries is the provision of student loans—either directly by the government 
or indirectly through guarantees of repayments to banks by the government 
in the event of default. Typically, and most simply, these loans involve fixed 
repayments, as, for example, with a house mortgage. While this seems to address 
the capital-market failure, it raises other problems.
Students face an important default issue. This is that some might be reluctant 
to borrow for fear of not being able to meet future repayment obligations. Not 
being able to meet repayment obligations has the potential to inflict significant 
damage to a person’s credit reputation (and thus access to future borrowing—
for example, for the purchase of a house). These concerns imply that there will 
be less borrowing than there would be in the absence of this default concern.
A reluctance to borrow due to the uncertainty of repayment constitutes what 
might be labelled an ex ante default problem for prospective students. There 
is also an ex post problem, which is that a proportion of those students who 
took the credit risk of borrowing for a human-capital investment will end up 
not being able to repay because of low incomes. In these circumstances, default 
imposes a potentially large cost on those unlucky borrowers who do poorly in 
the labour market. Significantly, research suggests that members of the default 
group are predominantly those who ultimately experienced relatively high 
unemployment rates and relatively low earnings.3
3 Dynarski (1994) used the National Post-Secondary Student Aid Study and found strong evidence that 
experiencing low earnings after leaving formal education is a strong determinant of default. Importantly, 
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The prospect and consequences of a student defaulting on a loan obligation are 
potentially critical issues for borrowing to finance human-capital investments, 
due to the uncertainties noted above. A consequence is that some eligible 
prospective students will not be prepared to take bank loans. This problem can 
be traced, in part, to the fact that bank-loan repayments are insensitive to the 
borrower’s financial circumstances. 
A final possible practical problem of government-guaranteed bank loans relates 
to the fact that in many countries loans of this type are not universally available, 
or available loan levels are limited.4 This is because loan provision and/or amounts 
available are usually means tested on the basis of family income. This raises 
the important issue explained by Carneiro and Heckman (2002) concerning the 
role of the sharing of financial resources within families. Some students will be 
unable to access necessary levels of borrowing and will face the same credit-
market failure as they would in the absence of a government guarantee of a bank 
loan. Making loans available on a means-tested basis (as is the case in the United 
States and Canada) suggests that some prospective students will have difficulties 
accessing the system. 
The bottom line is that, even though government-assisted conventional loans 
are a common form internationally of public-sector involvement in higher 
education financing, such an approach has several apparently very significant 
weaknesses.
The Costs and Benefits of Income-Contingent Loans
A different approach to student financing involves income-contingent loans, 
such as Australia’s HECS. The attraction of these schemes is that they can be 
designed to avoid many of the problems associated with alternative financing 
policies.
First, there is no concern with intra-family sharing so long as the scheme is 
universal. That is, no students would be denied access through the imposition of 
means-testing arrangements that could exclude some whose parents or partners 
are unwilling to help.
Second, given an efficient collection mechanism, there is no default issue as such 
for the government. That is, if the tax system works well and is used to collect 
the debt (at least for Australia, this is essential because the Australian Taxation 
Office is the only institution with reasonably good information on a former 
student’s income), it is extremely difficult for the majority of graduates to avoid 
borrowers from low-income households and minorities were more likely to default, as were those who did not 
complete their studies.
4 Eligibility for Canadian student loans is limited to less than half of all students (Finnie and Swartz 1996).
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repayment. There is a form of a default issue in that some students will not pay 
back in full, because income-contingent systems are designed to excuse some 
former students’ payments because their lifetime incomes are too low. Harding 
(1995) calculates that the total repayments remaining uncollected because of 
the nature of HECS would be of the order of 20 per cent for the original scheme 
(when the repayment conditions were particularly generous for the student). 
Other reasons loans might not be repaid include death and emigration.
Third, because repayments depend on income, there should be no concerns by 
students with respect to incapacity to repay the debt, or hardships associated 
with repayments. That is, once an individual’s income determines repayment, 
and so long as the repayment parameters are sufficiently generous, it is not 
possible to default for hardship because of a lack of capacity to pay. This is 
the critical practical advantage of income-contingent collection schemes: unlike 
any other form of assistance, there is insurance against default and repayment 
difficulties.
Income-contingent schemes have significant advantages over alternative 
financing arrangements, in that they can be designed to avoid the major 
problems of their alternatives. This does not make such approaches a panacea 
generally, however; for an income-contingent scheme to be made operational, it 
is essential that there is an efficient administrative collection mechanism. 
The matter of collection is of great importance for the introduction of income-
contingent loans in countries without the necessary institutional apparatus. 
Chapman (2006) argues that the minimum conditions for a successful income-
contingent loan seem to be
1. accurate record keeping of the accruing liabilities of students 
2. an effective collection mechanism with a sound and, if possible, computerised 
record-keeping system
3. an efficient way of determining with accuracy, over time, the actual incomes 
of former students.
While most Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
countries will have income tax or social security systems that enable efficient 
collection of income-contingent debts, it is very unlikely that developing 
countries have the capacity to meet requirement (3) above. This issue requires 
critical attention in the Thai policy context.
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The Student Loans Fund, TICAL and the Need 
for Alternatives
The Recent History of Student Loans in Thailand
A loan scheme for Thailand’s higher education students, the SLF was introduced 
in 1996, and has been analysed extensively by Piruna et al. (2008) and Ziderman 
(2003). The main features of the loan scheme are documented in Piruna et al. 
(2008), with the most important design issues for our purposes being as follows.
The SLF is in essence a traditional student loan scheme, with a fixed repayment 
period of 15 years after a grace period of two years, but with the novel feature 
that the proportion of the total debt-repayment obligation increases with time, 
starting at 1.5 per cent in the first year and reaching 13 per cent of the total 
debt in the final year. This aspect of the SLF can be seen as a part-concession to 
the benefits of income-contingent loans, since the repayment obligations will 
be correlated with increases in average earnings with age, as is clear from the 
analysis presented in this chapter. What these arrangements mean for repayment 
hardship is summarised below. 
An important feature of the SLF relates to the nature of the interest rate subsidies. 
As pointed out in Piruna et al. (2008) and Ziderman (2003), these arise principally 
from: the zero nominal interest rate in the period before repayment begins; and 
the fact that the nominal interest rate of 1 per cent per annum, when imposed, 
is significantly below the true cost of borrowing for the government of perhaps 
2–3 per cent in real terms per annum. The importance of these arrangements 
in an understanding of the overall interest rate subsidies is summarised below.
In 2007, the SLF was suspended and was replaced with the (short-lived) TICAL. 
The main design features of TICAL, and its financial implications, are explained 
and examined in detail below. In 2008, TICAL was replaced with what is 
essentially a new form of the SLF, but with the same fixed repayment period 
of 17 years. This new scheme has not been analysed by Piruna et al. (2008) and 
it will not be explored here, but it is very likely that the new loan system’s 
implications for both repayment hardship and interest rate subsidies are very 
similar to those of the SLF.
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The Effects of the SLF in Summary: Repayment 
hardship and interest rate subsidies
Piruna et al. (2008) analysed two critical aspects of the former Thai SLF: 
repayment hardships and interest rate subsidies. The former is defined as the 
proportion of a graduate’s income that is used to repay the loan, and is calculated 
both for graduates earning average incomes in the periods of repayment and so-
called ‘unlucky graduates’ who earn in the bottom 10 per cent of the graduate 
income distribution by age and sex. 
For the same sample of graduates used in this chapter, and using the same 
methods to project graduate incomes by age and sex, Piruna et al. (2008) find 
that the measures of repayment hardship on average are about 4 and 3.5 per cent 
for females and males, respectively. For the ‘unlucky graduates’, the results are 
about 12.4 and 9.7 per cent for females and males, respectively. It is reasonable 
to describe these outcomes as fairly low—certainly compared with the situation 
in other countries with similarly motivated and designed student loan schemes.5
Related to the above finding is that the SLF delivers very considerable interest 
rate subsidies, of the order of 67 per cent overall—a finding very similar to 
that found also for the SLF by Ziderman (2003). These very high subsidies are 
explained by a combination of policy parameters, but by far the most important 
empirically can be traced to the fact that SLF debt is adjusted annually by a 
nominal rate of interest of only 1 per cent—implying a real rate of interest of 
about –3 per cent per annum. Interest rate subsidies are a very important aspect 
of the Thai student loan debate, and they are now considered further with 
respect to the design of alternative possible income-contingent loan schemes 
for the country.
TICAL and an Alternative Form of an Income-
Contingent Loan Described
TICAL was motivated by the perceived benefits of income-contingent loans 
considered in section two, although it is reasonable to suggest that there are 
some controversial design aspects of the scheme. There are several important 
and arguably contentious design issues associated with the scheme that are 
addressed in our empirical exercises.
The first relates to the first income threshold of repayment, set at B192 000 
per annum, which seems to be very high given the age–earnings profiles of 
5 Recent calculations by Bruce Chapman and Colombian education officials illustrate that for the ICETEX 
loan scheme in that country, the repayment hardship results for unlucky graduates are of the order of 35–45 
per cent.
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graduates presented below.6 This matters particularly if the debt has no real 
rate of interest, since it is necessarily the case that the longer it takes to repay 
a government loan that does not have a real rate of interest, the greater is the 
size of the associated subsidy from taxpayers. A major goal in what follows is to 
illustrate the empirical significance of this feature of TICAL.
Because the first income threshold of repayment of TICAL seems to be very 
high, we suggest a different income-contingent loan model for Thailand for 
illustrative purposes, and we label this ‘ILLUSTRATIVE’. It has two repayment 
features different to TICAL: 1) the first income threshold of repayment is very 
much lower, at B100 000 per annum; and 2) the rates of repayment we have 
chosen are much closer to those of HECS, meaning that they are considerably 
lower than is the case for TICAL, particularly at high levels of income. Table 
11.1 presents the repayment thresholds and rates of income for the two broad 
schemes.
Table 11.1 Repayment thresholds and collection parameters (percentage 
of taxable income)7 of different income-contingent loan schemes for 
Thailand
TICAL ILLUSTRATIVE
Annual income (baht) Collection parameters Annual income (baht)
Collection 
parameters
Less than 192 000 0 .00 Less than 100 000 0 .00
192 000–360 000 0 .05 100 000–110 000 0 .03
360 001–840 000 0 .08 110 001–120 000 0 .04
Higher than 840 000 0 .12 120 001–130 000 0 .05
Higher than 130 000 0 .06
A second design issue concerns the indexation arrangements with respect to 
the income thresholds of repayments, and this is a critical point in trying to 
understand what the effects of TICAL might have been. The concern is that it is 
not clear if the income threshold for repayment of the loan was to be indexed, 
and to what, as is the case for all relevant parameters of Australia’s HECS, for 
example. To address this, we raise two possibilities.
The first possibility is that the income thresholds are eventually indexed to 
average nominal wage increases, but we are unsure what this means in a Thai 
context in which regular indexing is typically not part of the economic policy 
6 For example, from the data presented in this chapter, it would seem to take an average female graduate 
about 12 years before any TICAL repayments are made.
7 This form of collection is the same as that used in the Australian loan scheme, HECS, in which once a 
given threshold of income is reached, a given proportion of total income is owed. While this seems to imply 
an extremely high effective marginal tax rate at the first income threshold, work by Chapman and Leigh (2006) 
suggests this has only small behavioural effects.
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fabric. To illustrate the significance of this possibility, however, it is necessary 
that an indexation arrangement of some form is imposed and the one we have 
chosen is full (assumed to be 5 per cent per annum) wage indexation being 
imposed 10 years after the initiation of the policy, and continuing annually 
after that. This scenario of eventual indexation of the repayment thresholds is 
referred to as ‘TICAL1’.
The second possibility is that the TICAL thresholds are not to be indexed, meaning 
that over time as nominal wages increase the threshold becomes effectively lower 
and graduates would increasingly be repaying their debts earlier; in the event 
of real interest rate subsidies, this would mean lower taxpayer subsidies over 
time. This unindexed scenario is referred to as ‘TICAL2’.
A third, related and controversial aspect of TICAL is that there is no real rate of 
interest on the debt, with an adjustment being made annually to a student’s or 
graduate’s debt for changes in the consumer price index (CPI) only. This aspect 
of the scheme looks to be identical to Australia’s HECS arrangement, but there is 
a critical difference. This is that for HECS there is a 20 per cent discount for an 
up-front payment of the tuition obligation, which in effect means that students 
choosing to take the debt are subject to a 25 per cent surcharge8 (meaning that 
effectively there is a blunt form of real interest rate for HECS). The motivation 
for analysing in depth the conceptual issues associated with interest rate 
regimes, and for providing an empirical approach to explore this further, is now 
considered.
Understanding the Role of the Form of Real Interest 
Rates
The issue of interest rate subsidies in student loan schemes is extremely 
important. Moreover, there are major differences between countries even with 
apparently similar approaches to income-contingent loan policies. As examples: 
given the write-off of the interest rate of loans in nominal terms in New Zealand, 
the effective interest rate for that country is negative in real terms; for both the 
United Kingdom and TICAL, the real rate of interest is zero; and for HECS, there 
is a surcharge on the debt once it is incurred, but the ongoing adjustment of the 
debt is equal only to the rate of price inflation. 
There are important disagreements between researchers on the appropriate level 
and form of a rate of interest on the debt associated with income-contingent 
loans. Barr (2007) makes a compelling case that the Australian form, which 
uses a surcharge, introduces distortions in both efficiency and equity terms, 
8 This can be explained as follows. If there is a charge of $1000, a student may avoid the debt by paying 
$800; this means that students paying later take on an additional 25 per cent—that is, $200/800.
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although on average it still means that there is some attempt to require students 
to contribute to the government’s opportunity costs of borrowing. Chapman 
(2006) argues that the issue is quite complex in the case of an income-contingent 
loan, since such schemes are designed to offer insurance against the costs of poor 
future outcomes; and, in the case of a former student experiencing low future 
incomes, they might find themselves in an ex post situation of accumulating 
high real debts due simply to unpredictable poor luck.
Three broad points can be highlighted.
1. There is a strong case for an income-contingent loan scheme to require 
borrowers to contribute to diminishing the costs of borrowing for the loan 
for the government (which must mean that the UK scheme and TICAL, and 
now the New Zealand system, have important design weaknesses).
2. In the circumstances in which loans are offered in part for income support 
(as they are in New Zealand, but not in Australia), the case for having an 
ongoing real rate of interest such as suggested by Barr is strong, since 
otherwise some borrowers will be able to use their loans to make profits in 
the commercial money market—at taxpayers’ expense.
3. There might be a case for a surcharge instead of an ongoing real rate of 
interest for tuition charges if borrowers are averse to having rapidly 
increasing debts in times of ongoing low incomes—a possibility that seems 
to be recognised through most loan schemes having a so-called ‘forgiveness’ 
clause, after which all the outstanding loan is written off.
We are unable to determine with confidence what the correct form of a real rate 
of interest should be for income-contingent tuition charges in the Thai context, 
so in what follows we have designed two alternative forms of the suggested 
TICAL1 and TICAL2, and this is known as ILLUSTRATIVE. The first form is 
called ‘ILLUSTRATIVE1’, and this variant imposes the same rule as HECS by 
adding a surcharge of 25 per cent to the debt, after which the real rate of interest 
is zero (that is, with an ongoing CPI adjustment only). 
The second is called ‘ILLUSTRATIVE2’, which has a conventional real rate of 
interest imposed on the debt of 3 per cent real per annum, with adjustments 
beginning immediately after the debt is incurred.9 It is a significant goal of our 
research to determine the extent to which these different approaches matter 
with respect to the extent of taxpayer subsidies, and whether the size of the debt 
matters to an assessment of the relative appeal of these different approaches. This 
last point might become very important if the income-contingent loan system 
is allowed to move to the private sector where tuition charges are much higher.
9 Very roughly, this is about the long-term government bond rate, at least for Australia.
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The Data and Earnings Function Results 
Motivation
We are interested in estimating earnings functions in order to provide structure 
and understanding of the lifetime earnings streams of male and female graduates, 
on average. This will assist in an overall understanding of the Thai graduate 
labour market, allowing insight into increments to wages from additional 
education, and the internal rate of return to investing in a university education. 
In this sense, our single cross-section provides restricted but complementary 
information for the exercises reported in Lathapipat (2008).
More significantly, for the policy aspect of our exercise, the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) results will allow us to determine the extent of interest rate 
subsidies on average from our four different variants of income-contingent 
loans for Thailand. This is done by using predicted smoothed average earnings 
to ascertain the timing and structure of loan repayments under different debt 
obligation parameters.
It is also interesting and important for subsidy calculations to examine the extent 
to which interest rate subsidies vary between debtor groups with quite different 
ex post income levels. This is approached in a separate exercise explained and 
reported below by truncating the earnings data—our preferred method to the 
use of quantile regressions, for reasons to be explained. Our method reveals 
that the use of OLS to determine interest rate subsidies from different forms of 
income-contingent loans has the potential to overstate aggregate loan repayments 
and thus to understate loan subsidies. The differences are not trivial, and this 
matters for the policy debate.
The Data
We use cross-sectional individual survey data from the Labour Force Survey 
(LFS), collected in the third quarter of 2006. The LFS is administered by 
the National Statistical Office, and it contains information on individuals’ 
characteristics such as age, marital status, household size, educational 
attainment, and geographical location, as well as job-related information such 
as employment status, occupation, earnings, and hours of work. The LFS covers 
every province in Thailand and has a total sample size of more than 200 000; 
thus, it is the most comprehensive data set for the labour market available in 
Thailand to be used for analysing returns to education at the aggregate level. 
Summary statistics are presented in Table 11.2. 
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Our analysis is restricted to individuals aged from fifteen to sixty.10 We have 
omitted: a very small number of individuals whose earnings are significantly 
different from the population at large; the self-employed; part-time workers;11 
and those who work in the agricultural sector.
The major points are as follows. There are 19 856 males and 17 491 females 
in the sample. Earnings per hour are calculated as weekly earnings received 
from the main job divided by total hours worked in the main job per week, 
and gross hourly wages in 2006 for males and females are B52.47 and B54.68, 
respectively, and we have adjusted these to derive average annual earnings for 
men and women, of B106 769 and B108 385, respectively.
Binary variables (0, 1) are used to represent the highest educational qualification 
of each individual in the sample, and in the econometric work we use individuals 
who did not complete primary school as the reference point for comparisons. 
About 18 per cent and 13 per cent of males and females, respectively, have the 
highest qualification recorded as being primary-school level or lower, and about 
32 per cent of males and 29 per cent of females have attained lower secondary 
or upper secondary education. The receipt of an undergraduate qualification 
differs markedly between males and females, with the proportions being 17 per 
cent for males and 33 per cent for females.12 Average hours of work a week are 
45.7 for men and 44.9 for women. 
One drawback of the LFS is that respondents are not asked how long an individual 
has been employed in paid work—an important variable in the estimation of 
the earnings functions. To deal with this issue, we have constructed the usual 
proxy, known as ‘potential experience’, which is the difference between age 
and the sum of total years of schooling and the minimum age required to begin 
school. Based on this calculation, average potential experience is 19.4 years for 
males and 17.3 years for females.
10 Sixty is the official retirement age in Thailand.
11 A part-time worker is defined as a person who works less than 20 hours a week.
12 These sex differences in university participation are commonly found in Thailand. It is an area of future 
research by one of the authors of this chapter.
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Table 11.2 Variable definitions and summary statistics
Variable Definition
Male Female





Earnings per hour Gross hourly wages from 
main job in 2006 (baht) 52 .47 42 .67 54 .68 45 .83
Annual earnings Gross annual earnings in 





Dummy = 1 if did not 
complete school 0 .178 0 .383 0 .154 0 .361
Primary school Dummy = 1 if highest 
qualification is primary 0 .184 0 .387 0 .133 0 .339
Lower secondary Dummy = 1 if highest 
qualification is lower 
secondary
0 .178 0 .383 0 .123 0 .329
Upper secondary Dummy = 1 if highest 
qualification is upper 
secondary
0 .148 0 .355 0 .148 0 .355
Diploma Dummy = 1 if highest 
qualification is diploma 0 .082 0 .275 0 .080 0 .271
Undergraduate Dummy = 1 if 
highest qualification is 
undergraduate
0 .172 0 .376 0 .337 0 .473
Postgraduate Dummy = 1 if 
highest qualification is 
postgraduate
0 .020 0 .140 0 .025 0 .025
Other 
variables
Hours per week Hours of work per week 
in main job 45 .72 8 .10 44 .87 7 .86
Potential 
experience
(Maximum) time in paid 
work in years 19 .38 10 .89 17 .32 10 .14
Number of 
observations 19 856 17 491
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OLS Earnings Functions
The standard earnings equation is used in this study and is of the following 
form:
ln iw = +
'
i iX â å  
in which i = 1, 2, 3, …, n represent individuals, wi is the gross hourly earnings 
of individual i, and 'iX  is a vector of characteristics that determine earnings.
We employ three variations of the model: the first uses years of schooling as a 
proxy for educational attainment; the second variant uses the education dummies 
described earlier; and the third extends the second model to include interaction 
terms between education dummies and potential experience. The last of these 
is essentially a relaxation of the restriction imposed in the second model, which 
constrains returns to experience to be identical between education levels. The 
estimations for these models are carried out separately for males and females.
Based on the years-of-schooling coefficient model, on average, the earnings 
increases for one additional year of education are about 11.2 per cent for males 
and 12.9 per cent for females. Our estimates are reasonably close to the results 
from previous studies. The results from this study and selected previous studies 
are now shown in Table 11.3 (see Appendix 11.1 for the regression result).
Table 11.3 Selected comparisons of returns-to-schooling estimates for 
Thailand
Author Year of data Method































Source: Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2002) and authors’ (2008) estimate.
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Results from the dummies-and-interaction terms are reported in Appendix 
11.1. The findings from this model are consistent with economic theory—that 
is, earnings increase with education and experience, with the rate of increase 
with experience falling over time. The earnings–experience slopes are relatively 
steep for graduates, although not by much; this is as expected—a prediction 
that follows from the general view that university graduates are more likely to 
be in higher-training jobs with concomitant steeper earnings–experience slopes. 
The percentage differences in earnings associated with educational qualifications 
are shown in Table 11.4. The reference group is made up of individuals who did 
not complete school.
The data from Table 11.4 show that, on average, without any prior market 
experience, a male primary-school graduate earns 15 per cent higher than a male 
without any formal qualifications, and this commensurate figure for females is 
14 per cent. A male and female with lower secondary education experience 
higher earnings by 25 per cent and 22 per cent, respectively. Upper secondary 
qualification increases earnings by 32 per cent for males and 35 per cent for 
females. Average male and female diploma-holders earn 58 per cent and 55 
per cent, respectively, more than the ‘incomplete school’ individual, with the 
earnings advantage for university graduates 78 per cent for males and 86 per 
cent for females. These earnings advantages for postgraduate males and females 
are 102 per cent and 110 per cent, respectively.
Table 11.4 Percentage differences in earnings
Educational attainment Male Female
Primary 15 14
Lower secondary 25 22




Age–Earnings Profiles and Internal Rates of Return
We use the estimation results in Appendix 11.1 to construct age–earnings 
profiles.13 These profiles are used to derive the earnings path for males and 
females with upper secondary qualifications and undergraduate qualifications.14 
13 The predicted value of earnings has been adjusted by the formula; 
2
2 ölnö exp .exp
y
y
s⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠=  . See Wooldridge 
(2006) for details.
14 Observations with age greater than fifty-five years were dropped due the presence of several large 
outliers. 
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The profiles for average males and females are shown in Figures 11.1 and 11.2, 
respectively. These profiles assume that the full working life of an average upper 
secondary high-school graduate is 42 years—from age eighteen to sixty. For 
those who decide to undertake undergraduate study for four years, the full 
working life is reduced to 38 years—from age twenty-two to sixty. As well, 
we adjusted the age–earnings profiles by 1.5 per cent to capture productivity 
growth, with the choice of this adjustment factor based on the average real wage 
growth in Thailand for 2003–06.
Figure 11.1 Average male age–earnings profiles: Thailand, 2006
Figure 11.2 Average female age–earnings profiles: Thailand, 2006
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As can be seen from the figures, earnings increase at a decreasing rate with age 
(experience) for both upper secondary graduates and university graduates. The 
age–earning profiles for both male and female university graduates are (slightly) 
steeper than they are for secondary school graduates. It is of comfort to note that 
these relationships are familiar with respect to the findings for a large number of 
countries at different points of time. 
We can use these results to calculate the so-called internal rate of return (IRR) to 
investment in university education—a measure of the value in earnings terms of 
process. Formally, the IRR is defined as the discount rate that equates the present 
value of additional benefits from the investment to the present value of the cost 
of obtaining the additional education. The benefits are additional earnings from 
higher education, and the costs are tuition fees plus the opportunity cost of not 
working in paid employment after the completion of upper secondary school. It 
should be noted that the result from the IRR estimate is contingent upon both 
the cost of investment and the earnings streams. 
In our estimates, we assume that university graduates undertake study on a full-
time basis for four years and receive zero income at that time. The calculations 
have been carried out for a diversity of tuition fees—from B36 000 to B350 
000 per program—which reflects very broadly the current range of Thai higher 
education annual tuition charges for different institutions. Table 11.5 shows the 
results with the IRR, and these range from 8 to 12.8 per cent per annum for 
males, and 4.5 to 7.9 per cent per annum for females—estimates that are roughly 
in line with international experience (see Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2002). 
This familiarity should leave us with some confidence that the data and the 
methods employed are useful for describing the Thai graduate experience.
Table 11.5 IRR estimates (per cent per annum)
Tuition prices by type of 
institution*
Total tuition fee 
(baht)* Male Female
Public university
Low price 36 000 12 .79 7 .93
High price 144 000 10 .41 7 .13
Private university
Low price 192 000 9 .23 5 .55
High price 350 000 8 .04 4 .48
* average estimates from various universities
To this point the analysis has been based on average age–earnings profiles 
derived from OLS estimations. In order to better capture the heterogeneity 
of outcomes across different age–earnings groups, a truncated approach to 
estimation has been employed and this is now explained and the results are 
shown. A main reason that this more disaggregated approach is likely to be of 
considerable importance for the policy debate is that income-contingent loan 
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schemes typically have a first income threshold of repayment; this can mean that 
a small proportion of the graduate population does not repay (even the nominal 
debt) in full and this could have marked effects on estimations of interest rate 
subsidies that will not show up with the use of OLS.
Deriving Truncated Age–Earnings Profiles 
While it is of considerable interest to understand the earnings relationships 
at the mean of the data—which is what is happening with the use of OLS—a 
fuller understanding of the implications of different income-contingent loan 
schemes requires a more disaggregated method. We have approached this by 
doing the analysis separately for three parts of the lifetime graduate earnings 
distributions, and have thus divided the earnings data into three groups by year 
of age and sex: the bottom third, the middle, and the top third of earnings.15
There is an important reason for considering the earnings and loan experiences 
for different parts of the earnings distribution, which is that for TICAL1, 
TICAL2 and ILLUSTRATIVE1 (but not ILLUSTRATIVE2)16 there will be 
different subsidies depending on the lifetime earnings streams of hypothetical 
graduates; it is of interest to determine how big these are, and how much they 
differ between those earning low, medium and high lifetime incomes. 
The truncation exercise provides an indication of the distributional effects of 
policy regimes and, related to this, the possible future contributions of taxpayers 
given marked movements in graduate income distributions. More significantly, 
and as noted above, when loan schemes have the potential to have less than full 
collection from some parts of the graduate earnings distribution, this needs to 
be explicitly modelled in order that we estimate implicit interest rate subsidies 
properly.
There is, however, a major limitation of this approach. It is the implicit 
assumption that graduates remain in the low, middle or top third of the earnings 
distribution throughout their lives, and this is clearly not going to be the case. 
15 An alternative but similar way to have addressed this issue would be through the use of quantile 
regression techniques, which effectively divide the distributions into earnings categories. This approach, 
however, assigns weights to all the data points in the sample, with the weights being lower the further the 
data point is from the group under consideration. Because of this weighting procedure, we are unconvinced 
that such an approach usefully helps us understand the impact on subsidies of graduates in different thirds 
of the earnings distribution. Our approach using truncations implicitly assigns a weight in the regression of 
zero to all data points outside the group.
16 This is because ILLUSTRATIVE2 imposes the same real rate of interest on the borrowings as the real 
discount rate, and this must mean that there are no subsidies involved for any income groups, so long as all 
members of the group eventually pay off their debts in full.
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Even so, the approach employed allows us to determine upper boundaries of 
implicit interest rate subsidies (for the lowest third of earnings) and lower 
boundaries of implicit interest rate subsidies (for the highest third of earnings). 
The estimated parameters from the truncated OLS estimations are shown in 
Appendix 11.1 and these have been used to construct age–earnings profiles for 
the three different graduate earnings groupings.17 These are shown for males 
and females in Figures 11.3 and 11.4, respectively.
The results illustrated in the figures show quite different earnings outcomes for 
graduates by age and sex. For both sexes, it is apparently the case that those 
in the highest third of the earnings distribution start out with earnings that 
are about 2.5 times higher than is the case for those in the bottom third of the 
distribution, and that this advantage increases considerably as age increases; at 
age fifty, for example, the earnings advantage of the top third compared with 
the bottom third has grown to about five times for females and to about 3.5 
times for males. The size of these differences suggests strongly that estimated 
variations in implicit interest rate subsidies as a result of the parameters of the 
income-contingent loan schemes are likely to be very important.
Figure 11.3 Male graduate age–earnings profiles for low, median and high 
earnings groups
17 The profiles are adjusted for productivity change by the same method used for adjusting the OLS 
predictions.
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Figure 11.4 Female graduate age–earnings profiles for low, median and 
high earnings groups
Loan Repayments and Interest Subsidies for 
Four Income-Contingent Loan Schemes
The Implicit Subsidy Calculation: Concepts and 
assumptions
From a financial point of view, the efficiency and sustainability of loan programs 
depend significantly upon the level of loan recoverability. In turn, this is linked 
to the repayment conditions—the most important being: 1) the level and form of 
the real rate of interest on the debt; 2) the first income threshold of repayment; 
and 3) the rates of repayment as a proportion of income. 
The difference between the present value of the sum of the repayment stream 
and the present value of the tuition fee paid through the loan scheme is called 
an ‘implicit subsidy’, and it is likely to be an unintended consequence as a 
result of the design of the financing scheme. The word ‘implicit’ is used to 
distinguish this form of subsidy from the intended tuition fee subsidy usually 
provided to public universities. 
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For our exercises, and those reported in Piruna et al. (2008), we used the 
following formula for calculations of implicit subsidies.18
An implication of the above formula is that a loan package that takes longer to 
pay will result in a lower present value of repayment, and thus a higher subsidy, 
for all schemes except ILLUSTRATIVE2.19 This is an important issue for loan 
design and, as is shown below, it is a critical point with respect to whether 
or not it is possible to develop a workable income-contingent loan scheme for 
Thailand in circumstances in which debts are much higher than the low levels 
modelled here initially.
In what now follows, we present calculations of the implicit subsidy with 
respect to the collection of tuition fees for four possible income-contingent 
loan schemes for Thailand—described above and known as TICAL1, TICAL2, 
ILLUSTRATIVE1 and ILLUSTRATIVE2. The assumptions used in estimating the 
subsidies are as follows.
1. Real interest rates: zero for TICAL1 and TICAL2, as proposed for the 
original TICAL. A 25 per cent tuition surcharge with a zero real interest rate 
afterwards for ILLUSTRATIVE1, which is the same as is the case for HECS. 
A 3 per cent real rate of interest calculated from the beginning of the debt 
for ILLUSTRATIVE2, to represent a conventional method of covering the 
government’s cost of borrowing.
2. Discount rate for the present value calculations: 3 per cent per annum in 
real terms.20
18 Subsequently and fortunately, we ascertained that it is the same formula derived by Adrian Ziderman 
(2003).
19 As long as the nominal debts are paid in full using a real rate of interest equal to the discount rate (both 
are set at 3 per cent per annum for ILLUSTRATIVE2), this must result in implicit interest rate subsidies of zero.
20 The choice of discount rate is somewhat subjective, but can be justified with reference to some data. For 
example, in Australia from December 2001 to 2004, accountants used a 5.6 per cent nominal discount rate, 
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3. Full employment: the hypothetical graduates are assumed to be engaged in 
full-time year-round paid work. 
4. Tuition fee (initially): the tuition fee is set at B100 000 for a four-year 
undergraduate degree. This is approximately equal to the weighted average 
tuition fee of public and private universities in Thailand, and is equivalent 
to the tuition fee imposed in Piruna et al.’s (2008) exercises. This assumption 
is relaxed later.
As noted above, we approach the interest rate subsidy calculations with both 
OLS and truncated estimations, beginning with the former.
The Streams of Repayments and Interest Rate 
Subsidies: OLS
Using these assumptions and average earnings profiles predicted from the OLS 
coefficients, we are able to construct repayment streams under all four schemes. 
The annual payments are shown in Figures 11.5 and 11.6.
A critical reason that the repayment streams differ is that the first income 
repayment threshold for the two versions of TICAL is almost twice as high as is 
the case for the two versions of ILLUSTRATIVE. The very high first threshold 
means that under TICAL1 an average male does not start to repay the debt until 
he is twenty-six years old, and the non-payment period of an average female is 
even longer, with repayment not beginning until she is thirty-two years old. It 
is also worth noting that the presumed indexation arrangement for the former 
TICAL is very important to the timing of repayment streams, with the non-
indexed version resulting in repayments beginning three and six years earlier 
for males and females, respectively. A final obvious point is that the different 
forms of the real interest rate for ILLUSTRATIVE1 and ILLUSTRATIVE2 appear 
to deliver almost identical repayment streams. 
All the above points are broadly true for both males and females, with the main 
differences in the results lying in the timing of repayments. Because they earn 
lower incomes, females start to repay later with TICAL1 and TICAL2, and repay 
for longer and at lower rates with ILLUSTRATIVE1 and ILLUSTRATIVE2.
Table 11.6 reports the implicit subsidies associated with these streams of 
repayment in combination with the interest rate parameters of each of the 
schemes. 
and the average inflation rate was 2.3 per cent during that period, giving a real interest rate of 3.3 per cent 
per annum. Further, the real long-term bond rate is about the same as this. Piruna et al. (2008) also used a real 
rate of discount of 3 per cent.
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Male 31.54 26.20 2.03 0.01
Female 42.23 33.72 2.90 0.02
The major points with respect to the implicit subsidies from the four income-
contingent loan policies are
1. having a zero real rate of interest, in combination with very high first income 
repayment thresholds, results in the high implicit interest rate subsides for 
both TICAL1 and TICAL2—of about 30–40 per cent for the former, and 
25–34 per cent for the latter
2. while the TICAL subsidies can be considered high and reflective of less-
than-perfect design, it is worth recording that these subsidies are much less 
than those reported in Piruna et al. (2008) for the SLF—of about 60 per cent
3. it is clear that having a form of real rates of interest for ILLUSTRATIVE1 and 
ILLUSTRATIVE2 has a marked effect on calculations of subsidies compared 
with the two versions of TICAL
4. it is apparent that a 25 per cent surcharge with no further real interest rate 
adjustment (ILLUSTRATIVE1) delivers much the same implicit subsidies of 
about zero21 as having an ongoing real rate of interest of 3 per cent per 
annum22 (ILLUSTRATIVE2). 
These findings are an important part of our contribution. The results from the 
use of basic econometric techniques promote for discussion the advantages 
of an income-contingent loan with a relatively low first income threshold of 
repayment, and with some form of a real rate of interest. The approach adopted 
thus far, however, reveals only subsidies for the schemes at the means of the data 
by age and sex, since our method uses OLS earnings function results. We now 
move to consider the subsidies associated with the schemes for quite different 
lifetime earnings distributions.
21 The slight difference between the subsidies found for ILLUSTRATIVE2 and zero is the result only of a 
rounding error.
22 This is very close to the results found for the HECS system for public-sector undergraduates (Chapman 
and Lounkaew 2008).



























































































































11 . Income-Contingent Student Loans for Thailand
273
What now follows illustrates the streams of repayments and implicit subsidies of 
the three different lifetime earnings groups for both sexes illustrated in Figures 
11.3 and 11.4: high earners (Q75), median earners (Q50), and low earners (Q25).23 
Table 11.7 shows the implicit subsidies for males and females for each of the 
three lifetime earnings distributions for the four loan schemes.
Table 11.7 Implicit interest rate subsidies for low, median and high 









Male Q25 77 .42 43 .20 17 .40 0 .05
Q50 25 .23 23 .18 –0 .85 0 .00
Q75 18 .91 18 .38 –9 .01 0 .00
Average 40.52 28.25 2.51 0.01
Female Q25 100 .00* 100 .00* 58 .90* 53 .04*
Q50 42 .71 33 .42 1 .42 0 .02
Q75 20 .62 20 .62 –6 .92 0 .00
Average 54.44 51.35 17.80 17.69
An important aspect of the data from Table 11.7 needs to be explained, and this 
relates to the measure of the so-called ‘average’. The calculation is the average 
of the three cohort-specific implicit taxpayer-subsidy calculations and can be 
interpreted with the use of the following example with respect to the findings 
for males under the TICAL1 scheme.
The results suggest that if there are 100 men taking TICAL1 loans, about 33 of 
them will earn in the bottom third of graduate earnings for the period in which 
the loan is collected, and for this group the estimated subsidy is about 77 per 
cent; an important part of this subsidy can be attributed to the fact that when 
the retirement age is reached, the loan is not paid off in full (in nominal terms). 
There will also be 33 men in the top third of graduate earnings in the period in 
which the loan is collected and for this group the estimated subsidy is about 19 
per cent. Combined with the subsidy of about 25 per cent for the middle third 
of the male graduate earnings distribution, we can then calculate the (weighted) 
average for males as a whole under TICAL1. In this case, the answer is about 40 
per cent ([77 + 25 + 19]/3).
The strength of this calculation compared with the use of earnings data at 
the mean only is that it broadly takes into account the importance of subsidy 
differences across the earnings distribution. This must matter because income-
contingent loans require no repayments from debtors at the time that they 
experience low earnings, meaning that there are important asymmetries with 
23 The repayment streams data are available from the authors.
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respect to collection above and below the first (and later) income threshold 
at which repayments exist. Our method is necessarily more accurate than the 
estimates using OLS only. 
The major points with respect to the implicit subsidies from the four income-
contingent loan policies taking into account the earnings distributions are
1. in all cases—except for males in ILLUSTRATIVE1 and ILLUSTRATIVE2—
estimates of implicit interest rate subsidies are higher than is the case for the 
calculations done at the mean only
2. with TICAL1, the subsidies are now calculated to be about 40–55 per cent 
for males and females, which is not very different to the estimates from 
Piruna et al. (2008) for the SLF, of about 65 per cent
3. with TICAL2, the subsidy for males remains relatively low—about 28 per 
cent—but increases to more than 50 per cent for females
4. with both ILLUSTRATIVE schemes, the subsidies remain about zero for 
males—an interesting component of this result being that for males in the top 
third of the earnings distribution under ILLUSTRATIVE1, there is a negative 
subsidy of 9 per cent; this is because the 25 per cent surcharge on the debt 
represents an effective real rate of interest in excess of 3 per cent per annum
5. with both ILLUSTRATIVE schemes, the average subsidy for females 
increases to about 18 per cent, and this is due almost entirely to the fact that 
the subsidies for females in the bottom third of the earnings distribution are 
very large (59 and 53 per cent for ILLUSTRATIVE1 and ILLUSTRATIVE2, 
respectively). This important finding can be traced to the fact that a large 
proportion of women experiencing low earnings have unpaid debt at the 
end of their working lives and thus the end of their debt repayments—of 
about 45 per cent.
The final point above is critical to our understanding of the potential for having 
an efficacious income-contingent loan scheme for Thailand. It means that, 
with reasonable repayment parameters and a real rate of interest, there remain 
important subsidies associated with income-contingent loan schemes for some 
groups. This is because the lifetime earnings of some graduates are not sufficient 
to repay the debt in full, and this is traceable to the fact that Thailand’s per 
capita real incomes are relatively low when considered in an international 
context. This is unlike the situation in many countries with income-contingent 
loans such as Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.
The results of Table 11.7 imply that schemes with design arrangements similar 
to TICAL are associated with very considerable subsidies and their level might 
be such as to suggest that alternative income-contingent loan policies are more 
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appropriate. While the subsidies for schemes with forms of a real rate of interest 
and a much lower first income threshold of repayment are not insignificant, 
for the policy debate, it could be concluded that arrangements of this kind are 
acceptable with respect to taxpayer contributions. 
It needs to be recognised, however, that our subsidy calculations have been 
undertaken for a total tuition debt of B100 000, and it will certainly be the case 
that with higher charges—and thus higher debt—these subsidies will increase. 
This issue matters with respect to the coverage of an income-contingent loan 
for Thailand because outside the public sector, university tuition charges are 
generally and significantly higher.
Interest Rate Subsidies for Higher Debts 
The exercises reported above involve estimations of implicit subsidies from 
income-contingent loans of various forms for a total tuition charge of B100 000. 
While it can be argued that this is appropriate and typical for public-sector 
universities in Thailand, the story is different in the case of the private sector, 
where charges are much higher than this. 
Our best estimate of a typical tuition charge for the private sector is a total of 
about B350 000.24 Assuming an income-contingent loan facility is offered by the 
government to cover this charge, we are able to estimate the implicit subsidies 
associated with the four schemes. The calculations are presented in Table 11.8.
The main points from Table 11.8 are
1. with a much higher charge of B350 000, the implicit subsidies are higher for 
all four schemes, although the increases for TICAL1 and TICAL2—to between 
44 and 63 per cent—are not as high as the increases for ILLUSTRATIVE1 
and ILLUSTRATIVE2; this is due to the fact that both TICAL arrangements 
involve quite high collection rates (of up to 12 per cent of income) at higher 
levels of earnings
2. with the higher charge, there is now very little difference between the 
subsidies associated with TICAL1 and TICAL2 and those found for the SLF 
and reported in Piruna et al. (2008)
3. having a surcharge of 25 per cent on the loan and no real rate of interest 
after the debt is incurred (ILLUSTRATIVE1) is associated with quite high 
subsidies—of about 38 for males and 51 per cent for females
24 This is about the same as tuition fees for the undergraduate business program at Assumption University.
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4. even with an income-contingent loan with an ongoing real rate of interest of 
3 per cent per annum (ILLUSTRATIVE2), high charges are associated with 
important levels of subsidies—of about 17 per cent for males and 34 per 
cent for females.
Table 11.8 Implicit interest rate subsidies for low, median and high 








Male Q25 93 .55* 66 .38* 49 .29 50 .41*
Q50 40 .55 35 .72 35 .18 0 .00
Q75 30 .30 28 .47 30 .04 0 .00
Average 54.80 43.52 38.17 16.80
Female Q25 100 .00* 100 .00* 84 .33* 86 .58*
Q50 54 .28 45 .15 38 .08 16 .07*
Q75 36 .10 30 .62 31 .42 0 .00
Average 63.46 58.59 51.28 34.23
These findings are very important for Thailand’s higher education financing 
debate, since they imply that widespread reform of student loans, including their 
provision for relatively high-cost courses, is likely to involve sizeable taxpayer 
subsidies. We have not determined the possible overall costs for the government 
of broadly based coverage, and these might not be such as to undermine the 
basis for a universal income-contingent loan facility since we note that private 
universities apparently enrol about 15 per cent of all undergraduates (National 
Statistical Office 2006b).
On the other hand, the income-contingent loan schemes under consideration 
for our exercises have involved debts for tuition only. Since additional loans for 
income support would also seem to be a propitious aspect of higher education 
financing reform, the level of debts modelled, of B350 000, could well be 
required for the public sector as well.
Conclusion
There is an ongoing and very important debate in Thailand concerning higher 
education financing policy. For the 10 years prior to 2007, a traditional mortgage-
type loan—known as the Student Loans Fund (SLF)—was in operation, and, 
after this was suspended, a system very similar to the SLF was reintroduced 
in 2007. Piruna et al. (2008) analyse the SLF with respect to both taxpayer 
interest rate subsidies and graduate loan repayment hardships. As found also 
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by Ziderman (2003), it is clear that the SLF has very high interest rate subsidies 
and, consistent with this, it is associated with low repayment difficulties for 
former students.
The main contributions of this chapter are as follows. First, we present a 
comparison in conceptual terms of the costs and benefits of schemes such as 
the SLF with the other main alternative: income-contingent loans. Income-
contingent loans have advantages over mortgage-type loans in terms of providing 
insurance against both default and repayment hardships. A critical issue for 
this approach for many countries, however, concerns the efficacy of collection 
on the basis of a student’s future income stream—it being the case that quite 
sophisticated institutional mechanisms are required. It is unclear to us whether 
or not the Thai income tax and/or pension collection schemes are such as to 
make effective and operative the collection of an income-contingent loan.
Using the same data, econometric approaches and accounting methods as those 
employed by Piruna et al. (2008), we are able to estimate the implicit interest 
rate subsidies for four different income-contingent loan arrangements, differing 
importantly with respect to collection parameters and interest rate regimes. 
For the first time in analyses of the effects of income-contingent loans, we 
demonstrate that the use of averages provides misleadingly low estimates of 
the extent of interest rate subsidies. As well, it appears that schemes with high 
first income thresholds of collection, and without a real rate of interest, are 
associated with significant interest rate subsidies, and, for high debts, these 
subsidies are not very dissimilar to those estimated for the SLF.
Further, it is also apparent that, for relatively low levels of debt income, 
contingent-loan policies with relatively low first income thresholds of repayment 
and with real rates of interest can be designed to be workable for Thailand in 
an aggregate financial sense. As debt levels increase, however, so too do the 
interest rate subsidies, with an important part of this result being due to the fact 
that Thai graduate incomes per capita are just not high enough for many groups 
to be able to repay all the debt before they leave the labour force. 
Some important caveats are warranted. One is that we have not taken into 
account loan losses through poor collection outcomes, and this has the clear 
potential to reduce repayments and thus increase subsidies. Related to this is 
that graduate unemployment rates are quite high for the first several years after 
the completion of a university degree, and, from our calculations, with the SLF 
remain as high as 5 per cent even five years after labour-force participation 
begins. Taking this into account would necessarily increase subsidy estimates, 
and preliminary work in this area suggests that the figures would be about 5 
percentage points higher.
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Finally, it has to be stressed that our conclusions are derived on the basis of particular 
design rules concerning different income-contingent loan approaches, and this should 
matter very significantly to the debate concerning the efficacy of income-contingent 
loan approaches in Thailand. The important point is that subsidy calculations are 
very sensitive to choices concerning: the first income threshold of repayment; the 
proportions of income required for loan repayment; and real interest rates. The 
next step is to ascertain the extent to which our broad conclusions are reinforced or 
compromised with alternative loan design parameters.
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Appendix 11.1 
Table A11.1 Years-of-schooling model
Variable
Female Male
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
Schooling 0 .129** 138 .79 0 .112** 113 .58
Experience 0 .036** 34 .39 0 .037** 34 .60
Experience2/1000 –0 .1186** –5 .17 –0 .178** –8 .13
Constant 1 .692** 133 .93 1 .979** 164 .27
n 17 491 19 856
R2 0 .6146 0 .5436
* statistical significance at the 5 per cent level
** statistical significance at the 1 per cent level
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Table A11.2 Dummy variables and interaction terms model
Variable
Female Male
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
Experience 0 .063** 32 .34 0 .077** 47 .46
Experience2 –0 .001** –34 .55 –0 .001** –42 .79
Primary 0 .150** 3 .65 0 .146** 3 .83
Lower secondary 0 .254** 7 .28 0  .221** 5 .49
Upper secondary 0 .315** 9 .64 0 .350** 8 .33
Diploma 0 .577** 11 .79 0 .548** 9 .26
Undergraduate 0 .776** 28 .39 0 .859** 19 .37
Postgraduate 1 .025** 15 .95 1 .104** 11 .48
Experience*Primary/100 –0 .019** –4 .12 –0 .018** –4 .34
Experience2*Primary/10 000 0 .006** 4 .92 0 .007** 3 .58
Experience*LowerSecondary/100 –0 .023** –4 .79 –0 .018** –4 .14
Experience2*LowerSecondary/10 000 0 .810** 8 .31 0 .734** 9 .14
Experience*UpperSecondary/100 0 .008** 4 .14 0 .005** 3 .60
Experience2*UpperSecondary/10 000 –23 .351** –9 .11 –30 .058** –9 .39
Experience*Diploma/100 –0 .003** –4 .13 0 .023** 3 .90
Experience2*Diploma/10 000 0 .646** 4 .53 –0 .205** –1 .51
Experience*Undergraduate/100 –0 .009** –2 .66 –0 .025** –6 .08
Experience2*Undergraduate/10 000 0 .845** 10 .19 0 .822** 7 .70
Experience*Postgraduate/100 0 .026** 2 .31 0 .028* 1 .93
Experience2*Postgraduate/10 000 –0 .487** –1 .49 –0 .861** –2 .24
Constant 2 .860** 145 .93 2 .720** 155 .52
n 17 491 19 856
R2 0 .6146 0 .5106
* statistical significance at the 5 per cent level
** statistical significance at the 1 per cent level
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Table A11.3 Truncated OLS by income groups
Variable
Male Female
Q25 Q50 Q75 Q25 Q50 Q75
Constant 2 .5382** 2 .5804** 2 .6332** 2 .5621** 2 .6190** 2 .6571**
Educational 
attainment
Primary 0 .1117** 0 .1553** 0 .2443** 0 .0744** 0 .1154** 0 .1840**
Lower secondary 0 .2314** 0 .3002** 0 .4367** 0 .1857** 0 .2735** 0 .4003**
Upper secondary 0 .3874** 0 .5331** 0 .7328** 0 .3542** 0 .4740** 0 .6615**
Diploma 0 .6875** 0 .8419** 1 .0061** 0 .6610** 0 .8331** 1 .0663**
Undergraduate 0 .8647** 1 .0676** 1 .2960** 0 .8280** 0 .9467** 1 .1260**
Postgraduate 1 .7256** 1 .6819** 1 .5987** 1 .7043** 1 .8011** 1 .8186**
Experience
Experience 0 .0337** 0 .0454** 0 .0506** 0 .0253** 0 .0312** 0 .0354**
Experience2 –0 .0004** –0 .0005** –0 .0004** –0 .0003** –0 .0003** –0 .0002**
Undergrad*Exper 0 .0262** 0 .0196** 0 .0142** 0 .0266** 0 .0376** 0 .0389**
Undergrad*Exper2 0 .00001 –0 .0001 –0 .0004** 0 .0002** –0 .0003** –0 .0006**
Observations 19 856 17 491
R2 0 .2838 0 .3736 0 .4341 0 .3950 0 .4950 0 .5301
* statistical significance at the 5 per cent level
** statistical significance at the 1 per cent level

